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Introduction. 
 
The disciplines of Philosophy and Religious Studies contain a great deal of literature 
pertaining to the nature of reality, religious belief and God. This literature may be 
broadly divided into two categories, namely the rational or reasonable and the non-
rational or unreasonable. Both these categories, as well as the variables within these 
categories are often responded to as if they are self-evident entities that exist in and 
by themselves; for example: religious constructs, political institutions, nation states, 
cultural institutions and the contents of the electronic media. My purpose in this 
thesis is to argue that all these investigative frameworks and conceptual belief 
systems effectively follow a certain dynamic.  
 
I am arguing that this dynamic only occurs through the absence of God, which 
enables us to express our conceptual belief systems, as a function of our 
interdependent societies. The result of this is our continual creation of our own 
religion(s) and culture(s). Therefore, on the most elementary level I am arguing that 
the humanists1 are correct, and that our physical existence is ‘all there is.’ Therefore 
this thesis is a-theistic, although my definition of a-theism does not fall within the 
commonly accepted framework. 
 
Simultaneously, in what I admit is, on the face of it, a paradoxical position; I am also 
arguing that the metaphysical philosophers, theologians and mystics are correct. A 
rich tapestry of belief systems exist in a diverse variety of cultures and historical 
contexts, and have done so in varying degrees for several thousand years. The 
variables of these belief systems are certainly real, so long as we focus our intention 
on them. That is, these variables effectively act as tools that we utilise to create our 
conceptual reality; we express them as a function of us and these variables have no 
independent existence. Our aesthetic2 appetite reflects this behaviour today, with our 
appreciation of art, literature and music.  
 
From this position, (if I allow our aesthetic creations the same currency as our 
religious creations,) this thesis engages with what appears to be two opposing 
arguments. That is, the question emerges of whether we exist purely on the physical 
                                                 
1 I will discuss humanism in detail, later. 
2 I will deal with aestheticism in detail, later. 
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level, or whether there is another reality outside of our physical context, with one or 
many God(s) watching and sometimes ordering this physical context?  
 
My argument, (using a modified version of the Hegelian dialectic) is that both these 
positions are valid, if reality is broken into two orders. Within the context of this 
argument, ‘first-order’ reality is physical and nothing else. There are no external 
Gods, no non-physical truth, falsity, and no reference points. Only our physical 
context exists; this includes us, other living organisms and the physical 
consequences of our intentions within our physical context. 
 
In contrast to this, ‘second-order’ reality contains all of our conceptual reality. All of 
our laws, religions, cultures and languages are contained here. All of these variables 
are functions of us. We reference our physical context to project our intention both 
back onto it and into conceptual space, for the continual purpose of external 
referencing. These conceptual variables have traditionally been interdependently 
validated, and when validation caused conflicting intentions, the motivated physical 
consequences of these conflicting intentions occurred in war and genocide. That is, 
communities will in(ter)dependently discuss and validate concepts and motivations; 
the consequence of which will be played out in physical reality. 
 
This is evidenced in the manner in which we continually blur the boundaries between 
our physical and conceptual realities. Due to our technological evolution, we 
construct our cultures outside of (and in many cases in opposition to) our physical 
context; our conceptual systems are continually recycled, due to our primary concern 
with the variables of our belief systems, and not the method they operate in. In this 
thesis, I am investigating the method and dynamic our belief systems follow, and for 
this purpose I have categorised this thesis into four chapters.  
 
Firstly, I engage with the philosophical and theological arguments to outline the 
manner in which we form our conceptual reality. I then expand these arguments in 
the context of religious experience, where I argue that all religious experience is 
simply an attempt to fulfil our desire for singularity. 
 
Secondly, having argued for the complete absence of any external existent divinity, I 
examine the nihilism that I argue is ‘first-order’ non-physical reality, or divine space. I 
then outline my argument for an inverted form of kenosis; that is, the method with 
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which we ‘empty’ our conceptual selves into the absence. I then argue for an 
inversion of traditional arguments (such as Heidegger’s) for ‘Being’. 
 
Thirdly, having established the manner in which our conceptual reality occurs, I will 
demonstrate how we have become lost within the variables of these belief systems, 
and become devoid of reference points. I argue that we exist within a nexus, and that 
our current communication system dislocates us from our context, effectively 
transforming our ontology in a schizophrenic one.  
 
In the fourth chapter, I will demonstrate how a pluralist society could operate, (to 
lessen the damaging physical consequences of our conceptual realities); within a 
divine space that is the absence of God. I argue for the benefits of liminality, and 
show the dangers of homogenising a liminal or charismatic conceptual reality. I then 
draw an analogy between this type of pluralistic society and the manner in which both 
biological entities, and ecosystems operate.  
 
Finally, I conclude by reducing my argument back to the method and dynamic of our 
conceptual belief systems, which may only function within the ‘complete absence’ of 
any non-physical ‘first-order’ reality. 
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Chapter One. 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will engage a selection of philosophical and 
theological arguments regarding God and our conceptual reality. This selection 
makes absolutely no claims to be exhaustive, and assumes no hierarchical position. 
This will become apparent as my argument progresses. 
  
Most of the philosophical writing pertaining to concepts of God are rational and refer 
to arguments such as Anselm’s or Thomas Aquinas’ cosmological argument, Kalam’s 
ontological argument, or Paley’s teleological argument for the existence of god.3  
These hypotheses refer primarily to our observable physical reality. While some of 
these arguments allow for God, they do not argue that an experience of God is 
validation for God’s existence. 
 
Within Religious Studies there is a mixture of rational and non-rational (or 
theological) writing, particularly within the post-Christian context. William James4 has 
traditionally been a primary source for investigating religious experience and has 
been supported by the likes of Aldous Huxley5 to argue for the objective validity of 
religious experience. More recently, others such as Robert H. Sharf argue, “the term 
experience cannot make ostensible a something that exists in the world…. To put it 
another way, all attempts to signify “inner experience” are destine to remain “well-
meaning squirms that get us nowhere.””6   
 
Hans Penner has outlined two primary theories of religion within modern Religious 
Studies: “The first holds that religion… is rational and false…. entailing prepositional 
attitudes whose significance is not unique, special, or distinct from ordinary, natural 
language, thought, and action.”7 The “second…. claims that religion is not rational…. 
[and] neither true or false…. Nevertheless… religion is rich in symbolic significance.”8 
                                                 
3 http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/rossuk/existenc.htm  
4 The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature: being the Gifford lectures on natural 
religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902. 
5 In the introduction to The Perennial Philosophy, Huxley quotes ““Practice,” in the words of William 
James, “may change our theoretical horizon, and this is a twofold way” it may lead to new worlds and 
secure new powers. Knowledge we could never attain, remaining what we are, may be attainable in 
consequences of higher powers and a higher life, which we may morally achieve.”” P viii. 
6 Sharf, Robert. H. Experience. in Taylor, Mark C. ed. Critical Terms for Religious Studies. P113-114. 
7 Penner. Hans. H. “You don’t read a myth for information.” In Frankenberry, N. (ed.) Radical 
interpretation in Religion. p 153. 
8 Ibid. p 154. 
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I must state now that I agree entirely with Penner’s argument, which bears describing 
in more detail. 
 
My position, while agreeing entirely with Penner’s argument, is that his claims need 
more detailed analysis and critique, which is what I propose in this thesis. 
Penner references Victor Turner9 and Maurice Bloch10 to argue that ritual language 
and meaning has an inverse variation to normal language and meaning.11  
I want to argue that this is because ritual language has no physical representation 
(and thus is synchronic) and no objective/ external reality; instead, having an inter-
subjectively interpreted reality. For all intents and purposes it does not exist and 
describes nothing that exists, inverting normal language that describes ‘real’ 
existents be they ‘first-order’ or ‘second-order’.  
 
Penner argues “that if we want to understand the meaning of the language of 
religion, myth, and ritual, we must take it literally”12 and I would add, that by necessity 
we must accept its ‘second-order’ nature. If the ‘language of religion’ is to be taken 
literally, then obviously it must be (both diachronic and) contained within language. 
Therefore, it must have a physical referent (hence it must be dualistic) and cannot be 
singular. That is, there must be some conceptual method for referring to it, and hence 
it can only be a contextually specific human creation.  
 
While people may use ‘second-order’ conceptual creation to overlay or imbue a 
particular ‘first-order’ physical location with ‘sacrality’, this sacrality would not exist 
without the intentive focus of the conceptual creators of religious language. The only 
objectively comparable fact is the fact of its reality, with hagiographical details utilized 
purely to amplify intentional focus. God(s), martyrs and (super) heroes are easier to 
believe in and feel supported by if they are super-human; if they are saints then they 
are more than ‘normally human’. 
Penner uses the Theravada Buddhist tradition as an example of “an Indian 
production if ever there was one, with (the Buddha displaying) all the marks of a 
                                                 
9 In particular (on P 155 of this work), Turner’s The Forest of Symbols, where ritual is defined as 
“prescribed formal behavior(sic) for occasions not given over to technological routine, having 
reference to beliefs in mystical beings or powers.” p 19. 
10 (On p 155-156 of this work) Bloch’s “Symbol, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation” in 
Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 15 (1974) p 56 states “we can say that logic depends on the 
flexibility of the features of articulation in language and if there is no such flexibility there can be no 
argument, no logic, no explanation, and in one sense of the word no semantics.” 
11 Penner. Hans. H. “You don’t read a myth for information.” In Frankenberry, N. Radical 
interpretation in Religion. p 156 
12 Ibid. p 157. 
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superhuman being, comparable to what we find in the myths of Moses, Jesus, 
Krishna, and Muhammad.”13 The exact variable details are peripheral to the central 
mythic meaning, which may be exaggerated as required in order to create a suitably 
inspiring external reference/meaning, primarily to motivate physical consequences 
/actions. Therefore the physical reality of religious claims is conceptually unimportant, 
hence the observably reality is ignored, which I believes leads us into romantic 
interpretations of religion, dislocated from their context. 
 
If the basis of these ‘Romantic’ interpretations of religion is non-rational14 this 
presents a twofold question. The first questions how religion justifies itself as mimetic 
of objectively non-existent happenings? While this is subjectively irrelevant, it is 
certainly pertinent when we remember that all religions, as functions of humanity, are 
firmly planted in a physical context.  
 
Of far greater difficulty (using Christianity for a test case) is the question asked by 
Penner of whether:  
 
the Bible (is) false or an “ingenious lie” from cover to cover?… Trapped by the 
evidence of their own scientific research, the Romantics produced a revolution whose 
effects persist in our time. Rather than face the stark conclusion of their own scientific 
practice, they placed religion outside the domain of rationality, raising it to a “higher” 
level of meaning, a symbolic value “beyond” truth and falsity.15  
 
I argue that if the Romantics had faced their own conclusion (that religious claims 
cannot be empirically validated), religious institutions may have been allowed far 
greater freedom and far less bloodshed could have resulted. Without the priority of 
finding a recourse to absolute truth and hence a path to hegemonic power, religious 
institutions could have concentrated further on religious expressions as our human 
function, and less on the respective goals of our religious traditions. For while the 
Romantics solved their own problem with a short-term solution, they did nothing for 
the continuing investigation of religious practice and this solution may explain the 
continued imperialist attitude to other non-rational religious practices we continue to 
consume. 
                                                 
13 Ibid. p 159. 
14 Here Penner refers to Jonathon Z. Smith’s To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual and Levi-
Strauss’s The Savage Mind in order to illustrate the twofold problem the Romantics faced in 
formulating a religious theory. p 161-162. 
15 Ibid. p 162-163. 
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 As Penner states: “The test of religion, therefore, was not “is it true to nature?” but “is 
it true to itself?”…. God as creator is the original poet. The world is God’s poem. 
Religion and art are a second creation, a second nature, a “heterocosm.””16 If I may 
insert my interpretation of God here, that ‘God’ is the name for a nihilistic non-
existent ‘first-order’ sacred space, then my thesis perfectly supports this theory. Our 
‘second nature’ ‘heterocosm’ allows us to subjectively create and interpret the lack of 
‘first-order’ divine existents, and to interpret our physical world and the forces within 
it.  
 
Penner supports “the basic definition of religion that Tylor, Spiro, and Lawson, among 
others, have defended:”17 This contains three criteria:  
 
Religion is a communal system of propositional attitudes and practices related to 
superhuman agents. 
A myth is a story with a beginning, middle, and end which was or is transmitted orally 
about the deeds of superhuman agents. 
Ritual is a system of communal actions consisting of both verbal and non-verbal 
interactions with a superhuman agent or agents.18(Italics in quotation) 
 
Penner concludes by stating that once we can understand the difference “between 
sentence meaning and sentence use… between language and speech, the 
synchronic and the diachronic…. We will also understand that the best explanation of 
the meaning of religion begins by taking its sentences literally.”19  
 
However, if one applies the Hegelian dialectic to this concept, I believe a more 
useable conclusion arises. If the meaning of a sentence is to be taken literally with no 
objective truth or falsity, then two poles arise. One, the synchronic, occurring 
simultaneously, illustrates the subjective nature of experience. I am arguing that this 
is the connection between two people, using language as a common frame of 
reference, distinct from any context. This is a difficult argument to make, since we 
cannot speak of it due to its singular nature, that is, its lack of referent with its 
contextual dislocation. I must reiterate that the people involved are certainly still 
contextual, but that the subjective connection made, is not.  
                                                 
16 Ibid. p 163. 
17 Ibid. p 168-169. 
18 Ibid. p 169. 
19 Ibid. p 170. 
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 That is, the ‘subjective connection’ has occurred within ‘language as a common 
frame of reference’; yet this connection bears no relation to the content of the 
language. I am arguing that this connection occurs within physical ‘first-order’ reality 
and is a function of our biological selves. In an aesthetic manner, I am arguing that 
the connection occurs in the same way as other animals have nonverbal 
communication. However, since we have become dislocated from our physical 
context, we utilise language to accomplish this same function. As I have stated 
previously this is a very difficult argument to make, and as such is supposition. 
However this thesis proceeds from the supposition that it appears to be a valid 
argument, and at the very least one worth investigating in detail. 
 
The other pole, the diachronic, occurs in a linear manner and allows a subject’s 
history to develop within rational language; it may be empirically validated. There is 
not the connection (say between two people in a verbal discourse) and there may be 
a plethora of interpretations, all of which will be subjectively true. However, with its 
connection to context it may be inter-subjectively investigated. 
 
I also argue that while the diachronic may occur within empirical constraints it 
contains no more truth or falsity than the synchronic. Neither can claim a superior 
position, yet the diachronic may be constrained and ordered for transmission to 
others. Any ‘meanings’, intentional or otherwise, are thus passed along. While one 
may empirically validate the existence of the message, the details of it are no more 
verifiable than those of the synchronic message.  
 
That is, if we compare and contrast the synchronic and the diachronic for practical 
purposes; we find their meaning equally subjective. Wayne Proudfoot, suggests a 
perceptual judgement of subjective religiosity, arguing “that an experience is religious 
only if the interpreter understands it in those terms or if the agent does so herself.”20 
It is most important to emphasise that these experiences are certainly not hoaxes.  
Rather they are the fulfilment of deep-rooted desires, for connection, for singularity or 
non-duality. These experiences do not rise from the why/how of these desires, but 
are rather an expression of them. That is, one has to express these desires in the 
same context as the religious experience in order to enjoy the religious experience. If 
                                                 
20 Godlove. Terry. F. “Saving Belief.” In Frankenberry, N. (ed.) Radical interpretation in Religion. p 
20. 
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one is hostile to the desire it seems extremely unlikely that one will experience the 
expression of it.  
 
While there can be no objective method for investigating this argument, once the 
dynamics of the Laing’s nexus21 and religious belief in general are understood, it 
appears to be valid. Thomas Lawson argues in a similar vein, “people’s intuitive 
knowledge of agents and their actions… undergirds religious concepts about 
culturally postulated superhuman agents.”22 When these ‘superhuman agents’ are 
viewed through a Feuerbachian23 filter, this ‘intuitive knowledge’ has to be humanly 
projected consciousness.  
 
Cognitive scientists Justin Barrett and Frank Keil suggest, “people systematically 
misremember the properties of gods.”24 This activity is then transmitted (or projected) 
to others hence the wide variety of attributes each god may display, even within the 
same context. “When required to remember certain features of the stories that they 
had been told, the subjects misremembered the properties of the gods in an 
anthropomorphic direction. Such anthropomorphic representations are standard fare 
across religious systems.”25
 
That these transformations do not reduce the efficacy of the god(s) cannot be over 
emphasised. The misremembered qualities (or properties) act in the same manner as 
the original qualities, yet they are (in some cases) completely different. “Religious 
concepts are…. around because they are more likely to be acquired than other 
variants.”26 That is, the contextual belief creates and maintains the god(s) and all 
derivations of the god(s); since all such things are by nature ‘second-order’, the 
variables simply fit within the context of the expressed desires. 
 
Cognitive anthropologist, Harvey Whitehouse, argues that frequent activation of a 
religious notion, or mnemonic instillation through (McCauley and Lawson’s term of) 
                                                 
21 I will discuss the nexus in detail, later.  
22 Lawson, Thomas. E. “On interpreting the world religiously.” In Frankenberry, N. (ed.) Radical 
interpretation in Religion. p 117. 
23 Feuerbach argues that “when religion – consciousness of God – is designated as the self-
consciousness of man… ignorance of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion.” Feuerbach, 
Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. p 13. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. p 119-120. 
26 Functional Origins of Religious Concepts: Ontological and Strategic Selection in Evolved Minds † 
Pascal Boyer: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/bec/papers/boyer_ religious_concepts.htm 
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‘sensory pageantry’ is required for it to take root in a religious system.27 Whitehouse 
also argues that emotional stimulation is critical if one is to remember a set of 
religious practices.28 Hence it would seem no coincidence that drugs and ecstatic 
ritualistic experiences such as chanting creeds, have gone hand in hand with 
religious practice for a very long time. 
 
It must be emphasised that ‘psychedelic agents’ are by no means the only (or safest) 
method to experience and express religious desires. “In many cultures other methods 
are used: fasting (water and food); flagellation and self-torture; sensory deprivation; 
breathing exercises and yogic meditation; and ritual dancing and drumming.”29 All 
these have a similar effect on our function by altering our perceptive filters, and while 
they may not be as appealing as the immediate access provided by ‘chemical 
stimulation’, they will instead allow us to express religious desires, yet without the 
long term damaging effects of ‘psychedelic agents’. I will engage non-chemical 
‘altered perception’ later in this thesis with regards to socially constructed liminality 
and crisis. 
  
For the present, instead of adding my voice to one of these very well supported 
arguments, I intend to take another perspective. The primary thrust of my argument 
is that, regardless of context, a certain creational dynamic is constant, when 
investigated with an eye for (sub)conscious religious conceptual creation.  
This is not a reductionist critique of the variables of the creational dynamic but rather 
an investigation into the method this dynamic operates in. The variables are as 
unimportant as the contexts. This may sound contradictory and epistemologically 
weak, but since our language creates our non-physical reality, this non-physical 
reality is (as Wittgenstein elucidates) entirely contextual.  
 
Creational dynamic. 
 
Therefore the philosophical foundation for this argument is essentially a reductionist 
version of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with the view that: 
 
Objects are simple (P.T.L.P. 2.02)…. [and] make up the substance of the world. 
That is why they cannot be composite (P.T.L.P. 2.021)…. The substance of the 
                                                 
27 Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. p 125. 
28 Ibid. p 126. 
29 Harner. Michael. J. (ed.) Hallucinogens and Shamanism. From introduction by Harner. p xii. 
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world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by 
means of propositions that material properties are represented – only by the 
configuration of objects that they are produced. (P.T.L.P. 2.0231)30
 
These simple objects have ‘no kind of composition’ and are empirically unobservable. 
What is more they are permanent and unchanging. The only change possible is the 
myriad of combinations they are able to form, combinations which may also cease to 
exist.31 Within this argument, truth becomes a faith claim, as does the argument 
itself; since any attempt to describe either brings us to a tautology. If our language 
(and consequently our reality) creates/interprets our truth through ‘simple objects that 
have ‘no kind of composition’’, then the only referential point we have for truth is the 
concept of truth itself, making it the previously mentioned tautology. 
 
These ‘simple objects’ are our most basic elements of reality, since they are 
indivisible and therefore nothing can comprise them. They can ‘only determine a 
form’ in order to represent material reality, in the form of contingent combinations all 
which remain unobservable.  
 
As Norman Malcolm states: 
 
A possible configuration (of simple objects) is a possible state of affairs (in the 
world); an actual configuration is an actual state of affairs…. The Tractatus 
employs the metaphor of a space surrounding an object as an image of the 
object’s possible combinations with other objects. ‘Each thing, as it were, in a 
space of possible states of affairs. [This space I can imagine empty, but I 
cannot imagine the thing without the space, omitted in Malcolm] ’ (T, 2.013).32
 
As Wittgenstein has shown, if all objects can be reduced to ‘simple objects with no 
form’, then neither the synchronic or the diachronic have any preferential claim for 
hierarchical validation. All that has occurred within the diachronic is that a snapshot 
of the synchronic has been observed and connected to context, and thus to historical 
narrative, usually through the use of printed media.  
Therefore the ‘space’ assumes prior importance to the ‘object’, even though both 
have ‘no kind of composition’, for we could not observe the object without the space. 
While the concepts and variables may be contradictory, the same dynamic applies. It 
                                                 
30 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Prototractatus: An early version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. p 47. 
31 Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein: A religious point of view? p 29. 
32 Ibid. p 30. 
 13
is the interpretation (of our physical context or previously created concepts), and the 
subsequent creation and projection of our new non-physical created concepts that is 
in action here. When this argument is applied to monotheistic religious truth, we can 
see the maintenance of the respective institutions. I will argue that the only truth we 
may experience is contained within the physical laws of cause and effect and will 
demonstrate that our entire conceptual reality (including our inter-subjective 
interpretations of objectivity and truth) is contextually created within our language.  
 
It must be noted at the outset that the theological and revelatory claims of various 
religions are outside the context of this thesis. There is no objective method to 
determining the validity of competing claims, and as will become clear, if the 
subject(s)/object(s) of such claims bear any reality; it is impossible to speak of them. 
That is, as I will illustrate further, for a claim to be revelatory, it must refer to God or 
the divine.  
 
Yet, in order for that to occur, we require a real world reference for language to use in 
explanation. This therefore relegates God to our dualistic world, and it is no longer 
divine if the language is used in a literal manner and expectation. Yet I am not 
negating the existence of God. I am merely arguing that if such an entity exists, we 
may not speak of it. With this in mind, I will investigate some monotheistic claims, in 
an attempt to show the similarity these theological claims bear to the institutional 
structure(s) making them. I will concentrate on the practical method of religious belief 
and illustrate what I argue is an underlying dynamic. 
 
Charles Guigon helps in this task, with an understanding of what Heidegger calls “the 
hermeneutic circle”. Guigon argues:  
 
it is only because life has this circular structure that things can show up as 
counting in determinate ways…. The claim is that truth as correspondence, 
through which entities are “un-covered” or “dis-covered” in specific ways, is 
made possible by a prior “dis-closing” that opens a space in which anything 
at all can show up as such and such.33  
So if we treat the ‘objects’ or ‘truths’ as elements of language (since language allows 
us to discuss our individual realities), then without the ‘space’ they would be unable 
to form any ‘configurations’, or have the potential to form future ‘configurations’. 
                                                 
33 Guigon, Charles. “Truth in Interpretation: A Hermeneutic Approach.” in Krausz, Michael. (ed.) Is 
there a single right interpretation? p 270. 
 14
Therefore, these objects with ‘no kind of composition’ engage in possible or actual 
configurations respectively, within a metaphorical space to allow for further 
possibilities. Consequently the ‘objects’, the possible or actual configurations, and the 
‘space’ are all unobservable. This unobservable ‘space’ is the necessary condition for 
the reality of all unobservable ‘objects’ within it. 
 
Norman Malcolm furthers this argument by stating that with “the conception of all 
objects, we are conceiving of the totality of the possible states of affairs…‘the form of 
the world’. It consists of every possible state of affairs…. The possibilities that exist 
are facts. The possibilities that do not exist are still possibilities.”34 Therefore our 
facts bear ‘no kind of composition’ and are unobservable. Consequently, I am 
arguing that ‘the form of the world’, being the ‘totality of the possible states of affairs’, 
also bears ‘no kind of composition’ and is unobservable.  
 
Richard Rorty (in subscribing to a form of Prometheanism35) appears to support this 
from a slightly different perspective, arguing, “that there are lots of descriptions of the 
world. Some more useful and some less, but none that match the way the world 
independently is.”36 Obviously Rorty and Wittgenstein are speaking of two 
conceptually separate worlds, a difference that is worth expanding. Rorty’s world is 
the physical context in which we exist. It is impossible to ‘independently describe’ this 
world; the best we can do is to attempt a ‘useful description’.  
 
So, although we physically exist in this world, we can only glimpse its (and 
consequently our) existence independently of our conceptual framework. However, 
this (and our) physical existence would still occur with or without the reality of 
Wittgenstein’s world. The only difference is that we would have no means to discuss 
it, and arguably no understanding of it since we would be within the context, stripped 
of our self-reflexivity, due to our lack of language. 
 
Wittgenstein speaks of unobservable ‘objects’ combining in actual or possible 
possibilities, with ‘the form of the world’ being the ‘totality of the possible states of 
affairs’. Therefore the world of Wittgenstein’s reality is contained completely within 
                                                 
34 Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein: A religious point of view? p 30. 
35 Rorty claims that “Prometheanism is not a matter of claiming superior causal power. It is a claim 
about authority rather than about power – namely, the claim that the non-human things that have power 
over us (vultures, comets, and the like) have no authority over us.” in Krausz, Michael. (ed.) Is there a 
single right interpretation? p 131. 
36 Rorty, Richard. “Response to Kate Soper.” In Krausz, Michael (ed.) Is there a single right 
interpretation? p 131.  
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language, with anything outside of this context being both non-existent and unreal 
since it is not possible to form a possible or actual possibility.  
 
Investigative categories for the ‘world’. 
 
Arguments regarding the nature of the world split people into two broad categories, 
with the structuralists/materialists and behaviourists on one side and the holists, 
dualists and holistic dualists on the other. Acknowledging the importance of accurate 
terminology (in order to understand the exact specifications of each position), a quick 
review of each definition is appropriate.  
 
Behaviourism has three primary claims, which it perceives as offering the complete 
truth.37 Following the discipline of psychology (interpreted in this context as the 
science of behaviour and not the mind), behaviourists argue that “(t)he sources of 
behaviour are external (in the environment), not internal (in the mind).  
In the course of theory development in psychology, if, somehow, mental terms or 
concepts are deployed in describing or explaining behavior [sic] then either (a) these 
terms or concepts should be eliminated and replaced by behavioral [sic] terms, or (b) 
they can and should be translated or paraphrased into behavioral [sic] concepts.”38
 
Materialism offers a rather blunt view as to what actually exists.39 It should be noted 
here, that I base my ‘first-order’ reality squarely within the materialist context. 
Basically “materialism is an ontological, or a metaphysical view…. the view that 
everything that exists is extended in space, that nothing nonspatial exists.”40 While 
materialism allows for temporal extension, [that is, for something to exist over time 
but not in space] it simultaneously acknowledges that when speaking of “physical 
space or physical extension…. the threat of conceptual circularity is transparent.”41
 
Therefore, even if a materialist would strongly oppose me, materialism fits my 
argument perfectly within the context of this thesis. There is one proviso within this 
position; namely that, I will exchange the term “existence” for the term “reality” when 
speaking of persistence over time while not in space.  
                                                 
37 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ 
38 Ibid.  
39 http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/materialism.html 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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 At this point I should make clear I also argue that the holist, dualist and holistic 
dualist positions fit within the context of my ‘second-order’ reality, even though they 
too may strongly oppose this assertion. I will clarify this argument with the conclusion 
of these positions. 
 
A comparison should be made here to Descartes’ distinction between physical body 
(that he suggested should be studied by the methods of natural science) and the 
mind/soul (to be studied by introspection).42 The two subsequent major philosophical 
schools; structuralists and behaviourists, respectively believed that consciousness 
should be analysed into basic elements, or attributed exclusively to behaviour, 
denying the mind completely.43  
 
If the Hegelian dialectic is applied once again, we have the structuralists (analysing 
the basic elements of mind) and the behaviourists (denying the mind completely and 
attributing consciousness to behaviour) in opposing positions. If we apply the ‘first-
order’ and ‘second-order’ classification, we have two dimensions to this synthesis.  
 
‘First-order’ reality must favour the behaviourists, for there can be no empirical 
validation of mind. We can measure biochemical variations in the brain, but are no 
more able to quantify consciousness than we are able to quantify god(s).  
 
‘Second-order’ reality obviously favours the structuralists, but I am arguing that it is a 
mistake to attempt to quantify these qualities. Aspects of mind may be investigated 
through introspection, as Descartes suggested and certain patterns are sure to 
emerge, yet these patterns are still empirically non-existent. 
 
Holism is argued as the thesis that the state of the whole is more than the some of 
its parts, while also being inseparable from its parts. 44 Therefore the relation 
between the whole and its parts needs clarification.  
The Holist Philosopher, Keith Ward attempts to clarify this, with his concept of a 
person as analogous to a soul that “has the ability to ‘stand outside physical 
processes that generate it, and of which it is a part.’”45 Ward adds, “it is only when 
                                                 
42 Capra, Fritjof. The turning point: science, society, and the rising culture. p 166. 
43 Ibid. 
44 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-holism/ 
45 Ward, Keith. In Defence of the Soul. p 31 Quoting Ward 142ff. 
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perception is conceived of in terms of a purely mental or intellectual phenomena, that 
the whole of the human being’s conscious or mental life comes to be seen as 
possibly played out within some inner sphere.”46
 
If this is the case, then it must strengthen my argument that we create meaning from 
our perceptual interpretations. I argue further that our subjective experiences of the 
deit(y)(ies) are created within this internal sphere in symbiosis (or modified Hegelian 
dialectic) with our external contextual reality. Yet even as our experience occurs 
within this internal sphere, it projects out into conceptual reality and onto physical 
reality. While this subjective experience may be either synchronic or diachronic, that 
is, singular or dualistic, it is only the diachronic experience that we may speak of. 
Therefore, within the context of this thesis, language claims contain the whole of our 
observable conceptual experience. The meaning we create in this experience is 
subjectively real, and others may experience this meaning consciously or 
subconsciously.  
 
Ward suggests adopting a phenomenological approach to the soul47 since it acts in 
processes that transcend strict physical realisation. This concept contradicts the 
behaviourists, who “deny the idea that there is something inner, behind behaviour, 
since, for them, the mind lies in behaviour.”48  
 
Dualism separates our internal and external spheres, and provides a context for the 
discussion of observations and claims. Dualism (at least within Abrahamic 
Monotheism) also allows a hierarchical schema with God at the peak, and us 
beneath. It is important to note that dualistic claims are no more valid than any other 
categorical claims, for even if we are able to separate inner and outer spheres, our 
validity is achieved interdependently within our internal spheres. Thus our value 
judgements can still be flawed.  
 
Gillian McCulloch gives an example of ‘flawed judgements’ by describing the ‘true’ 
created contexts (and the associated ‘first-order’ physical consequences) that 
occurred because Aquinas followed Aristotle’s ‘faulty biology’ (in thinking females 
were defective males49). Consequently Aquinas reasoned that the women’s 
                                                 
46 Ibid. p 33. 
47 Ibid. p 34. 
48 Ibid. 
49 McCulloch, Gillian. The deconstruction of dualism in theology. p 17. 
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‘defective’ natures caused defective reasoning. Therefore “the continued association 
of matter with impurity, chaos and disorder meant that Aristotle devalued the body in 
relation to the mind, while Plato did likewise in relation to the soul.”50 Consequently 
Plato’s conceptual devaluation of the physical body required women to live as 
second-class citizens due to their procreative abilities and their connection to 
physical reality instead of the ‘superior’ spiritual reality. 
 
The subsequent “biblical theme expressing female submission to male headship”51 
dogmatised this concept and paved the way for a patriarchal social structure. While 
recognising the obvious resultant social problems from this phenomenon, McCulloch 
argues, “dualism does not necessarily entail patriarchy…. [and] need not function 
oppressively… [or] lend support to a sexist, racist, or anti-environmental ideology.52
 
While this is obviously correct, the fact remains that while dualism ‘need not’ act in 
this way, in many cases it ‘does’ function oppressively. My primary argument is 
against the creation of a ‘second-order’ external deity to allow and in many cases 
require a fundamentalist reading of this dualism. These dogmatised concepts are 
given as ‘truth’ when they are nothing more than fictions.  
 
An example of this dualism in action occurs within “(e)soteric cosmologies that 
reckon with a hierarchically structured set of spiritually evolved beings…. If a God is 
invoked, he/she/it is often presented in the most abstract of terms, perhaps as the 
Ground of Being…. Between this shadowy deity and humans stand a variety of 
beings.”53 For the purposes of my argument, the ‘variety of beings’ is a collective 
function of us, forming a pluralistic interdependent universe, within the dualistic 
investigative framework. This is borne out if we return to a Feuerbachian perspective.  
 
I am arguing that we are the shadowy deity, the projected subconscious reflection of 
ourselves (or aspects of ourselves) as ‘Other’. The ‘variety of beings’ reflects our 
qualitative desires, and are worshipped and idolised as paths to, and characteristics 
of this ‘Other’. Joining with the (projected) ‘Other’ dislocates us from our context, as 
aspects of our conscious become connected to our projection.  
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. p 21. 
52 Ibid. p 22. 
53 Hammer, Olav. Claiming Knowledge. p 14. 
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This ‘joining with our projected ‘Other’’ has historically implied a “Gnosticizing 
conception of the self.54 It is common to posit that we have within us a spiritual or 
higher self… sharply distinguished from the ego… our personality whilst in a state of 
ordinary consciousness.”55 Traditionally (surrounding Plotinus, Clement and Origen) 
Gnosis allowed a privileged few to access ‘direct spiritual understanding’, “thereby 
allowing access to the inner meaning of a religious tradition….in which material 
existence is condemned as irredeemably dark and evil in contrast to a spiritual realm 
of purity, goodness and light. Gnosis, then, is the means to release oneself from the 
bondage of matter to a state of beatitude.”56
 
If one accepts dualism (and therefore Gnosis) as a function of reasoning, then surely 
reasoning must have created dualism. Fontaine outlines two aspects of dualism, 
horizontal and vertical, within the context of gnosis:  
 
(M)etaphysical dualism… is essentially different from and opposed to the nether, 
material world, the cosmos. This is horizontal dualism. Next there is anthropological 
dualism, one between the elect, the chosen, the redeemed, the Gnostic pneumatics, 
and the hylics, the matter people, who will not be saved, this is a vertical dualism, but 
only present in the nether world.57  
 
While these forms of dualism are useful tools for investigating (both existent and non-
existent) conceptual frameworks, it should not be forgotten that the entire context is 
fictional as are the debates on its existence. Since language contains our whole 
conceptual reality, and language is dualistic (that is, we need a common frame of 
reference of two or more examples to discuss theories, or else we end up with a 
collection of un-provable tautologies,) any claims outside our dualistic context are 
non-sense.  
 
Yet dualistic claims are still observable projections and nothing more. The only reality 
these dualisms enjoy is that which we provide. Once we grasp the dualistic “fact that 
in practice icons are… found with indices or symbols…. [we see that] what is 
                                                 
54 It is footnoted that Gnosticizing is not to be understood as a synonym of Gnostic, in the historic 
sense… but in a more general meaning, as a complex of ideas…that flourished around the Eastern 
Mediterranean during the first centuries CE. 
55 Hammer, Olav. Claiming Knowledge. p 55. 
56 Batchelor, Stephen. The Awakening Of The West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western Culture. 
p 28. 
57 Fontaine, P.F.M. The light and the dark : a cultural history of dualism. p xxxv-xxvi. 
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important semiotically is the manner in which the sign functions for the interpreter.”58 
Therefore the interpreter must interpret/create a semiotic function in their internal 
universe, which is inter-subjectively interpreted/created, reproduced and/or imagined 
within communal contexts. Thus dualism provides the context for this inter-subjective 
validation, which is still ‘second-order’.  
 
For without this ‘semiotic function’, the sign has no meaning, and simply “is”. There 
appear to be two methods for assigning meaning to a sign. The first, “(r)eproductive 
imagination might be correlated with “imitation,” while productive imagination might 
be linked with “creativity.””59   
 
Holistic Dualism argues that since the sign cannot be separated into its functions, 
(being the ‘signifying’ and ‘signified’ aspects,) it has a dual or complementary 
nature.60 If we are to understand the symbolic function of the sign, then we need 
more symbols with ‘inseparable functions’ in order to understand it.61 The problem 
here is that this also arguably sets us up for a continuous cycle of tautology. That is, 
we cannot delve into any the nature of the sign in any great depth, and must instead 
rely on other signs for comparison. This problem means that we can never 
investigate any of our signs, (even the ones used for comparison), which leaves us 
with the previously mentioned tautology. However, “we can [still] understand that a 
concept is in fact a highly dynamic and holistic property.”62
 
The dualistic debate therefore centres on the need for some type of ‘bridge’ between 
the internal and external world, which is required to investigate the inseparable 
nature of what is perceived as separated aspects of the sign, or in this case the 
human. “While in dualism this divide is held to be an ontological fact, in materialism it 
is a methodological fact.”63
 
The need for this ‘bridge between the inner and outer world’ shows the limited nature 
of our language and thus our reality. It must be reiterated that only our understanding 
of reality is limited, for (even if much of our reality is our projected intention) this 
reality occurs with or without our understanding. The lack of agreement within this 
                                                 
58 Ibid. p 53. 
59 Desmond, William. Art, Origins, Otherness. p 67. 
60 http://nats-www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/~joseph/dis/dis/node31.html 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 McCulloch, Gillian. The deconstruction of dualism in theology. p 29. 
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debate illustrates our perspectival interpretation of our context and ourselves. The 
primary problem appears to be the importance of existent variables for 
epistemological analysis. However, if, as the Holist argues ‘the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts’ then this ‘wholeness’ is comprised of both existent and non-
existent variables (from a ‘first-order’ perspective). 
 
Therefore, by applying a modified version of the Hegelian dialectic to synthesise a 
workable conceptual schema, I suggest a thesis comprising of behaviourism and 
materialism/structuralism and an antithesis of dualism, holism and holistic dualism. 
The thesis (of behaviourism and materialism/structuralism) argues that only physical 
entities exist and that all behavioural sources lie in the external world. The antithesis 
(of dualism, holism and holistic dualism) argues that the whole is more than the sum 
of its parts and those concepts bear a dualistic relationship between signifier and 
signified64. Therefore the synthesis of these two positions must combine to form a 
new position and I am arguing for my proposed synthesis to achieve this while 
simultaneously leaving each position intact. 
 
The materialistic argument that only physical things exist is perfectly functional when 
one considers that non-physical things do not exist. Things do not need to exist in 
order to be real, as we are able to (collectively) project our consciousness (or 
conceptual reality) into the space left by the absence of physical existence. Emily 
Brady follows a ‘loosely Kantian’ model to support this argument and suggests, “the 
aesthetic response to natural objects begins with perceptual exploration of the 
aesthetic object.”65 Without our ‘perceptual exploration’, the ‘aesthetic object’ would 
simply “be”, thus it is our projection of consciousness for the purposes of 
interpretation that allows this aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic reality. This 
“perceptual attentiveness is ultimately linked to imagination…. [which] encourages a 
variety of possible perceptual perspectives on a single natural object or a set of 
objects, thereby expanding and enriching appreciation.”66
 
To distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate imaginings, Brady “suggest[s] 
two guidelines: the first is disinterestedness; while the second is characterized by 
comparing imagination to a virtue…. Disinterestedness checks any thoughts or 
                                                 
64 I will advance the relationship between signifier and signified elsewhere in this thesis. Suffice it to 
say that I am arguing against the existence of such a relationship but for the reality of it. 
65 Brady, Emily. “Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature.” In Carlson, Allen & 
Berleant, Arnold. (eds.) The aesthetics of natural environments. p 160. 
66 Ibid. p 161. 
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imaginings that stray from an aesthetic focus…. “Imagining well” involves spotting 
aesthetic potential, having a sense of what to look for, and knowing when to clip the 
wings of imagination.”67  
 
If this argument is applied to a religious context, it illustrates my argument for the 
non-existence of divinity, or more precisely for divine non-existence. Without this 
‘divine non-existence’ (since our religious constructs do not exist) these religious 
constructs would have no reality, for they require space if we are to project their 
conceptual reality.  
 
The conceptual spatial requirements of religious belief are also apparent within the 
field of aesthetics, since “(n)o set of criteria can adequately spell out what makes for 
good art”68. This same method is used by religious texts to direct “imagining well” to 
the contextually correct location and to ‘clip the wings of imagination’ when they stray 
too far from it. This focus is important and “it is no accident that religious zealots 
often destroy the worship places of their opponents.”69  
 
Yet tradition initiated and maintains this dependence, through the appropriate primary 
texts with humanity following it (within our respective contexts). The obvious 
alternative I am suggesting is an internally initiated experience contained within the 
‘absence of everything’. This alternative dynamic operates following the same 
method, but people are consciously engaged in the practice instead of following a 
fictional ‘truth’. As we evolve, we realise that what we took as objective truth is purely 
subjective fiction. We realise that it is only first order a-theism that allows us to be 
gods and goddesses, enjoying ‘second-order’ powers of creation.  
 
Brent Plate illustrates this “intimate entanglement between ‘function’ and structure”70 
with his investigation into the aesthetics of Walter Benjamin, who argues that: 
 
(p)eople across various cultures may share the physiological capacity for 
vision….In other words, aesthetics are… always a combination of the 
aesthetica naturalis and the aesthetica artificialis, the senses and their 
                                                 
67 Ibid. p 165-166. 
68 Brown, Frank, Burch. Good taste, bad taste, and Christian taste: aesthetics in religious life. p 157. 
69 Ibid. p 211. 
70 Plate, Brent. Walter Benjamin, religion and aesthetics: rethinking religion through the arts. p 137.  
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cultural construction, including (perhaps especially so) the role that art and 
architecture play.71
 
The only reducible constant is the occurrence of meaning; the variables are as 
diverse as their contextual religions and cultures. A practical example of this 
‘constructed contextual belief’ is the science of cartography, where “(w)e avoid the 
literal in making maps because to do otherwise would not be to represent at all but to 
replicate.”72 If replication were used in map reading, then we could not overlay any of 
our contextual data. This represented data achieves verification “by fitting 
representations to reality.”73  
 
Consequently there may be (with further exploration/ settlement) a wide variety of 
maps (showing details from geology to weather and even traffic volume) for the same 
geographical location depending on the requirements of the user, which are validated 
accordingly.74 This contextual validation affirms my reasoning for separating reality 
into the two categories, ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’, which I will outline with a 
return to Rorty and Wittgenstein.  
 
‘First-order’ and ‘second-order’ reality. 
 
The world Richard Rorty speaks of is ‘first order’ since it contains all of our ‘natural’75 
physical reality, including our physical selves and our empirically observable 
existence, independent of ourselves. Yet we are part of this physical context, even if 
we may only glimpse the true nature of this context and consequently our true nature.  
The only method we have of collectively investigating this reality is (‘second-order’) 
language; therefore language contains our collective observable reality. If something 
cannot be described, then it does not exist from our perspective, which is all we have 
to work with: “Inquiry and justification are activities we language-users cannot help 
engaging in; we do not need a goal called ‘truth’ to help us do so, any more than our 
digestive organs need a goal called health to set them to work.”76
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Gaddis, John Lewis. The landscape of history: how historians map the past. p 32.  
73 Ibid. p 34. 
74 Ibid. 
75 I am not implying any sacrality to the term natural, but using it purely to illustrate that it was not 
created by humanity. Humanly created physical objects are both ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’, since 
the materials used in construction are ‘first-order’, but the completed object is ‘second-order’ owing to 
its human input. 
76 Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and social hope. p 37-38. 
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 Any truth will be no more than a conceptual by-product of our existence, for if all our 
non-physical concepts are created fictions (taken as fact) then so is ‘truth’. Rorty 
argued that we cannot speak of a “connection between justification and truth”77since 
“the only point in contrasting the true with the merely justified is to contrast a possible 
future with the actual present.”(Italics in quote)78 Even when this action is undertaken 
it is still provisional truth, yet is given as permanent truth by those who espouse it. 
Our whole existence is a fluidly created fiction, with the only (non-physical) meaning 
existing within a ‘second-order’ context. 
 
The world Wittgenstein refers to is ‘second-order’ and contains our conceptual 
creations, hence it is a purely human realm79 utilising our self-reflexivity to shape our 
world. To clarify, I am arguing that all non-physical ‘second-order’ reality is entirely 
dependent on human consciousness, and that all physical ‘first-order’ consequences 
(such as our technological80 achievements,) are interdependent on us due to the 
reciprocal relationship between the physical nature of the raw materials that our 
concepts require, and our concepts. That is, these physical consequences of our 
creative intention (or ‘first-order’ consequences of our ‘second-order’ reality) have 
their own physical existence, but their function is interdependent on us.  
 
If we were not self-reflexive, there would be no physical consequences of our 
creative intention. To clarify, I mean by this that while we can argue that our base 
physical desires are an expression of our intention, they, like us, occur within our 
physical context. That is, they are not framed in ignorance or opposition to our 
physical context.  
 
As I have argued, (following Wittgenstein) our language determines our reality and 
since all religious entities (or ultimate truths) are maintained within (oral or textual) 
language; they are human creations, responses in an effort to fulfil the human desire 
for singularity. For example, if we play a semantic game, we can see that our reality 
is dislocated from our physical context, and only maintained within our language. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. p 38-39. 
78 Ibid. p 39. 
79 While it is possible other inhabitants of this or other worlds may possess self-reflexivity it is 
irrelevant to this thesis. My interest is religious praxis and the creation of our gods, societies and 
cultures. 
80 I define technology as any means by which humanity has altered our context through the use of tools, 
no matter how rudimentary they may be. The scale of this use is unimportant, for once the practice is 
implemented we appear to evolve exponentially, as history has shown. 
 25
Laing’s semantic example accurately outlines this argument. “The sky is blue and 
blue is not sky” 81, allows for existence and non-existence to both enjoy linguistic 
reality. ”‘Is’ describes (‘first-order’) ‘Being’ and ‘non-Being’, or existence and non-
existence perfectly. While ‘is’ is the qualifying necessity for all existents (and non-
existents), none of these existents can independently qualify ‘is’.82  
 
Yet obviously, as Rorty would (seem) to argue, both the sky and the colour blue exist 
independently of us, and we may only interpret them through language, forming our 
referential base. Semantically then, “‘(i)s’ as no-thing, is that whereby all things are. 
And the condition of the possibility of anything being at all, is that it is in relation to 
that which it is not.”83 The interconnectedness of existents and non-existents (both 
independent of and dependent on our language) is important. Without “that which it is 
not” we could not project “that which it is”, even though this “is” remains simply a 
human projection.  
 
So, without “‘is’ as no-thing” there could be no relationality between ‘first-order’ 
physical existents, and no relationality between ‘second-order’ non-existents. In a 
religious sense then, “(t)he experience of being the actual medium for a continual 
process of creation takes one… into the very mystery of that continual flip of 
nonbeing into being…when one makes the transition from being afraid of nothing, to 
the realisation that there is nothing to fear.”84
 
The only possible non-physical aspects of fear are created in the mind of the 
experiencer and projected into “that which it is not”; therefore while these aspects are 
real they do not exist. There can be nothing (non-physical and) external to fear and 
once people become aware of this; they must consciously choose the emotional 
state of fear if they are to ‘be’ scared. This seems an unlikely and non-productive 
choice. The same dynamic operates whether the contextual hegemony is one of 
realisation or one of fear. “We seem to need to share a communal meaning to human 
existence, to give with others a common sense to the world, to maintain a 
consensus.”85
 
                                                 
81 Laing, R.D. The politics of experience. p 35-36. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. p 36. 
85 Ibid. p 65. 
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While it is pointless to argue against an external God, since it is impossible to support 
the argument within language and thus reach a ‘consensus’, what is possible is to 
show that all qualities attached to religious traditions are human creations. I am 
arguing that it is only with the ‘complete absence’ of any quantitative divinity that this 
is possible.  While this is a nihilistic concept, I argue that this absence equals a form 
of negative divinity. That is, the absence of any divinity allows our conceptual 
creations. 
 
Gianni Vattimo argues that “the [metaphysical] non-existence of God…. in no sense 
gives way to a more profound and reliable truth; it gives way to a play of 
interpretations that is presented philosophically, in its turn, as no more than an 
interpretation.”86 That this ‘interpretation’ is accepted as ‘truth’ is precisely my point. 
We condition ourselves (through our projected external referencing) to believe and 
consequently accept these ‘fables’ and various religious and philosophical 
interpretations as ‘truth’. Effectively we are projecting our contextual conceptual 
myths into the ‘complete absence’, to self-express our desires as a function of our 
selves. This self-expression is realised through our conceptual projections and 
observed through the physical consequences of these projections.  
 
Nietzsche, who supported this idea argued “that what we call the ‘world’ is not a 
reality which is independent of our own historical schemes, but rather a game of 
interpretations…. because the very limits between the subject and object have 
become opaque.”87 Further to this, I am arguing that while the ‘world’ is located 
within our historical context, what most of us perceive of, as ‘our world’, is completely 
dislocated. I will pursue this argument in detail in the section on the information 
stream. Consequently my argument is for a reality that is externally referenced (both 
micro and macro cosmically); i.e. individually, provincially, ethnically88, societally, 
glocally or globally (with any amount of conceptual interdependence).  
 
This externally referenced reality is then internally justified89 interdependently of the 
communal context (through contextual language). Edwina Taborsky expands this 
argument by “understanding that life is experienced within two realities, that of the 
                                                 
86 Vattimo, Gianni. Beyond Interpretation. p 7. 
87 Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. p 2. (Introduction by Luca D’Isanto.) 
88 This may be either existentially biologically or non-existentially conceptually. For the purposes of 
this argument there is no difference. 
89 I must reiterate again that there is very little internal justification within our society, owing our 
schizophrenic ontology. 
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individual and that of the group…. Individual reality (IR)…exists only in current 
time…. [and] (g)roup reality (GR)…is made up of the pattern of social norms.”90 
Therefore, reality is individually interpreted/created and communally validated, to a 
varying degree. That is, some contexts allow rather less individual 
interpretation/creation than others. 
 
This argument, which relies on the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Charles 
Peirce suggests that from our human perspective,  “‘things’ are the immediate 
sensual experience, ‘intellect’ or ‘passive intellect’ is the individual conception, and 
‘sense’ or ‘active/agent intellect’ is that group logic that moves between the two and 
unites them.”91 Richard Rorty appears to agree with this level of interdependence 
and argues that “a believer who is (unlike a child or a psychotic) a fully fledged 
member of her community will always be able to produce justification for most of her 
beliefs, justification which meets the demands of that community.”92 If we approach 
theological claims with this in mind, we see that certain details appear important. As 
Martin Jaffe illustrates: 
 
elective monotheism[‘s]… structure[s] must be distilled from the mythic narratives and 
liturgical life that shape these communities’ historical identities…. The unique Creator 
of the world discloses his love and will in a unique moment of self-disclosure to a 
unique human community…. [and] the community embarks on a collective endeavor 
[sic] of obedient response to the Creator’s love and will.93
 
Since we have to distil monotheistic structure from “mythic narratives and liturgical 
life” (even if Jaffe is not saying the self-disclosure itself is mythic), this ‘self-
disclosure’ effectively becomes ours (making us unique) within the mythic context of 
revelation, since (as both the theologian and the philosopher must agree) no 
language can contain such a disclosure. Therefore all historical revelation becomes 
the community’s (contextually unique) responses to this mythic ‘self-disclosure’ 
(which serves to fulfil our desire for ‘self-disclosure’), hence the respective institution 
maintains its (unique) position, by allowing the continued ‘transmission’ of ‘revelation’ 
only by the reading of its specific historical responses (or desire fulfilment). 
 
                                                 
90 Taborsky, Edwina. The Textual Society. p 3. 
91 Ibid. p 5. 
92 Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and social hope. p 37. 
93 Jaffe, Martin. S. “One God, One Revelation, One People: On the Symbolic Structure of Elective 
Monotheism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Dec 2001. Vol. 69. No 4. p 760. 
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In many cases (such as monotheistic truth) these may be oppositional conceptual 
belief systems. For example the God of Christianity and the God of Islam are both 
claimed to be the one true God. Within Christianity, God created the heavens and the 
earth, sending his only Son (fully human and fully divine) to save humanity. Within 
Islam there is “no God but God”94, and all non-believers are in error. While these 
belief systems are oppositional in nature the manner in which these systems evolve 
and act is constant, that is, they follow the same dynamic. It is only the variables that 
alter.  
 
I must reinforce that it is not the conceptual systems that are constant, but rather the 
fact that these systems continue to be real, through the inverted ‘self disclosure’ (or 
an inverted kenosis95) creating a construct to satisfy the contextual belief of the 
participants. Even if some monotheism’s (such as Islam) subjectively oppose this 
claim, it is still my subjective argument for the dynamic of religious belief. A return to 
Jaffe illustrates this further. “Cosmologically, the Creator’s self-disclosure spans the 
distance between heaven, the abode of the Creator, and earth, the domain of his 
created beings. It unites, that is, various cosmological domains into a single order 
under the Creator”96 supporting the hierarchical structuring of the monotheistic 
framework.  
 
By attaching categorical qualities to the Creator and physical qualities to spiritual 
locations, the ‘unique community’ creates the concept of distance between heaven 
(the abode of the Creator) and earth (the abode of the ‘unique community’). This 
hierarchical structure is replicated as the ‘unique community’, which assumes a 
hierarchical position in relation to the other communities, while certain members of 
the ‘unique community’ assume a ‘hierarchically unique position’, namely as clergy.  
 
One possible consequence of the removal of hierarchical power structures is the 
“(l)iberation from domination….by rich over poor, powerful over weak… both within 
society and between nations.”97 That this hierarchical attitude is finally being exposed 
is gratifying. However, like any tabula rasa the opportunity is now even more present 
for hierarchical manipulation, since there is no fixed record of domination. Thus 
                                                 
94 The witness to faith (shahada) consists of repeating the two phrases “There is no god but God,” la 
ilah illa ‘llah, and “Muhammad is the messenger of God,” Muhammad rasul Allah. Rippin, Andrew. 
Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Pratices. Second edition. p 98. 
95 I will expand this term later in this thesis.  
96 Jaffe, Martin. S. “One God, One Revelation, One People: On the Symbolic Structure of Elective 
Monotheism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Dec 2001. Vol. 69. No 4. p 761.  
97 Harman, Willis W. Creative work: the constructive role of business in transforming society. p 75. 
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unless we are aware of the dynamic, we may not notice the manipulation of the 
variables.  
 
The (very generalised) current societal structure defines the mainstream’s 
domination over marginalized elements (through either ethnicity/culture or religion), 
either within or between societies as ‘normal’.98 Willis Harman denoted two areas of 
change,99 namely in our perception of the natural world (or ‘first-order’ physical 
reality) and within the (‘second-order’) societally or institutionally ‘normal’ motivation 
for us to pollute and destroy this natural habitat.100 This is another prime example of 
‘second-order’ ignorance of ‘first-order’ consequences. The question remains 
whether intuitive awareness of the hierarchical fictions that condition our lives is 
enough; since awareness and acting out of awareness to alter these fictions are two 
different things. 
 
Harman also looks to human community as a context for practical contributory 
democracy.101 People can no longer live on ‘autopilot’ and subconsciously externally 
reference their conceptual lives. They must become aware and responsible for their 
actions and beliefs, if this is to occur. Thus “intentional living”102 is of paramount 
importance, illustrating “the vast potential that our humanity gives us as a birthright – 
an emphasis which behaviorism(sp), with its more positivistic outlook, tended to 
ignore.”103  
If we become aware of our conditioning (allowing us the choice of either acceptance 
or negation) we become aware of our theoretical concepts and the associated 
consequences. Therefore my argument has a partial grounding in existentialism 
(“embracing the view that the suffering individual must create meaning in an 
unknowable, chaotic, and seemingly empty universe”104), which I use to argue that 
while not everyone is able to undertake this practice, those that are should provide 
impetus for those that are not.  
 
Harman infers that historical authority has always been based on “a basically 
negative view of human nature which assumes that for the stability of society, 
                                                 
98 Ibid. p 76. 
99 Ibid. p 77. 
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101 Ibid. p 83. 
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103 Ibid. p 85. 
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humans need to be controlled by some sort of external authorities.”105 These external 
authorities may be installed hierarchically within society, may have an imperialistically 
hierarchical dominance over other societies, or may be externally religious 
authoritarian displays of some deific nature. Regardless of the variables within the 
method, the same dynamic applies.  
 
The acquiescence of the mainstream to those in power (either within society or 
between societies) has long been evident.106  While Willis uses ‘fair and ethical’ as a 
proviso to such subsistence, I would add the word “seem.” If every one of us is acting 
in some manner and our external (collective) reality differs from our internal reality, I 
argue that in this hierarchical society the primary attitude is one of gaining and 
maintaining power. Therefore the ‘mainstream’ is conditioned with suitable 
propaganda in order to achieve those goals. If this is applied to a religious context, 
then the clergy assume this hierarchically unique position. 
 
With the removal of ‘this hierarchically unique’ institution, the primary text assumes 
this position, and the replication acts to strengthen the respective institution through 
history. That is, the power structure remains, but is referenced against a text, (which 
can be contextually interpreted in a variety of ways) maintaining the historical 
continuity of the institution(s). The knowledge that each community may only respond 
to self-disclosure allows us to see the hierarchical framework as simply a response to 
our desire for singularity and therefore the unique community as an amplified 
response. Regardless of whether divine ‘self-disclosure’ actually occurs, language 
can not describe such a disclosure and thus all revelatory claims are either mythic 
interpretations or pure creations, depending on the reality or non-reality of the 
Creator as such. While it may be argued that language may limit ‘self-disclosure’, I 
must disagree with this position.  
 
To limit something language must occupy the same context, which I have argued 
against with my argument for our inability to speak of singularity. Therefore, within 
the context of my argument, all monotheism is effectively humanism, since it is the 
history of human responses at a certain point in time.  
 
While this thesis is both reductionist and non-reductionist it is not arguing for a cross-
cultural religious experience. There is very little if any cross-cultural common ground 
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between the myriad of religious and/or mystical experiences present today. Rather, 
what occur are syncretic responses and readings to suit the claim being made. 
Instead of arguing for a reductive religious experience, I locate my position within the 
fact107 of experience, however varied it may be.  
 
Contextual religious claims. 
 
A return to Olav Hammer’s study on ‘post enlightenment esotericism’ is important here, as he 
deduced the emergence of four categorical approaches when investigating “religious 
traditions that one does not share”.108 The first is the sceptical approach, the second is the 
theological, the third is hermeneutical and the fourth is analytic.109 This is because any real 
analysis is “entirely dependent on social and historical context. Their claims are human 
construction and it is therefore relevant to ask how, by whom and for what purposes these 
claims are produced, legitimized, disseminated and reproduced.”110 This is supported with the 
recurring theme in New Age texts of the existence of a core or true Self. The post modern 
appropriation of shamanic techniques and the creation of pastiche111 interpretations of Indian 
philosophies are all part of the attempt to bring out that core self behind the veil of the false 
ego.112 This fits with my argument as another example of ‘second-order’ creation. 
 
Hammer notes that “it [is] feasible to disembed elements of Indian, Chinese or Native 
American origin”113 within the information stream of modern mass communication, “and 
reembed them in a Western context, thereby giving these elements new functions and new 
meanings.”114 Where previously this action would be limited to neighbouring localities, it is 
now possible to transpose these concepts into any context. 
 
One 18th Century case study outlining the fluidic modification that practices undergo with 
contextual shifts is Mesmerism and the changes that it underwent with its transmission to 
America. Franz Mesmer, an Austrian physician claimed in the 1770’s that every illness “is 
ultimately caused by an imbalance in the animal magnetism that flows through the human 
body.”115 Mesmer’s healing rituals focussed on provoking an interpretation of a crisis, which 
                                                 
107 As I will illustrate later, I take all non-physical ‘facts’ to be fictional from a ‘first-order’ perspective. 
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was then followed by a cure. The success of this practice earned him a great deal of renown 
together with many disciples, through which the tradition began to evolve. 
 
The first evolution or innovation to Mesmer’s practices occurred in 1784, when one disciple, 
the Marquis de Puysegur “surmised that Mesmer’s cures were due to an altered state of 
consciousness, which he called magnetic sleep or somnambulism, and discovered that this 
state could involve a much wider range of phenomena.”116
This ‘wider range of phenomena’, which included mind reading ability, hearing voices and 
messages from ‘spirit beings’, evolved and “formed the core of a proto-spiritualist culture.”117 
Whether these were the purely subconscious creations of practitioners, or subconscious 
transmissions between practitioners and ‘patients’ is to my mind irrelevant. The fact that 
differing results were available speaks to the subconscious creation or interpretation of 
individual reality. There was and is no external reality save that projected by humans, a 
concept that is borne out with contextual shifts in the Mesmerist tradition.  
 
The first contextual shift occurred from Austria into Germany which “was an especially 
fertile environment for….  the more spectacular aspects of mesmerism [that] went hand in 
hand with a fascination for the supernatural, and led to an interest in “spontaneous” cases of 
prophetic revelation.”118 Thus, with a nod to Feuerbach, the increased expectation and 
appetite for different phenomena allowed the human consciousness to deliver as required. 
That is, once the concept (of ‘prophetic revelation’) was created, it was projected as an 
inverted kenosis (into the sublime space) and then reabsorbed, a practice still apparent today 
within the current inter-societal nexus. 
 
By 1836 Mesmerism had reached America, with “(o)ne of the marquis de Puysegur’s pupils, 
Charles Poyen (teaching)…. literally hundreds of people the techniques of mesmerism.”119 
While some students followed the traditional methods of practice, others responded to this 
new contextual shift by transforming “mesmerism into a uniquely American family of 
religious traditions. One of Poyen’s many apprentices… Phineas Parkhurst Quimby…. 
transformed it into an eminently practical recipe for health, happiness and prosperity.”120  
That is, this new physical location transformed Mesmerism into a secular ‘practical recipe for 
health’ leaving ‘prophetic revelation’ behind.  
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This transformation could only occur within the individualistic climate of early 19th Century 
America, a climate that bears a strong correlation to the atomised climate of today. This loose 
interdependence allows for more conceptual fluidity in opposition to static or dogmatic 
institutionalised structures.  
 
While “(c)onflicting religious claims tend to undermine each religion’s central claim to be a 
vehicle for expressing ultimate reality”,121 this is only true from an objective perspective. If 
we realise these claims as a purely contextual method for achieving a certain subjective 
ontology, the practical aspects of these claims are true. The qualitative aspects are purely 
contextual and objectively irrelevant. The experience is of paramount importance and esoteric 
traditions gain some qualitative authenticity by appropriating elements from currently or 
previously existing cultures.122
 
This appropriation follows four distinct historical stages. “First, travel narratives are 
published…. [Second c]reative spokespersons steeped in the Esoteric tradition…transform 
them…. (t)hen come the first do-it-yourself books…. [and finally] reinterpretation and change 
soon transforms the originally exotic text into an organic part of the new context.”123  
 
This illustrates the cyclic nature of consumerism that we (and others) use to create our 
commodities for our consumption. That is: in the first stage, liminal parties (in this case travel 
writers (and not the hordes of tourists who follow)) externally reference the new experience; 
in the second stage we consume the new experience and project our ‘dislocated’ 
representation of it for mass consumption; in the third stage the masses consume and 
externally reference against this dislocated experience; and finally the experience is 
homogenised within the mass context. 
 
So to reduce this dynamic, we externally reference, to project, to consume and reference in 
order to fulfil our immediate desires. However, as Frederick Jameson argues in detail in 
chapter 3, “only a limited number of combinations are possible”.124 We appear to be 
exhausting our supply of ‘Other’ experiences with our assimilation of them along with their 
cultural aspects, since (for the most part) we do not enter the original context, but rather 
modify it for our context and then wonder why it does not work satisfactorily. We are the 
problem. 
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 Hammer shows how we normally apply this dynamic within our context, arguing that 
“(k)nowledge of social life is used in the conscious construction of self-identity…. In 
practically every area of life, there are competing theories on how one “should” act and 
think.”125 Within the information stream consumers may desire any simulated social life they 
wish. No longer is our external referencing limited to our immediate context, forming our 
identity from the moment we are born; it is now possible to desire and identify with aspects of 
any society that is deemed suitable.  
 
The important point is whether this suitability is actively chosen or passively accepted. It 
appears that within the nexus of mass media, the (productively imagined) ‘uniqueness’ of the 
opportunity initiates our desire. This may then be maintained by controlling the flow of (the 
reproductively imagined) consumer goods, in this case, ‘spiritual’ paraphernalia such as the 
“(e)soteric literature [that] abounds in descriptions of how to transform oneself in various 
ways in order to become a healthier, happier and more spiritual person.”126  
 
Within today’s society these ‘descriptions’ usually prescribe the purchase of certain intentive 
tools purchased from the local New Age supplier. These mass produced ‘spiritual tools’ form 
a “(v)irtual culture (that) realizes Nietzsche’s vision of a world in which every ostensible 
transcendental signified is apprehended as a signifier caught in an endless labyrinth of 
signifiers…. When there is nothing beyond the sign, image is all. Height, depth, and 
interiority collapse in an infinite play of surfaces. In the midst of this superficiality, nothing 
remains profound.”127
 
While this reflects the marketed religious paraphernalia of dogmatic religions, we must 
remember that this paraphernalia remains unnecessary. If the practitioner consciously realised 
that these tools were superficial and purely for the focus of intention, their purchase would be 
unnecessary. One could use any tool and construct one’s own religious framework 
accordingly. We can once again reduce the problem to our ignorance of the dynamic in action 
and our focus on the variables. That is, we focus on the specific tools and not on the method 
we use them to inspire in us.  
 
‘Contextualists’ such as Steven T. Katz have suggested, “that every [religious] experience is 
inevitably structured by and expressed in the symbolism and language of the culture within 
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which the mystic lives.”128 This, they argue proves that “a context-free “pure” mystical 
experience”129 is impossible. Conversely ‘decontextualists’ such as Robert Forman claim 
“there are transcultural experiences that are interpreted differently in different cultural 
settings.”130  
 
I am arguing that both are correct, again by utilising the Hegelian dialectic. If the 
‘decontextualist’ occupies the (nihilistic) ‘first-order’ position, it is this space that allows the 
projection of the inverted kenosis.  From the ‘contextualist’ ‘second-order’ position a ‘context 
free mystical experience’ is impossible, since this experience is a function of humanity and it 
is impossible to speak of escaping our context.  
 
Therefore the synthesis of these two positions collapses again into one, with both being valid 
when observed from differing perspectives. The constructive basics of religious experience 
are “that one presents the narrative of the experiencer as well as his or her framework of 
interpretation.”131 If the experience itself is of paramount importance then the ‘trimmings’ are 
only peripherally important, (providing an experiential context) especially considering the 
objective non-existence of the religious experience. 
 
When transferred to the textual consumerism of today’s New Age religious practices, “it is 
particularly important to note that these positive Others, who serve as reference groups in 
shaping one’s interpretation of experience, can be the physically and temporally distant 
Others of a printed text.”132 Thus one may purchase a connection to these ‘Others’ and the 
tools to the experience. No longer is faith required in any truly divine sense, just creation and 
actualisation through intention. The New Age has simply stripped the dynamic out of 
religious belief and marketed the method to extreme advantage. Therefore, I am arguing that 
the New Age is the commodified realisation that religion and religious belief are simply acts 
of production and consumption. 
 
Linda Woodhead is useful here as she takes a different line, and argues that “(a)t the deepest 
and most general level…New Spirituality/New Age….attacks all forms of dualism… 
regarding them as disguised hierarchies. Its ideal is ‘connectedness’ or ‘wholeness’, a state 
where everything is on a level, nothing and no-one is higher than any other, and where ideally 
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all real differences have been abolished. There can be no God above us, not a tradition which 
has authority over us.”133   
 
Religious experience as a function of humanity. 
 
Woodhead’s argument is a flawed one, for without dualism there is no means for referencing 
and discussing either ‘connectedness’ or ‘wholeness’, and we certainly cannot speak of any 
conceptual ‘Other’, since we have no reference. The consequence of negating dualism is 
apparent in today’s societal nexus. While there is no problem negating a hierarchical dualism 
with a ‘God above us’, there is no way to escape contrasting our (individual and collective) 
internal and external worlds.  
We may still assume a holistic position (acknowledging our internal and external spheres), 
but there is no practical method to describe ‘singularity’ as long as we conduct rational 
thought.  We must accept all liminal cases and religious experience as functions of humanity. 
 
One 20th Century example supporting this theory, that all phenomena are humanly 
constructed, is the work of Edgar Cayce, who “(a)t the age of six or seven…could sometimes 
see visions, occasionally talking to relatives who had recently died.”134 Cayce is also said to 
have had an interesting version of a photographic memory, and “could sleep on his school 
books and acquire a photographic memory of their entire contents”,135a claim that one could 
best describe as dubious. However it was Cayce’s self-hypnosis experiments that were of 
most interest. “At the age of twenty-one, Cayce developed a gradual paralysis of the throat 
which led to the loss of his voice. When doctors were unable to determine the cause of this 
condition, Cayce attempted to find an alternative treatment and tried hypnosis.”136
 
In 1900 a travelling hypnotist “Hart, the Laugh King” visited Edgar Cayce’s home town “and 
offered to try an experiment in an attempt to help the young man. In the first session, Hart 
hypnotized Cayce and…. (t)o the amazement of everyone present, Edgar responded to any 
question asked of him in a normal voice. However, he would not take a post-hypnotic 
suggestion, and the laryngitis returned when Hart awakened him.”137
 
                                                 
133 Woodhead, Linda. “Post-Christian Spiritualities.” In Religion. (1993) 23, April. p 174. 
134 http://www.edgarcayce.org/edgar-cayce2.html 
135 Ibid. 
136 Hammer, Olav. Claiming Knowledge. p 66. 
137 http://www.edgarcayce.org/edgar-cayce2.html 
 37
Cayce’s next step was to put himself to sleep with the aid of another local man Al Layne 
(who asked the self-hypnotised Cayce questions). Cayce then explained “that the condition 
could be removed by suggesting to him while in the unconscious state that the blood 
circulation increase to the affected areas. After Layne made the suggestion, he and Cayce's 
family watched in amazement as the upper part of Edgar's chest and his throat turned a bright 
crimson red and the skin became warm to the touch.” Twenty minutes later Cayce asked for 
the suggestion that “the blood circulation return to normal “138before he was woken. “When 
Cayce finally awakened, he was able to speak normally for the first time in almost a year. The 
date, March 31, 1901, marked the first time Edgar Cayce would give a psychic reading.”139
 
There would appear to be two possibilities to this scenario. The first and most obvious is that 
Cayce faked the whole thing and was basically fraudulent. This seems rather unlikely given 
the “approximately one dozen biographies and more than 300 titles that discuss various 
aspects of this man’s life and work.”140 The second is that he subconsciously lost and 
regained his voice, gaining in the process the tools to interpret and suggest remedies for 
illnesses, both his and others, in some non-verbal fashion. Supporting this “on file at the 
Association for Research and Enlightenment, Inc. (A.R.E.)... are copies of more than 14,000 
of Edgar Cayce’s readings”,141 not to mention a website (that provided this information) 
dedicated to him. 
 
While some of Cayce’s details appear hagiographical, (namely that he could sleep with books 
and remember the contents) it does seems reasonable to argue (within the context of ‘second-
order’ or non-physical reality), that he received his information “from essentially two sources: 
1) the subconscious mind of the individual for whom he was giving the reading; and, 2) an 
etheric source of information, called the “Akashic records,” which is apparently some kind of 
universal database for every thought, word, or deed that has ever transpired in the earth.”142
 
This second source is not as improbable as it might seem, even without getting into the 
creation of fictional or mythic realities. If our religions work by utilizing a nexus of 
productive (creative) and reproductive (consuming) hegemonies, then on one level every 
‘productive utterance’ simultaneously ‘creates’ intention, thereby ‘2)’ from the above 
contains the total sum of ‘1)’. That is, since our religions are a function of humanity, and (at 
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least within monotheism) are taken as ‘truth’, then for all intents and purposes they are 
produced (created) and reproduced (consumed) as such.  
 
The claim that these ‘Akashic records’ go back to the start of time is quite problematic and I 
would argue, is evidence of the hagiographical literature that succeeds Cayce. However, in 
the context of his readings it still seems reasonable. If we follow the same pattern of 
reference, consume, project and reference, as was previously illustrated in the ‘commodified 
realisation’ of the New Age; then a record of utterances could certainly persist for as long as 
we do. 
 
Cayce did not appear to promote a religious or philosophical framework, given that “people 
were told that if they could incorporate information into their own religious and belief 
systems… it could be a useful and positive experience; otherwise they were advised to leave 
the information alone.”143 Therefore I find my argument aligned with Cayce, as he appeared 
to be focusing on the method of intention and ignoring the variables. He offered the tools and 
did not care what religious context people subscribed to.  
 
It is for this reason that I argue religious experience may not be reduced, but that only the fact 
of experience may be reduced. While Cayce “claimed no special abilities….[he] was a 
Christian and read the Bible from cover to cover every year of his life, his work was one that 
stressed the importance of comparative study among belief systems all over the world.”144 It 
appears unimportant what context religion was practised in; they all have something to offer, 
since they are all functions of humanity and therefore our creations. Consequently pluralism 
ceases to be theoretically problematic (from an objective perspective), and only practically 
problematic as an expression of humanity’s need to conquer the ‘Other’ and consume it. 
  
Carl Jung’s psycho-religious belief system outlined the framework in which both Mesmer and 
Cayce operated. “Firstly…Jung saw religious experience as experience, not as an 
unproblematic reflex of a spiritual reality…. Secondly, Jung explored and modified his 
concepts repeatedly…and often changed his opinion or contradicted himself.”145 This 
reinforces the fluid dynamic behind ‘second-order’ religious experience. If this experience is 
located within the practitioner and the practitioner is moving through time, encountering 
various geographical and societal contextual shifts, then surely some elements of this 
experience will be contradictory at various times.  
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 Unlike texts, humans are not static or fixed in time, although we are presently trapped within 
the ‘ever-present-present’ of the information stream. This has effectively removed us from 
our historical context, although we are still very much a part of it. Hammer makes the point 
that “Jung is prone to seeing the human psyche as the locus of dark destructive forces, a view 
that is at odds with the generally optimistic outlook of the New Age.”146  
 
While Hammer is correct, I would suggest that this is due to Jung’s realisation that all 
phenomena are humanly projected. Therefore, owing to the amount of negative concepts in 
the world, human nature, the creator of these concepts must be the ‘locus’ of these negative 
qualities. Furthermore, unlike most ‘New Age ideologies’ Jung was not engaging in rhetoric 
or manifestos, but rather examining the underlying dynamic. 
 
Instead of various cultural interpretations of a unitary mystical experience, I would suggest 
that the only universality is the fact of experience. The myriad of pluralistic religious 
experiences (being a function of humanity) may not be reduced to a cross cultural singular; as 
language, music and culture may also not be reduced. This is supported by “(p)ractically all 
the main figures of this historical lineage, from William James to Abraham Maslow and 
beyond, [who] were convinced that religious experience was primary whereas doctrines and 
rituals were secondary.”147  
 
When contextual shifts occur, the characteristics of these experiences also transform but they 
do not reduce to a singular form. However, the function these experiences perform may be 
reduced. For instance, whether one is speaking in English, Chinese, or Spanish these 
languages all perform the function of communication. Therefore they may be reduced to 
communication, even though the only common ground between the variables is contextually 
determined. Thus, whether ‘within’, ‘across’ or ‘between’ contexts; even if the variables are 
completely irreducible, the method in which the variables are expressed may be reduced. 
 
An example of the irreducibility and consequent transformation of even the most traditional 
concepts is the post-theosophical practice of creating new legends around Jesus Christ. “Some 
elevated Jesus to the role of the cosmic Christ. Perhaps he is the leader of the Ascended 
Masters? He might be a cosmic being of light. Or could he be a spiritual being emanating 
from the Sun?”148 It seems unlikely that these claims could be further from the dogmatic 
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Christian position, yet they are just as fulfilling to their believers as the respective traditional 
Christian constructed beliefs.  
 
However, one example of such positive transformation that illustrates the possible 
consequences of active awareness is the growing reinterpretation of Christianity. Stewardship 
is replacing the traditional ‘dominion’ over creation and a more inter-dependent spirituality is 
achieving fruition through such New Age (in this case catholic) theologians, as Matthew 
Fox.149   
 
Fox calls “for the dismantling of liberal religion and the regrounding of faith in a mystical, 
prophetic, cosmological worldview – a transformation and renewal…. [arguing] Christianity 
has…. succumbed to a patriarchal mindset that has eroded its worship, message, and identity 
rendering them flat and lifeless.”150 “Fox believes we need to embrace a new cosmology; one 
that is built on the foundations of modern science but one which also includes a mystical 
awareness of the interconnectedness of all things.”151
 
With the non-existence152 of any religious experience and the subjective recollection of 
existing memories153 one may construct a tradition steeped in awe inspiring history, 
maintaining it to be subjectively true. This is purely the same method monotheistic 
institutions have used to maintain their hierarchical position in the nature of spirituality until 
very recently. Fox seems to be arguing for this type of (non-hierarchical) subjective creation, 
based in a context of interdependence. In the next chapter, I will outline the nihilism, or 
‘complete absence’ that allows the dynamic of religious belief to occur. 
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Chapter Two. 
 
In this chapter I will examine the ‘complete absence’ of non-physical ‘first-order’ reality in 
detail. I am arguing that this nihilistic ‘first-order’ is both kenotic and inversely kenotic by 
nature. This simultaneous occurrence is purely conceptual, and therefore non-physical, with a 
conceptual absence occurring in the human creator, as the projection of the creator empties 
into the nihilistic conceptual space.  
 
An inverted kenosis occurs, through mystical experience, prayer or meditation, namely the 
feeling of peace one enjoys with the reception of this space. Derrida and Vattimo call this 
absence the tertium. “(I)t is silence, the setting of that which is Other, of all difference, 
paradox and ambiguity, of the capacity of every term or thought to be turned about into its 
contrary.”154
 
In order to be ‘Other’ the tertium must be the absence of all physical reality. Therefore it is 
perfectly reasonable that terms and thoughts should be ‘turned about into its contrary’. If all 
thoughts and terms are human creations, then they will fill this ‘Other’ as it simultaneously 
empties its nothingness into them. “In reality…people are inevitably infiltrated by a tertium, 
which is no thing, no entity, no individual, no presence, but rather the setting that, like every 
religious experience, brings together and at the same time separates.”(Italics in quotation)155
 
It is this tertium that acts as a form of inverted kenosis.  “Once the subject and the world are 
both susceptible to a plurality of versions, heteronomy is no longer the most distinctive of 
aesthetic experience”156; attraction and repulsion can function at the same time, since these 
are purely functions of language and our consciousness, and as such they fill out the tertium. 
 
It must be reiterated that versions of the world are not reducible to a single account, but rather 
that the method behind the creations of the versions of the world follow the same dynamic. 
Therefore within both the tertium and the modified Hegelian dialectic, both may 
simultaneously be real. This is both a reductionist and non-reductionist argument, for, as with 
religious experience, it is not the experience that may be reduced but rather the fact of 
experience. 
I am arguing that one may experience this tertium without any ‘second-order’ deific 
construction, simply with an introspective focus on the absence of any ‘first-order’ deity. 
                                                 
154 Derrida, Jacques & Vattimo, Gianni. (eds.) Religion. p 124. 
155 Ibid. p 125. 
156 Ibid. p 132. 
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However, usually our ‘(sub)consciously projected deities’ fill this space with the 
characteristics we ascribe to them, transforming on a semi-regular basis as our interdependent 
consciousness evolves. Since these creations are ‘‘communal developments’ over a period of 
time’ they reflect our contextual attitudes and desires either supportively or antagonistically.  
 
Traditional theism and atheism. 
 
John Macquarrie adds to this argument by outlining what he sees as the three possible 
perspectives on concepts of God: the theist, atheist and polytheist. I am arguing that these are 
all conceptual categories within language, utilised to discuss religious experience and 
philosophy. Macquarrie is operating from a traditional perspective, so I am suggesting 
overlaying the three positions he describes, by reducing them back to ‘first-order’ and 
‘second-order’ reality.  
 
Macquarrie argues “that God-language, even in its earliest usage, arose from the sense of 
affinity that human beings had with the cosmic forces around them…. a sense of affinity with 
an environing reality.”157 This makes ‘God-language’ an internal creation in an effort to bring 
meaning to experiential physical existence. It is a conceptual ‘second-order’ creative 
interpretation of the ‘first-order’ (physical) environing forces, which possess regenerative and 
destructive phases, whether seasonal or cataclysmic. This ‘God-language’ is obviously 
contained in language, as Jaffe has previously shown; therefore it is a response to experience, 
which cannot be described. 
 
Therefore I am arguing that this ‘God-language’ is nihilistic from a ‘first-order’ perspective, 
since to be language it must be a human creation and thus ‘second-order’. It is only through 
the absence of any (‘first-order’) quantitative deific entity, that such subjective creation is 
able to occur. If we ignore or relegate the importance of this dynamic (that of inter-subjective 
creation) and instead indulge in categorising the comparative subjective relevance of religious 
schemas, we will remain perpetually trapped within this context; as no attempt is made to 
elucidate the method behind such created belief structures.  
As Macquarrie states: 
“Our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as such 
persons.158 There are limits to such unified control, which indicate 
                                                 
157 Macquarrie, John, In search of deity. p 19-20. 
158 “This account of a living personality requires completion by reference to its objectification in the 
consequent nature of God. Cf. Part V, Ch. II.” Cf. SA , pp. 127-145; and “Sense and Certainty” (1952) 
and “The Epistemological Argument” (1967), PP, pp. 60-75….6 “See Paul Ricoeur, Le Conflit des 
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dissociation of personality, multiple personalities in successive alternations, 
and even multiple personalities in joint possession. This last case belongs to 
the pathology of religion, and in primitive times has been interpreted as 
demoniac possession.”159
 
Macquarrie also argues (from a traditional perspective) that “(t)he atheist… acknowledges no 
such affinity…. [with an] environing reality… [that] belongs to an order of being that is 
essentially mechanical and sub-personal.”160 This argument refers to the traditional atheistic 
opposition to any form of deity. However the environing reality need not be ‘mechanical’ but 
may certainly be ‘sub-personal’ (allowing subconscious (secular or religious)) creative 
construction. 
 
We can observe this dynamic currently operating within a societal context, but we must 
remember that this context is currently hierarchically organised. Where we currently 
investigate such contexts from a mechanical perspective (since we construct the physical 
aspects of our societies), we forget that we human (‘second-order’ creators) make the 
dynamic that allows construction. Therefore we treat ourselves as a product of our own 
construction, (‘sucking ourselves into ourselves’ and) forgetting that we constructed and 
consume all these concepts in the first place. This is validated with my argument for the 
function of the nexus, which I engage in the next chapter. 
 
Returning to my a-theistic argument, I am arguing that this is what allows the space for 
‘second-order’ conscious creation and ‘Being’. This feeds into Macquarrie’s third 
perspective161 “of polytheistic religions, (where) talk of the gods takes the form of 
mythology…. they take on more definite personal characteristics”162 effectively reflecting the 
inter-subjective myriad of personal beliefs. Macquarrie’s work supports my a-theistic 
argument that both ‘God’ and the ‘world’ do not exist as “an item discoverable within the 
world. It is not an a priori idea, implicit in our recognition of any object. In fact, the logic of 
                                                                                                                                            
interpretations. Essays d’hermeneutique (Paris: Seuil, 1969) [Eng. Trans. Don Ihde, The conflict of 
Interpretations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974)]; Hans Georg Gadamer, Warheit 
und Methode 2d ed. (Tubingen: Mohr, 1965) [Eng. Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming, Truth 
and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975)].” 
159 Ibid. 
160 Macquarrie, John, In search of deity. p 19-20. 
161 I must emphasise here that from the perspective of my thesis, Macquarrie’s second and third 
perspectives are second order by nature. They are both created concepts, the characteristics of which 
are irrelevant. 
162 Macquarrie, John, In search of deity. p 20. 
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the concepts “God” and “world” is very similar. Both are inclusive concepts for quite unique 
realities.”163  
 
These realities are purely individual164 creations in an effort to interpret the external creation 
of socially constructed collections of these individual concepts. I must reiterate that I am 
speaking purely of non-physical existents, which opposes Macquarrie, assuming he is 
claiming for the physical reality of God and the world behind the concepts. I am arguing that 
our reality, which we take as objectively existent, is nothing more than supported fiction, both 
collectively and individually. As Laing argues, “(w)e experience the objects of our experience 
as there in the outside world. The source of our experience seems to be outside ourselves…. 
Persons as embodied beings relate to each other through the medium of space.”165  
  
So if we remove all our preconceptions and the semi-conscious aspects of our existence, we 
may consciously relate to each other and our context, bringing the creative experience to 
fruition on a daily basis. We realise that our experience of ‘Being’ occurs within our ‘internal 
sphere’ as a ‘second-order’ construct, functioning within the nihilistic space of ‘first-order’ 
‘non-Being’.  
 
Arthur Schopenhauer shows us that “the body…. is given in intelligent perception as 
representation, as an object among objects…. But it is also… denoted by the word will…. The 
act of will and the action of the body are…one and the same thing, though given in two 
entirely different ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for understanding.”166 This 
aligns itself to Macquarrie who argues that the “concept of God is an interpretative concept, 
meant to give us a way of understanding and relating to reality as a whole.”167
 
However any ‘concept of God’ or form of deism is dualistic, since it widens the conceptual 
gap “between creator and creation to the infinite distance between an absentee God 
unconcerned about his creation and an entirely autonomous and self regulating universe to 
which God has no access”.168 Therefore I agree strongly with Macquarrie, that due to this 
                                                 
163 Ibid. p 29. 
164 I am arguing for individual creations, as we all have individual ‘internal worlds’, which interact 
interdependently within and between societies. 
165 Laing, R.D. The politics of experience. p 33. 
166 Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, translated by E F J Payne.  § 18. 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/schopenh.htm
167 Macquarrie, John, In search of deity. p 29. 
168 Ibid. p 35. 
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perceived separation, any dualism “has a concealed tendency towards deism or even, 
eventually, atheism”, 169and hence this thesis is framed in an a-theistic context. 
 
I am arguing that through atheism it is impossible to envisage kenosis as “the indefinite 
negation of God”170 for one primary reason. These concepts all hinge on a concept of God 
(and not a response to God); the scriptures claim to possess God’s revelation, hence 
something of God’s character, and even the traditional atheistic negation of God must have 
some concept of what is being negated. Yet as we have seen, any attempt at a qualitative 
interpretation of a singularity is impossible and ends in tautology.  
 
The Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo is important here, arguing from the context of the 
Christian gospels, that it is necessary to “consider the meaning of creation and redemption to 
be kenosis… [therefore] the continuity of God and the world established by classical 
metaphysics is more authentically ‘kenotic’ than the transcendence attributed to God in 
naming him ‘the wholly other’.”171  
 
For if God is ‘wholly other’ then it is impossible for God to empty into us, as that removes 
God’s ‘otherness’ and necessitates a common context, which is lacking. The only possible 
‘otherness’ is the absence of us, which becomes clear when interpreted from a Feuerbachian 
context. We see that “(m)an… projects his being into objectivity,172 and then again makes 
himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject…. [then] 
(m)an is an object to God…. Thus the religious man virtually retracts the nothingness of 
human activity, by making his dispositions and actions an object to God…. Thus, in and 
through God, man has in view himself alone.”173  
 
So, if we project our ‘being into objectivity’ and then make ourselves an object of our 
objectivity, we are effectively emptying into ourselves. This inverted ‘dualistic deism’ is the 
same dynamic as operates in the nexus, with the exception that within the Christian context 
we were not divorced from history, whereas we are now trapped in the present. Mike 
Grimshaw inadvertently outlines a (post) Christian interpretation of this ‘inverted ‘dualistic 
                                                 
169 Ibid. 
170 Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. p 63. 
171 Ibid. p 83. 
172 This is footnoted in Feuerbach’s text as: “The religious, the original mode in which man becomes 
objective to himself, is (as is clearly enough explained in this work) to be distinguished from the mode 
in which this occurs in reflection and speculation; the latter is voluntary, the former involuntary, 
necessary – as necessary as art, as speech. With the progress of time, it is true, theology coincides with 
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173 Feuerbach, Ludwig. The essence of Christianity. p 29 
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deism’, arguing that God “occurs in two places: God is both the frame we use to create the 
view and the view we read and create. That is…. it makes us the liminal site for the creation 
and the encounter with that which we can call God….  So God is both a way of framing and 
perceiving.”174
 
Although this probably differs from Grimshaw’s argument, I would further argue that this 
illustrates God as a function of us, and therefore God also becomes ‘trapped in the present’ 
with us. If God is nothing or a non-existent, then from the (‘first-order’) physical perspective 
it is wholly other. That is, from the perspective of physical existence, God is an absence of 
existence, a space to project our ‘internal sphere’.  
To put that in context it should be remembered that our ‘internal sphere’ is also (as a function 
of us) non-existent, when measured by the same criteria.  
 
Yet God is conceived of as ‘wholly other’ since nothing contains it, nothing is contained by it, 
and it is not a function of anything save our collective inter-dependent beliefs. Effectively 
God is ‘it’, yet this ‘it’ must be an inversion of the traditional concepts of God, as ‘it’ has no 
characteristics. If one accepts God as nothing and accepts an inverted kenosis, these two 
positions effectively collapse (or empty) into each other in a (physically) non-existent 
conceptual kenosis. This ‘nothing’ allows space and as we empty out into this space, a space 
appears in us, (the negation of the negation) effectively acting as an inverted emptying into 
us, in an inversion or negation of traditional kenosis. If we apply this same dynamic to our 
other societal creations, we become aware that we are the only possibility for our own 
redemption.  
 
Consequently I am arguing that we conceive God as the nothingness of primary non-‘Being’ 
that allows us to create, project and interpret ‘second-order’ ‘Being’ as required. If God is 
nothingness and we are ‘Being’, then we are responsible for the free will we enjoy and by 
default also our resultant creations, actions and future consequences. To reiterate the previous 
paragraph, the nothingness occurs in us in the same manner as we empty our creations into 
the nothingness (or divine space). 
 
“No longer speaking of ‘Being’ is justified either as the attitude that corresponds best to a 
‘reality’ that excludes it and in which there is no ‘Being’, or as the recognition of the 
fulfilment of ‘Being’ in our culture.”175 To clarify, if we are looking for ‘Being’ in the form 
                                                 
174 Grimshaw, Michael. “Seeing through God: Towards an Eco A/Theology.” In Ecotheology. Vol 6. 
July 2001 & January 2002. p 198. 
175 Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. p 12. 
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of an interpretable ‘first-order’ divine referent, there is only absence, or ‘non-Being’, yet from 
a ‘second-order’ context, we are our own fulfilment and therefore ‘Being’ is a function of 
humanity. 
 
So, while ‘reality’ does not need to exclude ‘Being’ it does need to include ‘non-Being’ as 
‘first-order’ context. This fulfils ‘Being’ in ‘the history of our culture’ as our culture creates 
‘Being’ through language and our subsequently evolving ontology, that is, we are ‘Being’ in 
the Feuerbachian sense:  
 
(I)n religion man necessarily places his nature out of himself, regards his nature as a separate 
nature; necessarily, because the nature which is the object of theory lies outside of him, 
because all his conscious existence spends itself in his practical subjectivity. God is his alter 
ego, his other lost half; God is the complement of himself; in God he is the first perfect 
man.176
 
Therefore this ‘second-order’ ‘Being’ requires a ‘first-order’ ‘non-Being’ for the inverted or 
negative kenosis to occur. That is, we require the space to project our ‘alter ego’. While 
‘Being’ is relational (both within humanity and as a ‘second-order’ created concept 
interdependent of humanity) it is not a retrospective action. Certainly conscious aspects of all 
cultures utilise hindsight to shape their respective context, but I am not referring to this 
dynamic here. Instead I am attempting to investigate the (mostly) subconscious dynamic of 
our conditioned interpretational creation of our reality. As Vattimo notes:  
 
(I)f one thinks… that ‘Being’ can ‘return’ to speak to us beyond the oblivion into which it has 
fallen, or… continues always to elude us just because it transcends the capacity of our intellect 
and our language… it seems that one continues to identify Being with a being.177
 
Therefore we have created ‘Being’ (as a ‘second-order’ construct within a ‘first-order’ 
nihilistic context) with our language reflecting our ontology and inversely with our ontology 
reflecting our created ‘Being’. We forget that the only life this ‘Being’ has is the life we give 
it. This concept is outlined by Vattimo who calls hermeneutics a nihilistic vocation based on 
“the Heidegger – Gadamer axis”178, or a language – ontology axis that may be further broken 
down into a conversation – Being axis. Thus language/discourse/ conversation is both a 
function and necessity of our ontology. ‘Second-order’ reality is a function/necessity of our 
‘first-order’ ontology, unless we reject our self-reflexivity and rejoin the animals. 
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 Bataille on immanence. 
 
Georges Bataille brings an interesting perspective to discussions on immanence by showing 
that unlike humans, animals possess no self-reflexivity and therefore cannot ‘realise’ their 
contextual position.179 They simply ‘are’ and their many relative positions make up the 
environment they survive in. Animals achieve immanence in context specific situations, 
namely “when one animal eats another.”180  
 
There is no transcendence between eater and eaten, “nothing that might establish autonomy 
on one side and dependence on the other…. nothing between them except that quantitative 
difference.”181 It is only our consciousness that allows us the power of imagination182 to 
create meaning through interpreting our environment, and consequently to create conceptual 
transcendence. When envisioning “the universe without man…we can only call up a vision in 
which we see nothing, since the object of this vision is a movement that glides from things 
that have no meaning by themselves to the world full of meaning implied by man giving each 
thing his own.”183
  
Without humanity there would be no meaning, physical reality would not alter, and events 
would just ‘be’. We have created a world that is conceptually dislocated, although completely 
interdependent with our environment. Whereas a man will celebrate the death of his rival, an 
animal will not perceive the death of his rival in the same way: “The apathy that the gaze of 
the animal expresses after the combat is the sign of an existence that is essentially on a level 
with the world in which it moves like water in water.”184 That is, it forms an inherent part of 
the ecosystem, with no self-referential realisation of this. 
 
Without us, there would be no subject-object distinctions, I-thou relationships or meaning. 
With our absence all philosophies, religions, cultures and aesthetic forms would cease. “It is 
only within the limits of the human that the transcendence of things in relation to 
consciousness [or of consciousness in relation to things] is manifested.”185
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Therefore one interpretation (of the impermanence and conditionality of life) is that the death 
of the ego brings transcendence. If immanence is achieved by negating self-reflection (hence 
killing the ego) then effectively transcendence is also accomplished through the ego’s own 
death. Thus ‘voluntary self-sacrifice’ does not necessarily mean living one’s entire life as a 
victim, but rather sacrificing all one’s desires and realising the ‘inter-dependence of all 
phenomena’. 
 
Without human self-reflexivity, animals appear to accept their position in the greater context. 
That is, they participate in physical existence, procreate and then die. Perhaps this absence of 
ego and consequent lack of self-realisation is comparable to the non-duality sought after by 
eastern mystics, a return to the immanent state, with no subject-object differentiations. 
 
One prime example of subject –object relationships (outside the context of the ‘natural 
world’) is the construction of tools. “(T)ools are developed with their end in view, 
consciousness posits them as objects…. The developed tool is the nascent form of the non-
I.”186 The tool has no inherent value, as value is transferred to the task it will complete. This 
task also has no value, save the importance (and subsequent satisfaction at its completion) we 
attach to it. Yet we still persist in attaching value to tools, based on our historical usage, our 
societal age, and our technical and aesthetic appreciation of them. We must remember that 
these values are only significant for as long as we continue to ascribe them to tools. 
 
Whether the tool fulfils a circular (the stick digs the ground to grow the plant to feed the man 
to use the stick187), linear (where a ““true end” reintroduces… continuous being, lost in the 
world like water is lost in water”188) or no purpose (having value only in itself and “not with a 
view to something else”189) is irrelevant. The object is impervious to the subject while still 
remaining its property.190  
 
When we apply this concept (especially with regards to linear purpose) to religious contexts, 
we begin to ascertain the irrelevance of them, as they are our impervious constructed 
possessions. This adds to my argument for a-theism. The purposes these objects (tools) fulfil 
are perfectly acceptable and in some cases necessary for our survival, but they should always 
be remembered to have no inherent meaning save what we allocate them. This helps separate 
‘first-order’ physical and ‘second-order’ conceptual meanings. It is language that creates and 
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defines subject-object categories191 such as the way “we perceive each appearance – 
subject…from within and from without at the same time, both as continuity, with respect to 
ourselves, and as object.”192  
 
Bataille draws our attention to the concept of a ‘supreme being’ as a conceptual need to 
attribute “the virtues of a thing “capable of acting, thinking, and speaking” (just as men 
do)”193 to continuous existence. Since our self-reflexivity causes us to operate outside (in 
many ways) of continuous existence, it seems only valid that we should attempt to “define a 
value that is greater than any other.”194 This (within our ‘objectively meaningless’ culture) 
validates our conceptual schema, while inversely separating us further from continuity. 
 
Bataille continues: “By definition, the supreme being has the highest rank. But all are 
of the same kind, in which immanence and personality are mingled; all can be divine 
and…. in spite of everything, they basically line up on a plane of equality.”195 I am 
arguing that this allows for religious pluralism; for expressions of a ‘supreme being’ 
are attempts to express awe at life. Yet we effectively fetishise196 life, by inverting 
‘first-order’ reality with our ‘second-order’ lie, a lie that is necessary in order to 
express our creativity. We crave the “continuity… [that] offered man all the 
fascination of the sacred world”197 while manifesting the discontinuity of our 
conceptually dislocated context. 
 
With every attempt at expression (of the sacred world) we remove ourselves further from it, 
but only if this expression is taken as ‘first-order’ truth. If we accept the divine space and 
allow the simultaneously inverting kenosis, we should enjoy far greater fulfilment in our 
lives. “(T) he supreme oblivion of ‘Being’… is thought [of] as presence….in our terms of 
recognizing the link between the interpretative essence of truth and nihilism.”198  
 
So if nihilism is ‘first-order’ ‘truth’ in the form of a non-truth then ‘first-order’ ‘Being’ is also 
a form of ‘non-Being’. The plenitude of perceptible ‘second-order’ forms is subjectively 
ultimate and true for the interpreter or creator of this ‘Being’. “The divine being is nothing 
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else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the 
individual man, made objective – i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct 
being.”199
 
Since the traditional Christian God is said to be infinite, if this God is nothingness (or a 
‘complete absence’) then this absence is also infinite, allowing humanity (as we empty into 
the absence) the free will to project ourselves (in the form of our conceptual creations) into 
the nothingness, while treating this projection as external truth. This is an expansion on 
Ludwig Feuerbach’s argument; Feuerbach articulates: 
 
That each experience of truth is an experience of interpretation is almost a truism in today’s 
culture…. [and] may be verified or falsified by conformity or otherwise of statements to states 
of things… made possible by an ‘opening’ that is not itself the object of a description that can 
be verified or falsified other than by placing it within an opening that is ‘superior’, more 
original etc.200
 
Inverted kenosis. 
 
This method for creating our ‘second-order’ societally conditioned reality enhances my 
argument for an inverted kenosis. As we empty our conceptual reality into the space, that 
conceptual space simultaneously opens within us (through the absence of the space that the 
projected concept occupied while within us), until we fill it again by externally referencing 
against other projected concepts. Thus ‘second-order’ reality empties into the divinely sacred 
space of the ‘first-order’ (non-existent) conceptual reality, as the space in the ‘first-order’ 
reality allows some freedom (or coping) from the physical context of the external world. I am 
arguing that kenosis has traditionally been interpreted incorrectly, and that Feuerbach was 
correct, that we project our conceptual selves and effectively empty ourselves into what was 
considered God.  
 
While my argument is just another human projection, and this whole thesis is simply a 
‘second-order’ conceptual argument, there remains a strong case for the absence of ‘first-
order’ (non-physical) reality. These ‘second-order’ deities are effectively variables that fulfil 
our practical requirements in experiencing and interpreting ‘first-order’ physical reality. That 
is, they aid us to gain some meaning from our physical context, and we utilise them for 
focussing our intention to achieve certain goals. The method used for the creation of these 
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deities is the same as that behind all our conceptual (political, cultural and sociological) 
creations.  
 
If we acknowledge our interdependent creative reality, this consensus, conformity or need for 
belonging seems less important. If we are ‘Being’ within a context of ‘non-Being’ (or 
emptying into the tertium) then our individuality becomes interdependent and we no longer 
strive for acceptance. That is, if we realise the method of our ‘second-order’ creative ability 
and cease attempting to gain approval from some non-existent ‘first-order’ referent, we realise 
that our acceptance is inter-dependently communally achieved.  
 
 Thomas Altizer provides an interesting case study for the ‘second-order’ dynamic, arguing 
(from a western Christian position), that “it is precisely the deepest realization of the Passion 
of God, a realization of absolute abyss, which finally ends every possible naming of God, an 
unnaming which is itself a transfiguring movement”201 as “(b)oth the “I” of God and the “I” 
of consciousness perish in that abyss.”202  
 
This argument has its roots in the Death of God movement, that this abyss is a consequence of 
modernity, which removed God from our secular society. Within this context, whether one 
takes the traditional imago dei structure, or inverts it in a Feuerbachian projection is 
irrelevant, for the identity of both God and the conscious self are transfigured in the 
singularity of the abyss.  
 
However it is when Altizer’s argument is viewed from outside the Christian context that it 
accurately outlines my thesis. The statement that “(o)nly Christianity knows an ultimate self-
negation or self-emptying of the Godhead”203 since it was “(n)ot until the advent of 
Christianity… [that] a primordial Godhead manifest[ed] in the West”204 is internally valid for 
Western Christians.  
 
Since Altizer is writing from within this context, his argument is subjectively true for him and 
all those who share his beliefs. Yet for those outside the West, or without reference to ‘a 
primordial Godhead’ this argument (like my argument) is nothing more than a faith statement. 
Altizer drifts further into subjectivity with the argument that “[a] distinctively Christian 
primordial Godhead, as opposed to a Hindu or purely Neoplatonic primordial Godhead, is the 
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absolutely primordial... which orthodox Christianity knows as the Father and the Creator…. 
[and] in which the Father eternally generates the Son and the Spirit…. (T)hus the Father… 
[has] an absolute sovereignty and transcendence unknown in Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam, 
or unknown apart from the Christian Trinity.”205
 
This ‘absolute sovereignty’ imposes its own characteristics on other systems, which have 
distinctly different cosmologies. For example a Hindu would argue that all Gods exist within 
samsara (the ocean of existence) and that only Brahman (or non-duality) exists outside this. 
Karma operates within all of samsara (including the heavens) and thus all Gods are 
constrained by the rules of the system. Again, this argument is perfectly valid for a Hindu, but 
drifts into subjectivity when viewed from an external perspective. So subjectively, both the 
Christian and Hindu are examples of ‘second-order’ constructs and internal validation. While 
both constructs speak from their respective contexts (complete with self validating arguments) 
they both speak of singularity, either as the type that dissolves the “I” of both God and the 
conscious self, or of the non-duality outside samsara.  
 
Whether this singularity is experienced in the Christian sense of “an absolute sacrifice (that) 
is necessarily an absolute self-negation”206 or in the Hindu sense of escaping samsara, by 
achieving moksha207 is unimportant. I am arguing that both these theoretical constructs are 
Feuerbachian and functions of humanity. Again I must reiterate that my argument is only 
subjectively validating (as are the Christian and Hindu arguments), and revolves around what 
isn’t there; yet it shows the ‘first-order’ reducibility and ‘second-order’ irreducibility of 
religious experience. 
 
For the Christian “a fully actual Nothing is what can be known as the dead body of God, 
and… is only made possible by the Crucifixion….a forward and ultimately apocalyptic 
movement into that absolute omega which is only possible by way of a negation and reversal 
of absolute alpha….a reversal realizing the Nihil itself”208 and caused by the dissolution of 
“I”. However, (as Jaffe has pointed out with reference to monotheism) this statement also 
requires that all talk of God’s ‘passion’ is nothing more than expressions of humanity. For, as 
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Wittgenstein has also shown with regard to our linguistic reality, to speak of a singularity 
becomes nothing more than a tautology, and hence for all practical purposes we return to the 
position of simulation. 
 
Being and non-Being. 
 
Vattimo furthers this argument, claiming that: 
 
“(n)o longer speaking of Being is justified either as the attitude that corresponds best to a 
‘reality’ that excludes it and in which there is no being, or as the recognition of the fulfilment 
of Being in the history of our culture.”209  
 
However, while ‘reality’ does not need to exclude ‘Being’ it does need to include ‘non-Being’ 
as primary context. This fulfils ‘Being’ in ‘the history of our culture’ as our culture creates 
‘Being’ through language and our subsequent ontology, that is, we are ‘Being’ in the 
Feuerbachian sense. It should be remembered that this created ‘Being’ is contextually 
‘second-order’ within a ‘first-order’ contextual ‘non-Being’  
 
Vattimo continues on this track, suggesting that: 
 
“if one thinks…that ‘Being’ can ‘return’ to speak to us beyond the oblivion into which it has 
fallen, or… continues always to elude us just because it transcends the capacity of our intellect 
and our language… it seems that one continues to identify Being with a being.”210  
 
Therefore we have created ‘Being’ with our language reflecting our ontology and vice versa. 
We forget that the only life this ‘Being’ has, is the life we give it. Vattimo concludes this 
aspect of my argument, arguing that: 
 
“(n)ot for nothing is the supreme oblivion of ‘Being’ that according to which it is thought as 
presence. It is… a matter of remembering the oblivion; in our terms, of recognizing the link 
between the interpretative essence of truth and nihilism.”211  
 
So if nihilism is ‘first-order’ truth in the form of a non-truth then first order ‘Being’ is also a 
form of ‘non-Being’. The plenitude of perceptible ‘second-order’ forms is subjectively 
ultimate and true for the interpreter or creator of this ‘Being’.  While “Aristotelian 
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pluralism…remains a objectivist-metaphysical thesis (the Being is said in many ways 
because, and only because, it is in many ways – irreducible to be sure, yet nonetheless 
articulated as one in the sole descriptive proposition that ‘reflects’ them in their plurality), that 
is…ultimately untenable from a hermeneutic perspective.”212 However this statement appears 
to have been made from a purely epistemic perspective.  
These forms of ‘Being’ are irreducible as they will not collapse into other ‘second-order’ 
constructs. Yet in another sense they are based in a ‘first-order’ non-context with kenosis 
appearing to operate in both directions. The ‘first-order’ divine conceptual space, in which we 
may access our ‘inherent’ nature regardless of qualities, allows us ‘to be’ in what I argue is 
the ‘real’ sense of the word. That is, there are no reducible variables for this ‘Being’;213 only 
the act of Being is reducible. With a nod to Heidegger, human ‘Being’ or Dasein “is subject 
to a systematic, radical uncertainty. Because we know that we will die… Death is the key to 
Life. The only genuine question is why we are at all.”214  
 
I am arguing that this ‘Being’ does not describe our physical life, for it is only through our 
‘self-reference’ that we are aware of ‘Being’. So in a conceptual sense, how can death be the 
key to life? I am arguing that death is the same location as pre-birth. That is, the space we are 
injected into and the space that eventually consumes us. We are the only referent, since we 
are our own physical and conceptual creators. Since we only have an ‘absence’ or ‘space’ as 
our external reference, all human traditions are human creations. They do not last eternally 
and neither do we.  
 
However, with this acknowledgement a certain freedom evolves. If one inverts “Sartre’s 
idiom, (that the human) does not create being, but rather injects nonbeing into the world, into 
an original plenitude of being”215, then this supports my contextual argument. If ‘non-Being’ 
is the ‘first-order’ construct and our nature is ‘second-order’ (in all but our physical 
existence), then (from a ‘second-order’ perspective) we are ‘Being’ and we inject this ‘Being’ 
into the (‘first-order’) context of ‘non-Being’. Martin Heidegger covers this concept, with his 
‘analytic of Dasein’: 
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213 I must emphasise that I am referring to conceptual Being, and ignoring our physical requirements of 
food, shelter, warmth and procreation. While procreation effectively drives our sexual desires, these are 
no different from any other mammal. The only difference is that with our self-reference, we are aware 
of it. However, within conceptual reality, the projection of our sexual desires is just another variable to 
fill our ‘space’, with an inverted kenosis. There may be some objection to comparing sexual desire with 
God’s presence, yet in many religions (from Pagan, through Tantric to Shamanistic), sexual acts are the 
path to enlightenment. 
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We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case 
mine.216 These entities, in their Being, they are delivered over to their own Being…. which is 
an issue for every such entity.217
While Heidegger is not separating ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ reality, this statement is for 
practical purposes still very valid. In everyday life we are unaware of the distinctions between 
‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ reality and as such, barely conscious of the way we ‘are 
delivered over into our own Being’: 
 
That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its 
Being as its ownmost possibility…. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own 
possibility, it can in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and 
never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so.218
 
In a similar vein, Heidegger argued, “Nothing is what shapes Being generally. This reveals 
the most fundamental, transcendent reality, beyond all notions of what-is slipping over into 
what-is-not…. The only genuine philosophical question is why there is something rather than 
nothing”.219 This is a question that I believe is answered in the differences between ‘first-
order’ and ‘second-order’ reality.  
 
If we look at the kitsch nature of society today, we realise the (‘first-order’) empty nature of 
our (‘second-order’) fictional reality. Zizek elucidated that the “”empty” sacrifice is the 
Christian gesture par excellence: it is only against the background of this empty gesture that 
one can begin to appreciate the uniqueness of the figure of Christ.”220 Zizek supports his 
argument with some very useful examples. 
 
In “Ernst Lubitsch’s To Be Or Not To Be…. one of the funniest scenes of the film, [has] the 
pretentious Polish actor… [attempting to] impersonate the cruel senior Gestapo officer 
Erhardt”221 in an exaggerated and vulgar manner. While the spectators initially assume this is 
“a ridiculous caricature” they shift their opinion when the real Erhardt “reacts to his 
interlocutors in exactly the same way. Although the “real” Erhardt…“plays himself,” this 
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uncanny coincidence makes all the more palpable the absolute gap that separates him from 
the poor Polish impersonator.”222
 
As this example shows, there is no “authentic” way for one person to represent another; every 
representation is contextual, and responses are subconsciously conditioned accordingly. “The 
Real is the appearance as appearance, it not only appears WITHIN appearances, but it is also 
NOTHING BUT its own appearance… [an] ultimately illusory feature that accounts for the 
absolute difference within the identity.”223
 
To clarify; an ‘exaggerated and vulgar’ personality (such as ‘Gestapo officer Erhardt’) may be 
treated as a ‘ridiculous caricature’ in one context (namely when impersonated during a film 
for the benefit of an audience), and with absolute fear when confronted by a prisoner. Thus 
there is no underlying ‘reality’, save the real as “NOTHING BUT its own appearance”. 
Therefore this personality is a projection, to be contextually interpreted.  
 
Since the ‘real’ does not (from a ‘first-order’ non-physical perspective) exist, it is specifically 
this ‘first-order’ absence that allows the ‘second-order’ “Real” to occur/be experienced, both 
as appearance and within appearance. The fact that the ‘Real’ can exist in two aspects 
simultaneously and be interpreted in entirely different ways denotes its fluid nature.  
 
That is, the ‘exaggerated and vulgar’ behaviour has two antithetical meanings, depending on 
context. Therefore the ‘Real’ can have no independent existence, but relies on us for 
projection and interpretation. Note here that I am again purely referring to non-physical 
reality. If we apply this argument to religious principles, and “end with the Imaginary… we 
get the Real in its imaginary dimension… if we start with the Symbolic…we get the signifier 
itself transformed into the Real of a meaningless letter/formula.”224 We must remember that 
Zizek is here referring to his double negation that ‘can be experienced positively’. That is, 
whether ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’, all concepts are a function of humanity; they are our 
projections and our receptions. This then, appears to be kenotic within both ‘first-order’ and 
‘second-order’ contexts.  
 
If we examine ‘second-order’ reality, we find that the imaginary empties into itself; thereby 
creating the real, from its imaginary perspective. However this ‘real’ is purely contextual, and 
is only real within the confines of ‘second-order’ reality (as we have seen with the previous 
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example of the Gestapo officer). Thus, inversely, the ‘first-order’ absence appears. That is, 
this absence allows the inverted kenosis, and as this projection occurs, the space opens (left 
by the emptying of the projection) within the projector, thus the imaginary and the real are 
both contained. However the only ‘first-order’ non-physical reality is absence, space, or non-
existence. The ‘second-order’ real needs interpretation and is purely subjective, but then all 
non-physical truths are.  
 
So, if we examine the ‘first-order’ aspects of this statement, we have the divine emptiness 
emptying into the absence left by the projected ‘second-order’ constructs and the ‘second-
order’ constructs simultaneously filling the divine ‘first-order’ space. Zizek illustrates this 
concept with the way that “Christianity… renounces this God of Beyond. This Real behind 
the curtain of phenomena; it acknowledges that there is NOTHING beyond the appearance – 
nothing BUT the imperceptible X that changes Christ, this ordinary man, into God.”225
 
In short, if I understand Zizek’s reading, his claim is that Christianity assumes no existent 
God, save that of appearances, a kitsch representation. All concepts must be ‘second-order’, 
(empty of ‘first-order’ meaning, and thus kitsch), which contradicts the notion of (‘first-
order’) Christian truth. If God has no meaning, no truth or falsity, then the truth may only be 
that there is no truth.  
 
What ‘appears’ is what is claimed and then believed, making appearance both a religious 
claim and a belief. Christ does not become God; he only ‘appears’ to, and in fact Christ is the 
appearance of and onto the man Jesus. There is only divine nihilistic kenosis226. While there 
may be an ultimate truth and traditions may make claims through revelation to know such 
truth, as we have seen, if this is the case we cannot speak of them.  
  
If this is achieved on a societal level, then regardless of immediate context, community may 
still exist, with internal validity and integrity for all members. Diversity becomes a beneficial 
thing in opposition to homogenised normality. For this to occur, observers must have a 
common contextual interpretation, fulfilled by orthodoxy in its role of guidance for 
orthopraxy. Without this orthodoxy, we would be unable to perceive the diversity of beliefs. 
The diversity is therefore achieved by the individual subjective experiences within these loose 
contextual guidelines. If one carries this theory over to religious concepts, then since these 
concepts do not possess physical existence the believer must create them internally. This 
creation is always contextually interdependent (either supportively or antagonistically) and if 
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people become aware of the dynamic in operation it gives far more creative ability to societal 
members. 
 
Therefore, if we return to the earlier arguments of Cupitt and Rorty, our only (non-physical) 
truths are communal interpretations. We place concepts in openings. We define superiority 
and authenticity and always have done. My thesis very simple, and argues that we should 
become aware of our (conceptually creative) actions and consciously engage in these 
practices instead of subconsciously conforming to communal interpretations.  
 
As Vattimo claims: 
 
Nietzsche’s thesis concerning the death of God…. is the narration of an experience which is 
announced to others, so that they too may discover its truth for themselves, ‘constituting on 
the basis of this a we to which and in the name of which the name of Nietzsche might 
speak’.227
 
This truth is the ‘first-order’ truth that I speak of, namely that there is no external deity, which 
allows us the space to create our ‘second-order’ deities and religious concepts within our own 
relative contexts. Effectively this truth is that there is no truth, only a non-truth, which serves 
no applicable basis save allowing the aforementioned space to exist. 
 
If one utilises the western post-Christian context, this suggests we outgrow traditional 
concepts, previously taken as external truth, but which were previous creations. We begin to 
consciously create our subjective ‘second-order’ religious truths for this current context, 
instead of blindly following past concepts. This may or may not occur within the context of 
the Hegelian dialectic, for while new concepts are evolving they are not necessarily 
synthesising two oppositional poles. These may instead reinforce previously polarised 
concepts, with those who choose to continue following past concepts, consciously choosing to 
do so. If the Hegelian dialectic is utilised, the ‘we’ that Nietzsche speaks of can ‘Be’ in the 
current context. 
 
We may contrast this argument with our current historical and conceptual “understanding 
[which] is limited by our finitude, [and] our linguistic horizons”228 making our conceptual 
‘second-order’ reality possible. An awareness of the dynamic would allow the conscious 
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reinterpretation by all who choose to believe a subjective truth and would remove the 
traditional hierarchical power structures and notions of absolute truth. Thus ‘Being’ becomes 
authentic as the ‘second-order’ constructs can never replicate the ‘first-order’ nothingness and 
are created and interpreted subjectively, with the only subjective truth existing within the 
believer’s (microcosmic or macrocosmic) context.  
 
Macquarrie (1985) argued that in that context: 
 
“atheism, either explicitly or implicitly, is very widespread in human society…. Those who 
adopt such an attitude see no need to bring God into the picture, and may even think that the 
idea of God is harmful to human welfare. This is known as humanism.”229  
 
While I agree with Macquarrie, I must add that this conclusion is unnecessary if we simply 
ignore traditional (or obsolete) concepts of God. Most atheism of today arose from the 
corruption, persecution and infighting in the name of God, thus God may indeed be ‘harmful 
to human welfare’. Yet traditional contexts still couch this argument.  
 
If we follow Feuerbach, and assume the mantle of God and consciously project ourselves into 
the ‘god-space’ as we have always (sub-consciously) done, then a-theism is completely 
liberating for the human spirit. That is, it frees the human spirit from hierarchies that are 
‘harmful to human welfare’, while maintaining the same dynamic. A real risk exists that we 
may begin to simply ‘worship ourselves’ without the ‘God corrective’; yet as I have 
previously argued, this corrective is an absence of existence and is therefore purely an inter-
subjective communal validation for intention action. Therefore, the same dynamic applies, we 
are now simply aware of it. 
 
For this reason I oppose Macquarrie’s conceptual difference between the ‘universe’ and the 
‘world’. He appears to speak as if the “universe itself is some kind of absolute or ultimate 
being… which is precisely what the naturalistic or materialistic atheist denies. He regards the 
world as simply a collection of contingent facts.”230However, the physical universe and 
physical world have only a slim correlation to our contingently produced ‘world’. They 
provide a physical context for our ‘second-order’ constructed beliefs and creations but that is 
all. Our concepts and beliefs are no more existent than ‘God’ or the ‘world’. Macquarrie 
proves my point while seeking to negate traditional atheism: 
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The atheist… may import… certain ‘values’…. Nietzsche’s will to power is an example of 
this, and there is something similar in Marxism…. In such cases pure atheism has been 
abandoned, and there has been smuggled into the theory a creative power with at least some 
of the traditional attributes of God.231
 
I am therefore in full agreement with Macquarrie’s conclusion that:  
 
The ultimate expression of atheism was the philosophy of Nietzsche, in which everything is 
contingent or relative, and we stand on the verge of nihilism. There is no longer a forward 
or backward, an above or a below, a good or evil, except what we determine these shall be. 
There is no centre of reference, no absolute, and we have to ask ourselves seriously whether 
the logical working out of atheism must not have necessarily lead to nihilism.232
 
It is through an inversion of ‘traditional atheism’ that this new a-theism allows humanity to 
acknowledge the ‘creative power’ we have always had, and forces us to assume our correct 
role. No longer may we subconsciously create while referencing an external mythic ‘truth’. 
Everything has always been ‘contingent or relative’ and we have always determined ‘good or 
evil’. It seems that we finally understand the dynamic of religious and secular conceptual 
creation, understand that we are the ‘centre of reference’ and always have been. We may 
project our concepts and ourselves and then justify our actions against these projected 
concepts, whether religious (some external deity) or secular (the laws of the land, especially 
when utilised in order to action the death penalty). The initiatory point has always been the 
human species. 
 
Paul Boghossian asks the question of whether one may have a belief in something without 
desire, suggesting that: 
“there appears to be no difficulty in thinking of someone as a pure believer: that is, a creature 
who only has views about how things are, but no concept of how she would want them to 
be.”233  
 
Boghossian then asks conversely whether one may desire something with no belief in its 
existence. This seems unlikely, as “understanding the idea of wanting things to be different 
than they are actually believed to be…presupposes the concept of belief.”234 If we reframe 
these two positions within a religious context, we find that: 
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“(i)n the first place, such a God must be temporal… in the second place, such a God must be 
both the creator and the goal of all finite beings.”235  
 
If God is ‘the goal of all finite beings, then it stands to reason that these beings, ‘us’, would 
desire it. However, if God is neither temporal, or our goal, but only the ‘complete absence’ 
that allows us to be temporal and to desire, then my argument that we create ‘second-order’ 
God in order to satisfy our own ‘first-order’ desires appears validated. Therefore such a God 
cannot positively exist (regardless of the argument that any singular may not possess a real 
world signified existent), for if it were to exist (in anything other than temporal extension) it 
must have come into existence at some stage, negating the possibility of its infinite 
characteristics. If we argue that God created itself in order to know itself, then this is also 
problematic, since God is no longer singular, and is contained within the dualistic universe.  
 
Any positive existent, whether ‘first-order’ or ‘second-order’ can be negated and 
consequently either physically or conceptually destroyed. It is only through the absence of 
such a creator god, that the nihilistic divinely inverted kenotic space may operate. So if God is 
the absence of everything, then a-theism aligns with atheism, theism and polytheism. For, in 
this context, God is the absence of all duality, therefore, the absence of all theoretical and 
theological constructs. Using an inverted kenosis then, God is the sacred space that theists and 
polytheists project into, and, in one sense (when the focus of atheism is not simply the 
refutation of theism), God is what atheists speak of. 
 
Macquarrie refers to Plotinus’ preference for unity within: 
“the dialectical opposition of the one and the many…claiming that…the moving multiplicity 
of things and events in the world is illusion of mere appearance. The multiplicity, too, is real 
and the world of sense is real, but their reality is admittedly of a relatively low degree, 
compared with external realities.”236  
 
Within the context of this argument, I take these ‘external realities’ to be of a physical 
characteristic, as our own bodies are. Therefore these are either purely ‘first-order’ existents 
or a mixture of ‘first-order’ existents and ‘second-order’ concepts (in the cases of humanly 
constructed objects). 
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So, with the ‘complete absence’ of ‘first-order’ deit(y)(ies), Hegel’s “absolute, on this view, is 
not to be grasped in conceptual form, but felt, intuited”237 and subsequently expressed. 
(F)eeling is for Hegel only the beginning of the knowledge of God, and it has to be developed 
in conceptual form.”238 For Hegel: 
 
“spirit goes out from itself, yet remains within itself in a complex relationship of itself with 
itself. As subject, it knows itself as reflected in the object, while the object in turn knows spirit 
as the original subject.”239
 
It is this ‘second-order’ projection into the nihilistic divinity of (conceptual) ‘first-order’ non-
existence that I am arguing for in Hegel’s concept of the ‘complex relationship’ spirit has of 
‘itself with itself’. This is only achieved through both our ability to project consciousness and 
our ability to be self-reflexive. Since we all interpret reality differently, every interpretation is 
unique or authentic (before it is communally validated), as it does not directly reference any 
primary truth.  
 
This individual interpretation of truth would be both unique and authentic for each 
participant, as only the physical consequences can be valid or invalid; with all ‘second-order’ 
concepts examined for ‘first-order’ physical consequences. However, for the purposes of 
religious fulfilment, there need be no such justification, as long as these two realms are kept 
separate, with the acknowledgement of any possible ‘first-order’ consequences. 
 
The best method for transmitting a ‘second-order’ creation (either orally or textually) has 
always been the narrative. In all narratives whether meaning is implicit or explicit, one thing 
is constant, namely a linear progression. This progression need not be chronological, but is 
there never the less. It is this projection that allows us to interdependently interpret and/or 
create meaning, by referring to this narrative. 
 
Contemporary films such as Pulp Fiction (1994) and Memento (2000) are both examples of 
linear non-chronological narratives. Yet everyone who saw these films managed to form some 
conclusions and thus attached meaning to the experience. A linear narrative may still follow a 
non-chronological or circular contextual transmission, but that does not mean the story has no 
conclusion.   
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Narrative meaning. 
 
As William Gass argues: for all “stories, there are agents and actions; there are patterns; there 
is direction; most of all, there is meaning.”240 To draw an analogy between these narratives 
and our conceptual life, if people consciously create their own subjective stories, then 
meaning is also subjectively conscious. Whereas if people blindly follow dogmatic constructs, 
their meaning references the (perceived) creative construct of the original author, in 
whichever state of mind or spiritual orientation they were when they wrote it.  
 
Roland Barthes offers a contrasting argument, yet one that still ties into the overall argument:  
 
Writing is the neutral, composite, oblique space… the negative where all identity is lost…. As 
soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but 
intransitively… this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his 
own death, writing begins.241
 
If writing does not act ‘directly on reality’ then it enters the realm of the aesthetic and can 
have no consequences. The problem arises when writing that has no bearing on reality is 
interpreted as having bearing, sometimes with very negative consequences.  
Yet in most stories “opening events are always an excuse, for the real aim of every story is a 
justification”242. With the non-existence of divine ‘first-order’ justifications, these ‘second-
order’ fictive constructions become visible for what they are. Gass suggests the reason for 
“our fondness for narratives, as well as a great part of the structure of narratives themselves, 
derives from genealogy and the refining of kinship”243; while Barthes argues that writing is 
‘neutral, composite, oblique… (and) negative’. I agree that writing is all of this, yet it is also 
more. Writing acts in the same manner as the ‘complete absence of any ‘first-order’’ and 
allows us to empty into it. 
 
So, if we craft narratives primarily for our current context, we may more accurately engage 
pertinent issues instead of reinterpreting narratives244, reapplying them to today’s society. Not 
only does this leave less room for hierarchical manipulation, it also forces us to acknowledge 
the state of our spiritual welfare and to act on that state. 
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 Returning to Vattimo, we are reminded:  
 
(t)he point is that the text of creation, as well as that of the Scriptures, opens the way to an 
unlimited semiosis…. If nihilism is understood as kenosis, as the self-exhaustion of 
transcendence, it is devoid of any apocalyptic features, but announces itself with the logic of 
religion.245
 
Therefore, if humanity assumes the role of an inverted God of Genesis, we contextually create 
our own conceptual narrative (the world) each day, which is communally projected onto our 
physical context and validated against a nihilistic backdrop. There are no negative 
connotations to this form of nihilism for it liberates humanity and forces us to assume 
responsibility for our own belief structures. Vattimo concludes: 
 
“(f)rom the perspective of kenosis, then, existence appears as infinite plurality…. It is a 
humanity that glimpses the trace of a God… that emerges from infinite dialogues and 
interpretations.”246
      
Derrida also uses the word ““trace” (the French word [that] carries strong implications of 
track, footprint, imprint), a word that… presents itself as the mark of an anterior presence, 
origin, master. For “trace” one can substitute “arche-writing” (“archi-ecriture”), or 
differance,” or in fact quite a few other words that Derrida uses in the same way.”247  The 
point to this is that whether taken in a positive or negative way, ‘trace’ amounts to God. In a 
positive sense, trace (when subscribing to Feuerbach) is the ‘imprint’ that traditional society 
has left on today’s schizophrenic nexus. In a negative sense, trace is the sacred space that 
allows the inverted kenosis, of ourselves emptying ourselves into the space.  Regardless of the 
interpretation, trace explains the ‘missing’ element of today’s kitsch society. 
 
These ‘infinite dialogues and interpretations’ are possible only within the infinity that is 
absence. One cannot quantify nothing, or non-God; one can only project into the nothing. If 
we recognise the negation and experience it positively instead of continually filling it up, we 
may break out of the circular dynamic that is the nexus, as Laing states shortly. For as Derrida 
claims: 
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“the sign is the place where “the completely other is announced as such – without any 
simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity – in that which is not it” (69,47). Word 
and thing or thought never in fact become one.”248  
 
Singularity cannot be signified, for there is no referent. Derrida continues, stating: “Such is 
the strange “being” of the sign: half of it always “not there” and the other half always “not 
that.” The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is 
forever absent.”249 For without that which is absent, there would be no space for the sign to 
project into and the inverted kenosis could not occur. “Derrida’s trace is the mark of the 
absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the 
condition of thought and experience.”250  
 
Mike Grimshaw appears to follow Derrida’s ‘infinite plurality’ by also utilising architectural 
trends as a microcosmic investigative tool. In his article on “Soft Modernism” he elucidates 
that “as the globalized [sic] world seems to be uncritically embracing that which it calls 
postmodernism… architecture has conversely thrown off the ornamentation of 
postmodernism.”251 One may see the circular dynamic in action, with the ‘globalised world’ 
embracing the ‘trace’ of the old concept, while the ‘architectural world’ projects the next 
concept, for the globalised world to embrace. Again, this concept will be dealt with in more 
detail with the nexus. 
 
Grimshaw continues by arguing that: 
 
“(m)odernity hinged on two broad axes--reduction (less/ loss/ order/ control) and progress. 
Postmodernism acted as the polar opposite: excess (eclecticism/ ornament/ chaos/diversity) 
and relativism…. To attempt to understand the rise of soft modernism we perhaps need to 
think in terms of a Hegelian dialectic where modernity is the thesis, postmodernism its 
antithesis and soft modernism its synthesis-- perhaps. For what is happening is a modernism 
without theory, without context, that exists as style alone.”252  
 
I strongly support this argument and would only add that this ‘soft modernism’ is divorced 
from its linear narrative, from history, and from our physical context. This is why ‘soft 
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modernism’ is so pertinent for today’s religious concepts, since ‘soft modernism’ effectively 
heralds the return of kitsch.  
 
No longer is there a narrative, no longer is there progress, there is only relativity, and that 
relativity occurs within a context of order and control. It is ironic that this order and control 
reflects the current social environment. With ‘an infinite plurality’ of ‘conceptual relativism’ 
and an absent common referent, we are (for the most part) unable to recognise the manner in 
which we are being controlled. Again referring to Zizek, our ‘freedom’ is commodified with 
reference to those ‘unfree’ countries.  
 
Consequently, our possessions or commodities effectively own us, with us acting as slaves, 
ignorant to the controlling physical consequences of our conceptual desires. I am arguing that 
this dynamic is viral by nature, therefore if we are “(t)o make sense of social epidemics, we 
must first understand that human communication has its own set of very unusual and 
counterintuitive rules. What must underlie successful epidemics…is a bedrock belief 
that…people can radically transform their behaviour[sp] or beliefs in the face of the right kind 
of impetus.”253  
 
If we compare our lives with another self-organising complex life form within our context, 
the virus, we may learn something of our dynamic. Fritjof Capra argues that the sole purpose 
of a virus “is the production of new viruses that will then go on to form living systems of this 
peculiar kind in the environments provided by other cells.”254  
 
Following this line of reason, it seems feasible to classify the societal behaviour of ‘western’ 
humanity as viruses.  As the late Bill Hicks parodied, “We're a virus with shoes, okay? That's 
all we are.”255 On a serious note, if we consider our environmental context as a biological 
organism and our communities as cells in a parasitic relationship with this organism, then we 
structure ‘living systems’ within the environments provided by other communities. We do not 
harmonise with our ecosystem but ‘self-organise’ and go onto produce more ‘viruses’, with 
new ecosystems subsequently tailored for our needs and desires. However, we do not possess 
viral evolutionary (st)ability and thus I suggest we should redefine our role as part of our 
ecosystem’s self-organisation.  
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Our concepts of god(s) would then reflect this holistic schema, instead of a hierarchically 
organised mechanical power game. Capra argues that since ecosystems are self-organising, 
“particular populations of organisms undergo periodic fluctuations…. animals and plants live 
together in a combination of competition and mutual dependency.”256  
 
There is no true hierarchy present, except in the human sphere, where we operate outside our 
physical context into a fictional context. This is evidenced within our culture, sport and 
antecedently, our religion. “Excessive aggression, competition, and destructive behavior [sic] 
are predominant only in the human species and have to be dealt with in terms of cultural 
values rather than being ‘explained’ pseudoscientifically as inherently natural phenomena.”257
 
This leads me to the obvious conclusion that it is no coincidence that these attributes are 
found in many humanly projected Gods, including the Judeo-Christian/Abrahamic God(s). 
Writing out of a 21st Century (post) Christian context, I am arguing that these attributes reflect 
our own nature, since our ‘God’ is a ‘second-order’ projection of our own consciousnesses. 
More than this, since this ‘God’ is accepted as omnipotent and omniscient, it externally 
validates all actions in continuing this virulent ontology until we meet our own demise. I am 
certainly not advocating another post-Christian apocalypse, but rather advocating some 
conscious thought in our ontology, bearing some personal responsibility for our beliefs and 
actions.   
 
Systems hierarchy. 
 
Capra suggests a systems hierarchy in opposition to this traditional hierarchy. He “turned the 
pyramid around and transformed it into a tree, a more appropriate symbol for the ecological 
nature of stratification in living systems.”258 With the inversion of the traditional hierarchy, 
one ‘god’ or ‘truth’ is transformed into many subjective truths, with the many followers of 
this ‘truth’ transformed into one communal collective creating a plenitude of religious beliefs, 
all of which (referring to Penner) are neither true or false.  
 
“The important aspect of the stratified order in nature is not the transfer of control but rather 
the organization [sic] of complexity.”259 I must reinforce the point that any attempt to order 
our environment and ourselves as we would our physical creations is problematic. We are part 
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of this ecosystem, not operating externally from it; yet these are the societies we construct. 
Our traditionally hierarchical aspirations, for power and eventual eternal life have fashioned 
an unsatisfactory society for most of us, as meritorious contexts do not work for all. By 
separating ourselves from our context and from our ‘second-order’ deities, we breed an 
element of dissatisfaction and fear, which is all too evident in the world today. “Since we too 
are born and are bound to die, does this mean that we are parts of larger systems that 
continually renew ourselves?”260  
 
I must argue yes, as social evolution takes place far quicker than genetic evolution261 and the 
path it takes depends on the societal context of the day. That is, thought forms may be 
transformed instantaneously, while biological transformation must obey the physical laws of 
‘first-order’ reality. As Capra notes: “The evolution of consciousness has given us not only 
the Cheops Pyramid, the Brandenburg Concertos, and the Theory of Relativity, but also the 
burning of witches, the Holocaust, and the bombing of Hiroshima.”262  
 
Since these signifiers initially image only a conceptual signified location, their only 
reality is their own symbolic or signifying nature. That is, the signified location does 
not become physical until the image is acted upon, or until ‘first-order’ consequences 
occur. This dynamic bears a strong analogy to religious reality, where Slavoj Zizek’s 
critiques of Hegel’s and Kant’s concepts are a good illustration. However, before 
proceeding one must recall Wittgenstein’s assertion that ‘objectivity’ is entirely 
contained within linguistic representations and Jaffe’s evidence that ‘monotheistic 
structure’ is distilled from ‘mythic narratives and liturgical life’. 
 
Zizek argues “(t)he Sublime is…the paradox of an object which, in the very field of 
representation, provides a view, in a negative way, of the dimension of what is 
unrepresentable.”263 The word ‘object’ is used here in that same way Wittgenstein uses it, 
having ‘no kind of composition’ and ‘is unrepresentable’ since it cannot be contained within 
language. This is the paradox Zizek speaks of, since the view must be a negative view in 
order to be unrepresentable, yet all positive views are open to a myriad of interpretations as 
Emily Brady argues with aesthetics. Therefore I am arguing it is this negative view; this 
absence of all things that allows the myriad of ‘mythic narratives’ Jaffe speaks of. 
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This is an inversion of the argument Kant appears to take up when he “presupposes that the 
Thing-in-itself exists as something positively given beyond the field of representation… a 
way of indicating, within the domain on phenomenality, this transcendent dimension of the 
Thing which persists in itself beyond phenomenality.”264 I disagree with Kant that the ‘Thing-
in-itself exists…beyond the field of representation’ and prefer Hegel’s argument “that there is 
nothing beyond phenomenality, beyond the field of representation.”265 Therefore the ‘Thing-
in-itself’ may be real, but it is a negative reality, an absence of existence.  
 
The primary difference (which I believe Hegel is correct in identifying) is that while 
our physical reality has phenomenal existence, our spiritual reality does not, and 
instead requires language to enjoy some form of existence. However, with its 
entrance into physical existence (through either voice or text) it instantly becomes 
dualistic and hence loses its singularity. “(T)he Sublime is… an object which 
occupies the place, replaces, fills out the empty place of the Thing as the void, as the 
pure Nothing of absolute negativity – the Sublime is an object whose positive body is 
just an embodiment of Nothing.”266 If we transfer our interpretation of God from the 
bible to that of Nietzsche’s metaphysics, we will see that his concept has also been 
misread.  
 
Since we currently “live in a formal and ordered social world, in which science and 
technology are available to rid our stay in the world of the terror that belonged to 
primitive man”267 we have assumed the mantle of the God of Genesis 1:28. When 
this fiction is taken as truth, it is of major concern. If we ultimately frame ourselves in 
a nihilistic (physical as well as conceptual) context, we must openly and carefully look 
and listen for the consequences of our fictive constructions, while maintaining an 
inter-dependent vigilance of our environmental context.  
 
In the next chapter I will argue that in contrast to this possibility, we currently operate in a 
semi-conscious state. I hypothesise that unless we are to assume some responsibility for our 
conceptual creation, we will become more and more dislocated from our context. This is not 
an apocalyptic warning, but purely an investigation of the methods of our belief dynamic. 
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 Chapter Three. 
 
In this chapter, I will firstly outline our societal slide into a pastiche/kitsch ontology. This 
pastiche ontology occurs through our lack of a referent, which dislocates us further from our 
context, making us schizophrenic interfaces within the nexus of the information stream.  
 
Pastiche reality. 
 
Frederic Jameson illustrates our (individual and collective) contextual dislocation by outlining 
the societal slide from parody to pastiche in the postmodern world. While “(b)oth… 
involve… mimicry(,)…. parody… produce(s) an imitation which mocks the original.”268 So 
by mocking the original, the parody reinforces its existence, as I have argued narrative also 
does. That is, whether supported or opposed, the original hierarchical position remains. This 
is an important contrast to pastiche non-existence, especially when referred to Zizek’s 
inverted interpretation269 of the traditional sublime and Baudrillard’s simulation within a 
religious context. Throughout history propaganda machines have parodied “other” cultures 
and institutions to reinforce their own context, while reinforcing (albeit from a disparaging 
perspective) their interpretation of the “other” context. 
 
However “(p)astiche is blank parody, parody that has lost its sense of humor[sic]”270 and with 
this loss of humour, the mimicry fades and the original subject is lost, or more correctly 
“dies”. Again, this is a ‘second-order’ “death”, as the physical subject still exists, and it is 
simply the physical subject’s function that dies. Where the ‘modern’ parody was linked to the 
individualist ‘private’ self, the ‘postmodern’ pastiche signals “that the old individual or 
individualist subject is “dead”; and that one might even describe the concept of the unique 
individual and the theoretical basis of individualism as ideological.”271  
The ‘subject’ is not only dead; but from our present contextual perspective it never existed, 
since we have no referent for it because of our contextual dislocation. The current hegemony 
argues that it “is merely a philosophical and cultural mystification which sought to persuade 
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people that they “had” individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity”,272 
when placed within the ever-present-present of the information stream that I will discuss later 
in this chapter.  
 
When this ‘mystification’ is applied to our Imago Dei argument, it explains the problems with 
religious truth today, as Ludwig Feuerbach illustrates: 
                       
(I)n religion man necessarily places his nature out of himself, regards his nature as a 
separate nature; necessarily, because the nature which is the object of theory lies 
outside of him, because all his conscious existence spends itself in his practical 
subjectivity. God is his alter ego, his other lost half; God is the complement of 
himself; in God he is the first perfect man.273
 
Therefore, with no ‘individual subjectivity’ it is impossible to project a personal ‘alter ego’ or 
God, and thus we currently live in reference to ‘second-order’ concepts (that are nihilistic 
when placed in a ‘first-order’ context), projected by those with knowledge of the dynamic of 
belief. 
 
Supporting my argument is Jameson’s notion that current: 
 
“writers and artists…will no longer be able to invent new styles and worlds – they’ve already 
been invented; only a limited number of combinations are possible…. [since] all that is left is 
to imitate dead styles.”274  
 
This limitation occurs through our need for a real world referential ontology and the 
necessary communicative context for discussing our reference to any signifying aesthetic. 
While these limited understandings may (as the holist would argue) point to something more 
than their finite constituents, they are still drawn from a finite context. Otherwise we have no 
means of understanding something we do not understand, which obviously leaves us with 
another tautology. 
  
This is apparent within textual and aesthetic creations such as art and music. There is a 
continual referencing of past concepts, within the pastiche practices of today, bringing about a 
plenitude of fragmented non-existent styles and selves. There is not and never was (from our 
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current perspective due to the negation of the subject) a ‘first-order’ (non-physical) textual or 
aesthetic existent. People continually reference (non-existent) ‘past’ concepts to shape 
‘future’ ones, while never considering that these concepts were kitsch simulations as well and 
not representations. 
 
Baudrillard articulates: 
  
Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and the 
real…. Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the utopia of the principle of 
equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the 
reversion and death sentence of every reference.275
 
Therefore, any real concept of the sublime or the divine must (as Zizek argues) be essentially 
negative (due to the ‘complete absence of any ‘first-order’ divinity’), as it is impossible to 
locate a real equivalent of any concept of God. So all concepts (that are contained within 
language) must, as Jaffe notes, be “mythic narratives”, a problem not confined purely to texts.  
 
Images also devolve in significance as we understand more about the nature of the sublime. 
What starts as a reflection of a “profound reality” proceeds to denature it and finally “masks 
the absence of a profound reality; it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own 
pure simulacrum.”276 An excellent example of the ‘absent subject’ is the Star Wars saga.  
 
Where this would have previously been a satire based on “the most important cultural 
experiences of the generation that grew up from the ‘30s to the ‘50s [that] was the Saturday 
afternoon serial of the Buck Rogers type…. [for today’s audience] there is no longer any 
point to a parody of such serials since they are long extinct.”277 These serials are extinct on 
three levels.  
 
Not only are the individual selves portrayed within the serials extinct, but also both the 
physical and conceptual existents (being the serial itself) are also extinct, due to our 
microcosmic and macrocosmic external referencing and our historical dislocation.  
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That is, the characterised portraits (of the ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’) are not only extinct, 
but the whole of their prior context is extinct. Consequently, since the individualist subject no 
longer exists (regardless of whether it ever did) neither do the values it portrayed.  
 
This may be clarified with the Mel Brooks parody “Space Balls” based on the Star Wars 
episode “The Return of the Jedi”, as both the characters and context were immediately 
recognisable. However the same does not hold when comparing Star Wars (which was also 
influenced by the work of Joseph Campbell278) against its target parody, the original Buck 
Rogers. Jameson notes our longing for these previously important contextual cultural 
experiences, articulating:  
 
Star Wars, far from being a pointless satire…satisfies a deep… longing to experience 
them again… (O)n some first level children can take the adventures straight… 
[while] the adult public is able to gratify a deeper and more properly nostalgic desire 
to return to that older period and to live its strange old aesthetic artefacts through 
once again.279
 
This ‘nostalgic desire’ refers to the first Star Wars trilogy in the 1970’s, which had a far 
greater cultural impact than the more recent trilogy. This fails to deliver nostalgia for the first 
trilogy and bears no relationship at all to the original Buck Rogers serials, thus illustrating its 
pastiche nature. However, it should be noted here that the Buck Rogers television series 
(1979-1981280) effectively parodied Star Wars. 
 
Our pastiche ontology occurs because we lose sight of the previous generation’s ‘cultural 
experiences’ after a certain time period has elapsed, and procure them as our own. These 
‘experiences’ exist within a linear timeline where they provide a future for us to live into. 
However, in opposition to linear non-chronological narratives, there is no meaning to be 
found, since we are dislocated from the context that our previous generation(s) enjoyed.  
This continual recycling of the previous generation’s pastiche concepts effectively traps us in 
societal reincarnation, as Engels argues: 
 
Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, through each person 
following his own consciously desired end, and history is precisely the resultant of 
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these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon 
the external world.281
 
Jameson notes the warning signs of: 
 
“the very style of nostalgia films invading and colonizing even those movies today which 
have contemporary settings: as though… we have become incapable of achieving aesthetic 
representations of our own current experience…. at the very least, an alarming and 
pathological symptom of a society that has become incapable of dealing with time and 
history.”282  
 
Baudrillard appears to agree with Jameson’s noting of the incapability ‘of dealing with time 
and history’, arguing that it is with the absence of the real that “nostalgia assumes its full 
meaning. There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality – a plethora of truth, of 
secondary objectivity, and authenticity”.283 These are obvious within Jameson’s fragmented 
society, which finds its roots in Plato’s cave argument.  
 
This argument suggests “(c)ultural production has been driven back inside the mind… it can 
no longer look directly out of its eyes at the real world for the referent…”284 Thus it seems we 
have (in the words of  Francis Fukuyama) effectively reached the end of time and are living 
post history. Fukuyama compares: 
 
“Plato’s thymos… the psychological seat of Hegel’s desire for recognition…. (with) the 
“desire for recognition”… (T)he former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with 
value, whereas the latter is an activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness 
share the same valuation.”285  
 
So the ‘desire for recognition’ is a function of the thymos. However, with no ‘real world 
referent’ the thymos is unable to validate its desire for recognition, hence is unable to live 
within a historical context. This causes the fragmented, pastiche, schizophrenic society that 
Jameson warns of. While the “thymos is, even in its most humble manifestations, the starting 
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point for human conflict”286, once this is removed from society, it allows the growth of 
Megalothymia, or “(t)he desire to be recognized as superior to other people.... Its opposite… 
(I)sothymia [or] the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people”287 is more difficult 
to validate.   
 
Fukuyama progresses this argument, claiming: 
 
Hegel too understood that the fundamental transition that had occurred in modern life 
was the domestication of the master, and his metamorphosis into economic man. But 
he realized that this did not mean the abolition of thymos so much as its 
transformation into a new and, he believed, higher form. The megalothymia of the 
few would have to give way to the isothymia of the many.288
 
I am arguing that with the lack of real world referents, and an ignorance of the mechanics of 
religious and secular belief systems, most of us are in a position of isothymia in order to 
indulge the megalothymia of those few pulling the proverbial strings. Certainly we are not 
trapped in this position by any other means than our own ignorance, as there are no 
conspiracies to discover.  
 
We are in this fragmented state through our own greed and laziness, transferring our “Imago 
Dei” image to kitsch commodities to satisfy our immediate desires. We are living post 
history, for we have lost all concept of continuity, and have no sense of our context. We only 
have veiled references to a (dead or non-existent (depending on the perspective taken)) past 
context; we have trapped ourselves. If we are to free ourselves, we must find a way of 
discussing the method our ontology follows within our (inter-) societal dynamic. 
 
Whereas the narrative of linear modernity previously provided a future destination in space 
and time for living into (while also always looking backwards), post-historical living has 
ignored this concept. While we may treat life as the ‘eternal now’ this is simply evidence of 
our dislocation from our physical context. There are consequences for all actions, which occur 
whether we acknowledge them or not. What is required is an ontological destination to live 
into, a method of ‘Being’, not a tangible destination. The pertinent question here seems to 
concern locating signs of such ontology in a world of simulation. 
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 Simulation. 
 
Jameson refers to Lacan’s model, which conceives of a linguistic sign: 
 
“as having two (or perhaps three) components. A sign, a word, a text, is here modelled as a 
relationship between a signifier – a material object, the sound of a word, the script of a text – 
and a signified, the meaning of that material word or material text. The third component 
would be the so-called “referent,” the “real” object in the “real” world to which the sign 
refers.”289  
 
Thus, to simplify, the signifier (from a ‘first-order’ perspective) exists since it is a sign that 
can be empirically validated. The signified element does not exist, but is real none the less, 
with the physical consequences of the signification being both real and existent. The referent 
also exists as it is a real object in the real world. So, if this theory was practically applied to 
today’s society, the sign could be a police statement informing society of the dangers of pure 
methamphetamine, the signified element would be the inter-subjective meaning people took 
from that and the choices they made in their lives, and the referent would be the positive or 
negative physical consequences of those choices.  
 
This is the method behind societal belief, a method that is inoperable without a full grasp of 
language, and a dynamic that is impossible to attribute to the sublime, as there can be no ‘real 
world’ referent for it. This argument is also utilised by the philosopher Charles Peirce, who 
splits a genuine sign’s foundation into three aspects forming the triadic relative of icon, index 
and symbol.290  As John Fitzgerald critiques: “Peirce says: “A sign is in conjoint relation to 
the thing denoted and to the mind…. The kind of sign that fulfils this description is a symbol, 
especially a linguistic sign.””291
 
Therefore, whether traditionally interpreting or consciously creating a significant element, 
one finds this symbolism in all language. This includes language of a religious nature, and 
any attempt to signify a designated subjective internal experience. There can be no 
independence between the sign and its interpreter, or the sign becomes degenerate, such as the 
naturally occurring relationship between smoke and fire.292 That is, the sign requires the 
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interpreter to generate a signified meaning, and the symbolism the interpreter uses to generate 
this signified meaning is contained within language, or else we may not speak of it. 
 
The independence between sign and interpreter distinguishes between the external (‘first-
order’) world of physical reality or what Peirce calls ‘brute force’, and the internal (‘second-
order’) world of consciously perceived reality (through interpretive experience). The fact that 
there are a variety of interpretations points to the impossibility to ‘know’ the true semiotic 
function of a symbol. If we cannot ‘know’ the true semiotic function, then we are free to 
create the interpretations we wish, albeit it at a ‘second-order’ level (which is all humanity 
has ever been capable of). “There are no pure icons, that is, disembodied qualities, but the 
closest analogue is an idea or image in an interpreter.”293  
 
If one follows this argument to a linear conclusion, the split between internal and external 
becomes plain. “If a sign is an icon, for example, it cannot give assurance to the interpreter 
that there is an existing object corresponding to it.”294 Without this, as Baudrillard has shown 
an icon or image bears ‘no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own simulacrum’, 
consuming itself into itself and creating its own kitsch reality. That is, the absence of a 
signifier removes any meaning, save that which we choose to commodify and create, whether 
actively or passively.  
 
The commodification of ‘the absence of a signifier’ is obscene since “through it, objects 
communicate…. All functions abolished in… communication….  All secrets, spaces and 
scenes abolished in a single dimension of information.”295 This abolition of function, secrets, 
spaces and scenes are functions of the schizophrenic information stream, as it controls our 
societal nexus and those who project the stream. This amplifies the obscenity (of information 
and/or commodification) and our desire for it as most of us search in vain for externally 
referenced meaning.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari offer an example of the obscenity of the absent signifier: 
 
There is a simple general formula for the signifying regime of the sign (the signifying sign): 
every sign refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum. That is why, at the 
limit… what is retained is… only the formal relation of sign to sign insofar as it defines a so-
called signifying chain. The limitless of significance replaces the sign…. Thus the sign… is 
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thought of as a symbol in a constant movement of referral from sign to sign. The signifier is 
the sign in redundancy with the sign.296
 
So, when we locate this ‘constant movement of referral’ within the information stream, we 
can see the amplified obscenity that contextually dislocates us. When our ‘second-order’ 
reality is dislocated from ‘first-order’ (physical) consequences, it is dislocated from us, hence, 
with our current societal ontology, we are dislocated from ourselves. Baudrillard outlines our 
dislocation from our physical context: 
 
Simulation is…. the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal…. It 
is the map that precedes the territory…. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist 
here and there in the deserts which are…ours. The desert of the real itself.297
 
This ‘desert of the real’ is our ‘first-order’ (physical) real, or our biological existential selves. 
‘Vestiges’ of us ‘persist here and there’, but for the most part we do not exist. While this 
argument is only pertinent to the technological world (contained within the information 
stream), the consequences of our actions on the rest of the world are very real.  
 
Mark C. Taylor advance Baudrillard’s argument: 
 
Whether the referent of the sign is taken to be “real” or “ideal,” the distinction between 
signifier and signified is actually a product of consciousness itself…. That to which 
consciousness points is already within consciousness itself…. Consciousness, therefore, deals 
only with signs and never reaches the thing itself.298
 
So the only way there will be ‘something’ there to reach is if we reconnect to our physical 
(‘first-order’) context and realise the consequences of our intentions. To do this we must 
acknowledge the fictitious nature of our ‘second-order’ truths, as Slavoj Zizek elucidates. 
Zizek does this by outlining and naming the contrast between ‘first-order’ natural reality and 
‘second-order’ created reality as ‘fetish’. This “is effectively a kind of inverse of the 
symptom…. which disturbs the surface of the false appearance… (F)etish is the embodiment 
of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth.”299  
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Fetish. 
 
Zizek uses the analogy of a repressed death for his example, where “the repressed trauma 
returns in the symptom”300 unlike the fetish which allows one to cope with the rational reality 
of the death, by denying it with a lie. Therefore instead of repressing the trauma, only for it to 
emerge subconsciously in a harmful way, the fetish allows one to ‘lie’ to oneself in order to 
avoid the reality. If this practice is carried over into organised religion, it may be seen with 
the lie that there are (any number of) Gods to avoid the reality, the unbearable truth of ‘first-
order’ absence of a qualitative God.  
 
Adrian Johnson301 reflects that “Zizek makes the paradoxical move of arguing, alongside his 
rejection of a stable distinction between subjectivity and sociality, that the big Other of the 
symbolic order only effectively exists (albeit in an illusory, ephemeral fashion) insofar as 
subjects treat it "as if" it possessed a stable, independent reality as an overarching system of 
collective mediation--"there is an "objective" sociosymbolic system only insofar as subjects 
treat it as such" (Zizek, 2000a, p 26302).”303 A practical secular example of fetish occurs in the 
Columbia Pictures film, “GO’.304  
 
Two characters in this film, a gay couple that play a pair of ‘soap opera’ doctors, hit a woman 
in the car park of a rave, sending her body into a ditch. They hurriedly drive off, but on 
reflection think she is dead, and return to dispose of the body. The driver (Adam) who hit the 
woman stands on the edge of the ditch; while his accomplice (Zack) goes down to retrieve the 
body.  
 
Zack: “Listen to me.” 
Adam: “She’s dead.” 
Zack: “She’s not dead.” 
Adam: “She’s dead and I hit her and I killed her and she’s dead.” 
Zack: “She’s not dead, she’s acting dead. Listen Adam, this is just a scene, look at the light, 
the one you’re blocking, say hi to Molly in makeup.” 
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Adam: (crying) “Hi Molly.” 
Zack offers Adam as many vege-burgers as he wants from the place: “round the corner…. just 
help me get through this scene Adam.” 
Adam: “I’m not delusional Zack.” 
Zack: “Well then grab her fucking arms.” 
 
Although the victim (who, incidentally is still alive but from their current perspective) is 
dead, and Adam has tremendous guilt for ‘killing’ her, fetishising reality in this manner 
allows him to help dispose of the ‘body’ while still maintaining rationality.  
In this case, Adam is able to function by lying to himself about the ‘unbearable truth’ of his 
actions. He is ‘not delusional’ and knows exactly what he has done, but by ‘acting’ (or lying 
to himself) instead of losing emotional control as he initially did (when he was a crying mess) 
Adam is able to function in a fully rational manner. Adam has simply conditioned himself to 
believe a certain lie. 
 
When this example is expanded we can see how our entire existence is externally conditioned 
and how we have no concept of how little our lives actually belong to us. Fetish is a conscious 
method of accepting (otherwise known as a coping strategy) our unfavourable circumstances 
in life, as opposed to subconsciously inhibiting them and not recognising the dynamic. Fetish 
allows us to escape into our alternative realities, although not in a schizophrenic way. We are 
not isolated from the external world (reality), thus we do not create fictional personalities and 
existences. We merely allow ourselves some escapism, a holiday from the world as such, in 
order to cope with the external dynamic.  
 
So, it is only because of this coping mechanism that “fetishists…are thoroughly “realists,” 
able to accept the way things effectively are – since they have their fetish to which they can 
cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality.”305 This ‘second-order’ ‘fetishism’ allows 
the person to cope with (and assumes an antithetical position to) their ‘first-order’ ‘physical 
reality’. Yet the person is not lost in either position but (sub-)consciously synthesises the 
middle position to enrich their life, in this case as a coping mechanism. From an objective 
rational perspective, fetishising is lacking reason, is wasteful and is effectively an empty 
practice. Yet from a subjective perspective, it is essential to a balanced life. The variables and 
methods of the fetish dynamic are sure to vary widely, and one may be assured that some 
aspects are rather unsavoury.  
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Yet regardless of the specifics: 
 
(I)f the fetish-object is taken away from the fetishist, this cynical facade of pragmatic 
resignation disintegrates …. “So, when we are bombarded by claims that in our post-
ideological cynical era nobody believes in the proclaimed ideals, when we encounter a person 
who claims he is cured of any beliefs, accepting social reality the way it is, one should always 
counter such claims with the question: OK, but where is the fetish that enables you to (pretend 
to) accept reality “the way it is?”” (Zizek, 2001c306, p 15).307
 
Contextually, if there is true freedom of choice and the individual endures no external 
influencing factors, fetishism is a safe and practical method for many individuals to manifest 
an alternate reality (for a certain limited period of time) in order to ‘accept reality “the way it 
is”’. This fetishisation does not interfere with their ‘societally objective’ reality, yet allows 
them to cope with certain eventualities, minus the chemically assisted ontologies so many of 
us choose in this secular day and age. Failure to attend to this aspect of our dynamic ensures 
the bulk of our ‘second-order’ created reality as naturally problematic, manifesting as the 
(‘first-order’) ‘symptom’.  
 
Since we are the variables within our system, we often miss noticing the dynamic in 
action, since it is not physically observable. For example “capitalism's life-blood, 
money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-
performative force emanating from this same material. And yet… its vampiric 
symbiosis with individual human desire… makes it highly unlikely that people can 
simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking.”308
 
The “social relations” of this ‘Capitalist commodity fetishism’ then drive “the mystification 
of one’s daily activities, the religion of everyday life which attributes living activity to 
inanimate things”.309 Therefore, our whole subconsciously conditioned, ‘second-order’ 
conceptual existence is effectively empty, from a ‘first- order’ perspective. That is, the only 
‘first-order’ reality is the physical context for the consequences of ‘second-order’ conditioned 
thought.  
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Currently anything that is unacceptable to the status quo (some of it rightly so) is termed 
destructive. This communal validation has always been essential for religious acceptance, and 
while this has always been the case, it is only with the postmodern/pluralistic freedom of 
expression that such explicit criticism has been widely noticed.  “Personal action is either 
predominantly validating, confirming, encouraging, supportive, enhancing, or it is 
invalidating, discomforting, discouraging, undermining and constricting. It can be creative or 
destructive.”310
 
Nexus. 
 
Laing (writing in 1967) outlined the manner in which: 
 
we obey and defend beings that exist only in so far as we continue to invent and to perpetuate 
them…. We act not only in terms of our own experience, but of what we think they 
experience, and how we think they think we experience, and so on in a logically vertiginous 
spiral to infinity.311
 
I am arguing that the majority of societ(y)(ies)are manipulated in just this way; blindly 
following the few who have mastered the trait of manipulating others’ experiences. Laing 
identifies a reciprocally interiorised group (labelling it a ‘nexus’), whose unification is 
achieved purely through its members with no “’common object’ nor organisational or 
institutional structures”.312 This ‘nexus’ bears a striking resemblance to what Zizek terms the 
negative sublime, an argument that I discuss in my conclusion.  
 
This nexus contains no common objects or structure and its unity and the “condition of 
permanence of such a nexus… is the successful re-invention of whatever gives such 
experience its raison d’etre…. Each person has to act on the others to maintain the nexus in 
them”313. Therefore, with its reciprocal interiorization, there are very few if any observable 
qualifying characteristics from an external perspective, making it a perfect example of 
consciously created community.  
 
This nexus has gained unprecedented access to our inner worlds through the fluidity and 
provisionality of the perceived fixed truth of the electronic media, which allows unlimited 
manipulation. As Baudrillard comments: “With the television image – the television being the 
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ultimate and perfect object for this new era – our own body and the whole surrounding 
universe become a control screen.”314 For example, we may use the Patriot Act of post 9/11 
America to illustrate the practical method of a nexus. “The Patriot Act allows the government 
to do widespread surveillance, hold people indefinitely without charges, take away due 
process from non-citizens, and more.”315  
 
While this would have been previously unthinkable in ‘the land of the free’, it is now 
perfectly acceptable when (accompanied by the correct media spin) it is based around the 
nexus of George W. Bush. Carol V. Hamilton names Bush as a “Presidential Simulacrum”, 
comparing him to “Jerzy Kozinsky’s…character named, Chance the Gardener”316 played 
memorably by Peter Sellers: 
 
(I)n a post-literate, hyperreal world, those accretions of historical time and psychological 
reflection that produce subjectivity tend to disperse before they constitute a deep, coherent 
self. The result can be a personality like that of Bush ….a commodity produced by 
contemporary American culture, with its bizarre admixture of consumerism, television, 
worship of celebrities, and glib Christian fundamentalism.317
 
So this presidential simulacrum acts as the perfect nexus (since he effectively does not exist 
except as an image projected into a space) while also spouting “Churchillian rhetoric… 
[which] is used inappropriately… [in] America’s, war against its haters, despoilers, 
destroyers, with scant attention to complex histories that defy such reductiveness”.318 As the 
public are fed this dynamic through the media, they (also effectively act as a nexus, and) 
subconsciously maintain the ‘truth’ of it, by receiving and transmitting it over and over as all 
good interfaces should.  
 
However, the information is dislocated from their contextual reality and thus all ‘complex 
histories’ and physical consequences are deemed irrelevant. With this contextual dislocation, 
the rhetoric/information/image is simulacrum/hyper-real/kitsch.  
This dynamic of this information stream is the exact inversion of the sublime (that also has no 
real world referent), as this is a secular construction following the same method. The only 
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meaning the information stream carries is that which is encoded to it, but this meaning is 
determined by the spin-doctors controlling the interface input.  
That is, the information stream acts as an inverted ‘first-order’ (or kitsch) absence in order to 
receive ‘second-order’ properties. However this inversion also acts to remove the choice of 
the human interface. The space within our language for the (positively inverted) sublime319 
allows the projection of certain chosen concepts within our cultural context.  
 
Albert Einstein (1941) has previously brought this subject to our attention with a practical 
example that I must agree with:  
 
In their struggle for the ethical good, teachers of religion must have the stature to give up the 
doctrine of a personal God, that is, give up that source of fear and hope which in the past 
placed such vast power in the hands of priests. In their labors [sic] they will have to avail 
themselves of those forces which are capable of cultivating the Good, the True, and the 
Beautiful in humanity itself. This is, to be sure, a more difficult but an incomparably more 
worthy task ...320 (Italics in quotation) 
 
That we have failed to ‘give up the doctrine of a personal God’ only adds to my argument 
that we collectively wish to take the easy path and have our immediate desires fulfilled. We 
see this same dynamic in today’s society through the transformation of the religious hierarchy 
into those whom control the information flow. Since the nexus currently force feeds concepts 
through our interface, the only means of rejection (and reversing the flow) would seem to be 
a removal from the data stream. This would require conscious effort but would allow us to 
see the dynamic in action. I must reiterate that this is not a conspiracy theory, for those 
controlling the ‘information flow’ are only fulfilling the demands of our immediate desires. 
Therefore, I realise that this ‘conscious effort’ is extremely unlikely to occur within the 21st 
Century.  
 
Patrick West argues that the physical consequences of our ‘fulfilled desires’ and our 
contextual dislocations are immediately apparent: 
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In the arts and in our lifestyles, endless bricolage, regurgitation and imitation bear testament 
to (simulation)…. We drink in fake Irish pubs, cocoon ourselves in virtual reality, and visit 
Disneyland to immerse ourselves in the worlds of ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, Olde 
England or the Wild West…. Technology dictates that nearly any object can be simulated…. 
If someone is an identical copy, then what makes the original “original”? After all, we do not 
label identical twins as “real” and “copy”321
 
That is, this acceptance is hyperreal since there are no ‘real world’ signifiers to correspond to 
in this inversion of the sublime, making it an obscene nexus. The problem is that we as a 
species have become too caught up with variables and paid far too little attention to the 
dynamic of the nexus and our pastiche society. Returning to Deleuze and Guattari, we 
become aware of the method of the dynamic: 
 
(T)he form of expression is reducible… to a set of statements arising in the social field 
considered as a stratum…. The form of content is reducible… to a complex state of things as 
a formation of power…. We could say that there are two constantly intersecting multiplicities, 
“discursive multiplicities” of expression and “nondiscursive multiplicities” of content.322
 
With expressiveness, permanence of record, swiftness and diffusion as the major contributory 
factors to efficient communications,323 it was “possible for society to be organized more and 
more on the higher faculties of man, on intelligence and sympathy, rather than on authority, 
caste, and routine.”324 However, when information is taken as permanent instead of 
provisional it is a primary concern, and the consequences of this are exacerbated in today’s 
society. With the printed media(s) (d)evolution325 into the electronic media two simultaneous 
consequences eventuated. Fixity transformed into fluidity, in essence replicating the 
transmission of traditional oral narratives, with our information disseminated through info-
taining news personalities. We formed a loyalty to certain personalities and trust their 
information transmission as a function of their integrity.  
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 Simultaneously, receivers (readers transformed into watchers and listeners) accepted this new 
provisional truth as a permanent one, since we have been raised in the age of printed media. 
That is, we still act as if there is a linear narrative, a documented history, but this only exists 
within the information stream of the ‘ever-present-present’. We have forgotten that with no 
(divine or secular) external referent, we must realise that the only reason those in hierarchy 
enjoy their power is because we acknowledge and accept them and their abilities.  
The Bivings group (who specialise in internet lobbying for major corporations such as 
Monsanto) provide evidence of the operative method of this power dynamic. An 
article on their website “warns that “there are some campaigns where... it is important 
to first ‘listen’ to what is being said online... Once you are plugged into this world, it is 
possible to make postings to these outlets that present your position as an 
uninvolved third party.... Sometimes only the client knows the precise role we played. 
Sometimes, in other words, real people have no idea that they are being managed by 
fake ones.””326
With our dislocation from the ‘everyday world’ we accede to the suggestions and demands of 
‘fake’ people with a modicum of fuss. If our informational inputs assure us of the 
(hierarchically positioned) truth of their concepts we accede happily, as long as we maintain a 
passive position. Charles Cooley argues: “we ought to keep at least a subconsciousness of this 
radical change in mechanism, without allowing for which nothing else can be understood.”327 
Without noticing this ‘radical change’ the best we can hope for, is to retrospectively notice 
shifts in society, and even if this is achieved, we will remain ignorant of reasons for them 
arising due to the fluid fixity of our ‘ever-present-present’. 
 
In Cooley’s historical context there was “nothing in this new mechanism quite so pervasive 
and characteristic as the daily newspaper…. a sort of screen on which is inscribed a world-
wide gossip!”328 While the ‘daily newspaper’ seems mundane by today’s ‘gossip screen’ 
standards, we must remember that the proportional contrast between gossip newspapers and 
other forms of printed media is equivalent to that between electronic media and ‘gossip 
newspapers’ today.  
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Regardless of motivation and content, this gossip “promotes a widespread sociability and 
sense of community…. (and) fosters superficiality and commonplaces in every sphere of 
thought and feeling”329, albeit in an intensified form today. The dynamic of supply and 
demand is pertinent here, for if we did not desire consumerised acceptance, those in power 
would have no need for the delivery of it. No one is to blame; we have simply ceased 
maintaining the structure of a post Christian society.  
 
This is evidenced by the manner in which “(t)he relation between the statement and the act is 
internal, immanent….a relation of redundancy…. Newspapers, news, proceed by redundancy, 
in that they tell us what we “must” think, retain, expect, etc.”330 We relinquish our creativity 
in this ‘relation of redundancy’, yet it would take very little to remember/re-learn the method 
of the creative dynamic. 
 
This ‘relation of redundancy’ has become dislocated from the fixity of the printed 
media, with the (d)evolution of the ‘information stream’, thus dislocating itself and us 
from our historical context. Stewart Hoover outlines our contextual dislocation, as we 
become entrenched in the ‘ever-present-present’: 
 
In the secular news, everything is immediate and oncoming. You don’t see enough of 
the religious view or of the community news…. Even if you do see a church doing… a 
revival or something, it doesn’t follow through. You anticipate its coming, but what 
happened after that revival?331
 
Essentially this function of the information stream acts as a synthesis between the printed 
media and the orally transmitted traditions as Ruth Finnegan illustrates: 
 
When the description of the past depends on recollection… as in an oral culture, the account 
is liable to be directly susceptible to present-day fashions and the current allocation of 
power.332
 
Finnegan then contrasts this susceptibility to printed media: 
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where there is a permanent and unchangeable record in writing, there is, by that very fact, at 
least the possibility of a detailed and self-conscious check on the truth of historical 
accounts.333
 
Therefore, we have a fluid media that is susceptible to alteration, which we accept as a fixed 
record. That is, with our contextual dislocation (due to our use of the media for our external 
referencing) our only useful purpose is to transmit and receive information (which maintains 
the media); the specifics of the information are irrelevant, and it is purely the transmitting 
dynamic that matters.  
 
Baudrillard articulates the consequences of our passage into simulation:  
 
The very quotidian nature of the terrestrial habitat hypostasised in space means the end of 
metaphysics. The era of hyperreality now begins…. what used to be lived out on earth…is 
henceforth projected into reality…into absolute space which is also that of simulation.334
 
Yet how could this occur without our knowledge and agreement? How can most of us be 
living a life of simulation, while still believing it to be real? These questions can be answered 
with reference to Baudrillard’s outlining of the method of desire fulfilment: 
 
The control of the extensive and speedy media of modern communications can add extra 
strength to a totalitarian government and additional force to a power seeking demagogue…. 
(I)t is sometimes argued that the overall effect of the present system of telecommunications 
(together with mass-circulation newspapers) in modern industrial society is to lull and 
manipulate the people into acceptance of the current power structure.335
 
This supports the argument that we appear engaged in the practice of externally referencing 
our pastiche reality from the obscene flow of information, which we subconsciously utilise to 
maintain our interdependent nexus, while following traditional patterns. Pastiche hierarchical 
structures subsequently remain. Therefore hyperreality is our own ‘second-order’ 
manipulation of our previous ‘second-order’ reality and ourselves. It accounts for our 
exuberance in accepting it through the familiarity of its dynamic. The ‘information stream’ is 
only manipulated because we allow it, and in many cases desire it.  
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New Zealand case study. 
 
The historical ‘familiarity’ of this dynamic is outlined in Bill Pearson’s Fretful Sleepers336 
essay, which was published in the New Zealand journal Landfall in 1952. Pearson was born in 
1922, in Greymouth where he also grew up. He then: 
 
“attended Canterbury University College, Dunedin Training College and Otago University 
College…. taught briefly at Blackball School…served in the Dental Corps in Fiji in 1942–43, 
in the infantry in Egypt and Italy and in the occupation force in Japan in 1943–46. After 
completing an MA at Canterbury in 1947–48, he taught at Oxford District High School in 
1949 and then went to King’s College, University of London (PhD 1952). He remained in 
England, writing and working as a supply teacher for London Council Schools 1952–53. He 
returned to lecture at Auckland University College (later University of Auckland) from 1959 
until his retirement as associate professor in 1986, apart from periods overseas”.337
 
As such, Pearson’s career spanned a wide variety of contexts and offered him a variety of 
perspectives. Therefore his argument provides a useful contrast to today’s nexus, while 
comparing the implicit behaviours of yesteryear with today’s society. If we compare our 
current ontology to Pearson’s ontology, it would appear that while New Zealand has made 
technological and cultural progress, we still collectively act as the atomised ‘man alone’ (a 
fact Pearson criticised in 1952). This atomised attitude, when combined with our marginalised 
geographical location makes us an excellent microcosm to investigate today’s global yet 
atomised society. The nexus regulates our own individual experience (through our interface) 
against what we think other individuals experience. This supports Laing’s ‘vertiginous spiral 
to infinity’. 
 
Therefore, it is our ‘atomised’ nature that makes this dynamic possible, as all individuals 
within the collective follow this dynamic in the same manner as we traditionally followed a 
religious belief. That is, the kitsch nature of our continual semiconscious behaviour is 
illustrated by ‘projecting itself into absolute space’.  
Since our society has made ‘technological progress’ within the ‘global community’, the 
effects of this progress should be quite pronounced. That is, we should have noticed a more 
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pronounced contrast, since we were previously geographically marginalised before our 
contextual dislocation within the global interface. If we begin by considering some of 
Pearson’s central claims, it should be readily noticeable whether they still hold today, or 
whether they contrast with the consequences of our technological evolution.  
 
Pearson wrote contextually that: 
 
(t)he New Zealander delegates authority, then forgets it. He has shrugged off responsibility 
and wants to be left alone…. (o)nly when things go visibly wrong does he recall his right to 
question authority and change it. When he complains half his bitterness is that he has been 
made to complain because he hates complaint and he can’t complain with dignity.338
 
While there are certainly a percentage of New Zealanders who involve themselves in 
pertinent issues, this has always been the case. The primary New Zealand ontology still 
appears to be one of apathy, (if the current social environment is anything to go by,) 
illustrating the atomisation and (consumer driven) kitsch lack of ‘reality’. It certainly appears 
that our current global simulacrum is merely the destination of our collective natures within 
the developed world, for if we are not an accurate microcosm, why do these results appear to 
bear out on a macrocosmic scale? 
 
I am arguing that we have become divorced from our existential physical context as well as 
our historical location, and now reference ourselves against the information we are fed. We 
have become part of our own system of belief, sucking ourselves into ourselves, purely ‘to 
transmit and receive information.’ Objects within our context have become “tests, they are the 
ones that interrogate us…. Thus all the messages in the media function in a similar fashion: 
neither information nor communication, but referendum, perpetual test, circular response, 
verification of the code.”339  
 
Ranulph Glanville, agrees with this claim, and refers to cyberspace to argue: 
 
Events are made by observing….occur in the space between….also determine that space…. 
[and] make up the interface…. The interface lies… between [the] acts of the Objects…. When 
we assume the interface is “as if” it were on the Object of our observing, we give no space to 
                                                 
338 Pearson, Bill. Fretful Sleepers and Other Essays. p 2.
339 Baudrillard, Jean. “Hypermarket and hypercommodity.” In Baudrillard, J. (ed.) Simulacra and 
simulation. p 75. 
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that Object to help form that interface. Then the interface only admits action and reaction: 
behaviour determined by the observing Object.340
 
Whether we are the observing Object, or the event that the information transmitter observes, 
becomes irrelevant. We collapse into each other, (removing the space and) becoming singular, 
with no contextual reference and no dualistic means of interpretation. Thus our societal nexus 
continues instantaneously transmitting and receiving within a closed loop context. 
 
Hence “one can no longer talk about the “real”…. [or] try to dispel the old conception of 
language as naming…a one-to-one correspondence between a signifier and a signified.”341 
With ‘postmodern’ fractionalisation any communal possibility of such naming has long since 
evaporated. While schizophrenics cannot know the past and future components of language, 
they “will clearly have a far more intense experience of any given present of the world than 
we do, since our own present is always part of some larger set of projects which force us 
selectively to focus our perceptions.”342 This perceptual focusing or ‘closing our mind’ is 
purely contextual and is a choice that we make, usually without considering the 
consequences, as we continue within our ever-present-present. 
 
To clarify, instead of acting as a switching interface that is divorced from ‘first-order’ reality, 
I am arguing that we have the ability to either choose already existent deities, or create new 
ones, as intentional tools to enhance our ‘internal sphere’. By considering what emotional and 
psychological states would satisfy our requirements in the long term (both individually and 
societally), we could consciously work toward realising this goal.  
 
Again, I realise that mainstream society has little time for this practice due to societal 
obligations, but if academics and theologians made the physical consequences of our ‘ideas 
and scholarship’ apparent, our ontology should shift. That is, if academics and theologians 
contextualised their theoretical concepts by linking them to our physically existent reality, 
instead of adding to societal dislocation: then mainstream society should reconnect to our 
context.  
Mediating clergy would serve no purpose and religious and secular hierarchical power 
structures should consequently become obsolete, unless they were chosen as a reaction to 
their disappearance. That is, they would hopefully be actively chosen and not passively 
                                                 
340 Glanville, Ranulph. “Acts Between and Between Acts.” In Ascot, Roy. (ed.) Reframing 
Consciousness. p 13. 
341 Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society.” In Foster, Hal. (ed.) Postmodern 
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utilised to avoid conscious thought; they would be an integral part of the societal context and 
not a hierarchical hegemonic power structure. People would not follow by apathy, but instead 
by assent (replicating the traditional Christian model within a secular context). 
 
Traditionally our accepted ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ (with the exception of physical facts) are purely 
others’ annotated experience that is passed down to us. Currently we receive and transmit 
them as (dislocated) switching interfaces. While the traditional practice perpetually trapped 
society into the previous context and allowed little choice, the current practice keeps us in the 
‘ever-present-present’, where we suck ourselves into ourselves through our desire for 
isothymia.  
 
Imagined Community. 
 
Benedict Anderson confirmed this ‘superficiality’ with his four primary aspects of the 
Imagined Community; the first two directly describing the dynamic of the schizophrenic 
nexus, while the last two deal with the perceived sovereignty of the post modern nation state:  
 
1) It is imagined because the members never know their fellow members.  Nationalism 
invents nation.     
 2) It is imagined as limited because it has finite boundaries.  
 3) It is imagined as sovereign because this is an age of post-Enlightenment and Revolution, 
i.e., an age of freedom of individuals.  
 4) It is imagined as a community because the nation is conceived as deep, horizontal 
comradeship.343
Since we are isothymic schizophrenic switching centres, we never know the inner 
nature of our fellow desirers, save within the information stream, where we are 
singular and thus have no ‘real-world’ reference point. The ‘finite boundaries’ of our 
electronic media appears limitless from our subjective position, yet it provides a very 
real boundary between our ‘Imagined Community’ and our physical context, where all 
consequences of our actions affect our existence.  
Anderson’s imagined community has also been criticised344 as: culturally reductionist, invalid 
in certain cases concerning nationalism and religion, flawed in arguing that the Americas 
                                                 
343 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. p 5-7 
344 http://www.revisionist-notes.co.uk/revision/964.html. © UK-Learning 2001-3. 
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were the birthplace of nationalism, and flawed concerning anti-colonial nationalisms. Its 
premise is apparently:  
 
that the decline of religion made it possible… to imagine the nation…. Whilst Europe existed 
as the great religiously imagined communities, the conception of time was one in which 
history was fused together. The past, present and future were not linked causally, but through 
the will of the divine. Within such a conception of time, the word "meanwhile" can have no 
meaning. With the dissolution of such communities, it became possible to imagine a state in 
which there was…"homogenous, empty time.345
 
It is worth briefly investigating these criticisms to show that, regardless of them, Anderson 
makes valid points in his argument. The main thrust of this argument is that imagined religion 
fused history together and that ‘empty time’ was only possible with the decline of these 
religions. While America may not have been ‘the birthplace of nationalism’ I must agree with 
Anderson and argue that it was the birthplace of current nationalism.  
 
I argue that, like culture, religion is a function of human society; an effort to fulfil our desire 
for singularity and with the decline of religion this desire was simply transferred from God to 
the flag. I also disagree that Anderson’s thesis is ‘culturally reductionist’, since all three major 
Abrahamic monotheisms follow this same dynamic. While his argument may be religiously 
reductionist, I feel that this is an unfair criticism, since the majority of the western world 
follows a religious or secular methodology with monotheistic roots. Since this is the context 
we are working out of, then it seems reasonable to base the argument within this context. 
Anderson’s ‘homogenous, empty time’ is the perfect context for the schizophrenic nexus we 
enjoy today. While it may be argued that religion is on the rise; whether in the form of 
fundamentalist Islam or a return to one of the many Christian traditions, this return is of an 
atomised nature. That is, the religion does not cause the cessation of patriotism, international 
commerce and continually glocalising communities. Church and state are unlikely to form a 
symbiotic enterprise in the foreseeable future. This religious revival appears to be more of a 
search for community, and personal meaning as a member of said community. 
 
Cooley articulates human social interactions as “a sample…of those processes… identifying 
itself with the general movement of a group as to achieve a remarkably just anticipation of 
what the group will do.”346 This I argue accounts for traditional cultural differences, and 
evolutionary variations between ‘truths’ (when not interfered with through external means). 
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Thus the inter-dependency that existed maintained the societal identity. However within the 
nexus, this interdependency exists through our ‘switching interface’ and therefore on a 
subconscious level. As the conditioning ‘information stream’ informs us of the next 
provisional truth(s), we simultaneously create this/them on a societal level and accept them as 
valid.  
 
Cooley suggests that an acceptance of an evolutionary perspective allows us “to see the 
relation between society and the individual as an organic relation.”347 This relation, when 
applied to our current consumerist culture and our isothymia, works very efficiently to 
maintain our position in ‘empty time’ and ‘empty space’ for the previously mentioned 
inverted kenosis to occur.  If this appears entrenched in a philosophical argument and 
irrelevant to the practical world, one need only look to the marketplace to locate two excellent 
current examples of this concept. As stated above, it must be remembered that as we interact 
with these ‘objects’ or ‘tests’ we ourselves transform.  
 
Jeff Brand argues for utilising the effects of video games on children as a transformative tool, 
in “Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate: 
 
For young learners today, video games are part the “cultural furniture” (this term used by UK 
author and journalist Steven Poole). The development of boys and girls, their socialisation, 
and their formal learning (including literacy) are at risk if they reject contemporary media. 
What humanises technology most completely is appropriation of it.348  
 
This research is supported by “(r)esearchers at the Institute of Education at London … (who) 
confirm that games are good for a child's development….  (and) are as culturally relevant as 
music, film and literature.”349
 
Yet while these humanised technologies may aid in personal development, they still interact 
within the matrix of information processing. This is a consequence of technological progress, 
and while games such as Play-station 2 and X Box may be contextually beneficial, they still 
turn humans into (the previously mentioned) electronic interfaces. The difference between the 
actual games and the associated marketing is also a pertinent issue:  
 
Julie Creighton, director of the Duracell Kid's Choice Toy Survey…. said. "If you ask 
children what they want, they give you the marketing information they've been fed by the 
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media. But if you ask them why they want it, you'll learn what meaning the toy has in their 
lives.350
 
It is striking how our children replicate our behaviour, as we behave in exactly the same way 
in response to marketing campaigns, with the majority of our population (locally and 
globally) preferring to be spoon-fed by the mass media rather than logging on to the quality 
cyber-media that exists with critical integrity351 to gain an informed perspective. 
 
While it is easy to criticize the current generation of teenagers for their consumerist desires it 
must not be forgotten that we are their parents. They are a product of our conditioning as we 
are a product of adults of a similar age to Bill Pearson, thus they are the ‘destination (and 
dislocation) of our collective nature’. 
 
This current dislocation from historical continuity shows how “the experience of the present 
becomes powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and “material”: the world comes before the 
schizophrenic with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge of affect, 
glowing with hallucinatory energy.”352 This has little application within creative visualisation, 
as there are no referents and both the game and the player collectively become a kitsch, or 
‘invertedly sublime singular’ simulacrum. By searching for external salvation (only to find 
none) we have settled for sensory intensity with the games acting as technological 
appendages, making us cyborgs with a gaming interface.  
 
This concept was explored in the David Cronenberg’s science fiction film Existenz (1999) 
with the video game interfacing through a bio-port in the gamer’s lower back. While this is 
purely science fiction, it illustrates how close Donna Haraway’s conceptual cyborg is to 
current reality:  
 
Late twentieth century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between 
natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and eternally designed, and many other 
distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly 
lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.353
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 Thus by joining with them, we become the space for them to project into, dislocating us into a 
‘singular simulacrum’. For a real world progression from Cronenberg and Haraway, we need 
only look to Markus Giesler, an assistant professor of marketing at York University. Geisler 
describes the experience of using an iPod as one: 
 
“that transforms listeners into “cyborgs” through a process he calls “technotranscendence.”…. 
Giesler notes that users give their iPods names, and carry them close to their bodies—the 
vibrations of the hard drive makes the device feel alive.”354
 
Consumers therefore unintentionally support Haraway’s theory that these machines make 
humans ‘frighteningly inert’ with the iPod user considering it:  
 
a body extension. Its part of my memory, and if I lose this stuff, I lose part of my identity…. 
The consumer is plugged into all kinds of technologies and networks that affect consumer 
behavior [sic]…. consumption patterns change: from materiality to information--the internet; 
from ownership to access--file sharing; and from pattern to randomness--the iPod355. 
 
With the shift from physical ‘first-order’ to kitsch ‘second-order’, and from contextual 
reality to dislocated hyper-reality, the human interface now ceases thinking about the 
context of the experience and instead becomes part of the new dislocated context, 
transmitting and receiving with heightened sensitivity. This dislocation is heightened 
by the previously gimmicky “(s)huffle mode…. [which] is (now) the most viable 
strategy to access information that would otherwise be lost…. It reduces the 
complexity of consumption. It’s a cyborg consumption strategy.””356
 
However, like Dr Frankenstein’s monster, Haraway’s concept has evolved and will continue 
to evolve. Katherine Hayles argues that where the “(c)yborg looks to the past as well as the 
future”,357 current cyborgs have no concepts of historical narrative and are instead best 
summarised by the shuffle mode which is now most popular. Therefore, while the ‘traditional 
cyborg’, like Frankenstein’s monster, was created in a certain context, this same cyborg was 
not contextually dislocated (as we currently are) and was therefore not a hyper-real simulation 
of itself. That is, our technology has a conceptual life of its own, with us becoming 
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increasingly ‘inert’. The analogy here is that the megalothymic master that currently 
dominates us is our own creation, a creation we appear to desire, yet be completely ignorant 
of.  
 
One example of this is the way that “(m)imesis in modernity moves between…the 
sublime and the kitsch…. mirror reflections of each other, each….  [that] require the 
disintegration [and proclaim the fundamental illusion] of time and space. That which 
lies beyond can either be theistically or atheistically interpreted; it can either be 
plenitude or void.”358 While this disintegration ‘of time and space’ speaks of 
transcendence, it outlines the dynamic that is utilised within the nexus of today. I am 
arguing that it is this desire (for transcendence) that maintains our current societal 
structure and our blindness to the underlying dynamic. 
 
The absence of ‘reality’ is borne out with previous signifiers loss of their signified 
consequences. “[A] signifier that has lost its signified has thereby been transformed into an 
image.”359 Not only does it cease to exist, it never did (from a ‘first-order’ perspective, of 
course). That is, its only previous reality was as a cultural construct and since meaning has 
been diverted to images, it simply now just “is”.  
 
An analogy may be drawn here between transcendence and Bataille’s immanence, except that 
we are consuming our projected provisional immanence to satisfy our immediate desires; 
dislocated from our physical context. Where previously, “(t)he oppositions subject/object and 
public/private were still meaningful…. today the scene and mirror no longer exist: instead, 
there is a screen and network.”360 The illusion of ‘objective’ reality has vanished, leaving the 
myriad of kitsch atomised interpretations:  
 
So the first originals are not those who simply mimetically follow another, but in some sense 
they exemplify a creative power immanent to their being as humans. … They do not merely 
image themselves…. (t)hey struggle to rescue human promise from its formlessness…361
 
Again, if this argument appears overly dramatic, we may find it easier to trace the path from 
human to cyborg with a return to Bill Pearson’s New Zealand example. Where Pearson drew 
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attention to many explicit aspects of New Zealand society, I argue that these have become 
pastiche, implicitly constructing our current ontology with no reference to the past.  
 
Pearson’s referencing of what he terms the two-faced attitude of middle class New Zealand 
(assuming such a collective still exists) to social climbing362is particularly pertinent here. This 
still appears to be a search for an external referent, and for meaning, while attempting to 
maintain some independence. If we treat New Zealand as a globally liminal context (due to 
our short period of nationhood, our subsequent lack of historical tradition and our low 
population), then we provide an interesting microcosm into human nature, once it has been 
removed from its context. That is, without extended history and high population for us to 
immerse ourselves in, we illustrate human nature without influencing factors. 
 
Pearson stated that “(b)eing middle-class we fear and sneer at royalty and aristocracy, yet we 
hanker after them because an aristocrat’s goodwill confers security on our self-esteem…. We 
sneer at English customs, yet from every visiting Englishman we exact words of praise and 
are offended if he criticises us.”363 It seems we want their praise and approval, yet we don’t 
want to be like them. This need for belonging or community would appear to be a human 
condition.  
 
However, while the behaviour remains, it has passed from parody into pastiche in the same 
way as the Buck Rogers type serials have passed to the Star Wars trilogies. We still behave in 
the same way but we have forgotten the reason for this behaviour. What is more, this attitude 
has disseminated into our local contexts, causing a rather schizophrenic contrast to our ‘tall 
poppy’ syndrome. We want acceptance and praise yet we have no wish to be noticed and 
most of us will avoid ‘rocking the boat’ at all costs. Pearson elucidates how in his day, when 
people left their hometown to travel to university, the hometown folk would look for a chance 
to condemn you for being different.364 This being ‘different’ was another pseudonym for 
‘getting ahead’ and Pearson ruminates that at that stage, no other population in the world 
behaved in this manner.  
 
I argue that it is still the case; that ‘blue collar’ people have to work extremely hard to 
shake the conditioning of youth. Yet the reason for this ‘condemnation’ has long 
since been forgotten. We act on ‘autopilot’ never questioning why we behave in these 
ways. It is for this reason that I am arguing for the pastiche nature of today’s society.  
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As Pearson365 so aptly illustrates, we all fear (to some extent) public opinion or ‘not looking 
good’.366 This fear has been passed through generations in a ‘self fulfilling prophecy’, 
eternally recycling “in the same way as this year’s pullets pecked by old hens grow into next 
year’s hens to peck the new batch of pullets.”367 This externally referenced fear from the 
previous generation is negative for two primary reasons.  
 
Firstly and most obviously it keeps those of us in the current context referencing against the 
same values, whether supportively or antagonistically; but secondly and I argue more 
importantly, the reasons for these values erode over time, are lost and assimilated into our 
ontology, with us never questioning why. This is especially apparent within the information 
stream, as the spatial collapse and contextual dislocation consequently removes our reference 
points. 
 
Pearson bemoaned the inability of New Zealanders to speculate about themselves368 
suggesting that “(i)t all boils down to a paralysing self-consciousness, a fear to appear in 
public without fulfilling every expectation of the audience, a craving for protective 
camouflage.”369 I want to suggest that these behaviours are the human ontology, exacerbated 
by our ‘man alone’ status in this previously isolated community. 
 
Where in other cultures there has been a long history with which to identify, a linear 
community to belong to with traditions to follow, these are all sadly lacking in New Zealand.  
We are left with the perpetual recycling of antagonistic attitudes to each other and ourselves, 
with a fear of achievement beyond the societal aggregate.  
 
The paradox presents in the fact that we require an externally referential source of meaning 
and praise, yet we will not expose ourselves enough to receive such praise, and when we do 
receive it we camouflage our gratitude with self-deprecating insults.  
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 Schizophrenia. 
 
Therefore we are schizophrenic. We show two faces to life, in this ever-present-present: our 
private face, which craves for belonging and community contrasts to our public face, which 
presents these ‘self deprecating’ insults and the consequences of our ‘craving for protective 
camouflage’. While this behaviour is a societal schizophrenia, it still falls within clinical 
guidelines. 
 
Dr. Julian Silverman370 has distinguished two types of schizophrenia, “essential 
schizophrenia” and “paranoid schizophrenia”. With “essential schizophrenia” one withdraws 
“from the impacts of experience in the outside world…. [which] falls back and away, and 
invasions from the unconscious overtake and overwhelm one.”371 This appears an accurate 
representation of our society as information interface. The physical consequences or ‘impacts 
of experience’ fall away, with the electronic media overwhelming our unconscious and 
overtaking us. While this describes the isothymia or ‘desire to be recognised as the equal of 
other people’, it does not apply to the few in the position of megalothymia.  
 
In ““paranoid schizophrenia”…the person remains alert and extremely sensitive to the world 
and its events, interpreting all, however, in terms of his own projected fantasies, fears, and 
terrors, and with a sense of being in danger from assaults. The assaults, actually, are from 
within, but he projects them outward, imagining that the world is everywhere on watch 
against him.”372 This belief acts as a powerful motivational force for the ‘desire to be 
recognised as superior to other people’ or megalothymia. If the whole world is ‘on watch 
against him’, then the best way one can stave off these perceived attacks is to be superiorly 
intimidating. Joseph Campbell adds that: 
 
man…. has both an inherited biology and a personal biography, the “archetypes of the 
unconscious” being expressions of the first…. (I)n a schizophrenic plunge one descends to the 
“collective,” and the imagery there experienced is largely of the order of the archetypes of 
myth.373
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 This argument is supported with the content of popular electronic fantasy and war gaming (as 
a simulacrum for mythic archetypes) in the isothymia’s ‘desire to be recognised’, by assuming 
a persona within the game’s contextual conflict; while the megalothymia’s desire for 
superiority can cause epic physical consequences, when one is deluded enough to attempt to 
dominate the ‘collective’ according to mythic narratives. There is a dislocation from physical 
community and historical time. Everything is pastiche with no referential points (and no 
perceived consequences to our actions); yet we behave as if these referential points still 
existed. 
 
The rampant consumerism of today only drives us to keep up with current trends for fear of 
falling behind, for fear of losing the externally referential support and praise of the advertising 
media (in an implicitly hegemonic way) and other members of (our and other) societ(y)(ies). 
Even this praise we desire, will (and always has) lack(ed) intimacy, as this is impermissible to 
Kiwi mate-ship. While we wish to be recognised as the equal of other people, we do not wish 
them to know that we desire this. Pearson illustrated this hypocrisy (of desiring something yet 
simultaneously criticizing those who are noticed as also desiring it), and these attitudes are 
again pertinent when contrasted with current society; illustrating the current lack of 
community, even if it was previously based on hypocrisy.  
 
For instance “(t)he youth leering off to his first booze-up drinks as if he has been initiated into 
the mysteries of manhood.”374 He has attained the rite of passage, enthusiastically accepting 
his role in the hypocritical community, and behaving in a way deemed as unacceptable in his 
family home.  Yet, other “fathers can’t be bothered with this hypocrisy: they swear and drink 
at home and their children grow up knowing the hypocrisy of others who are models before 
their children and only relax in the bar.”375  
 
These ‘models before their children’ would frequently criticise the behaviour of those who 
‘swear and drink at home’ as unacceptable, yet those who behaved in this manner exhibited a 
great deal more integrity, as they did not modify their behaviour in order to garner societal 
approval, approval that would still be lacking intimacy. However, the fact that societal or 
communal approval was important provides a good contrast with today’s absence of 
community, with individuals instead desiring societal approval with regards to consumer 
goods.  
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While revealing our schizophrenic nature, this hypocritical behaviour also illustrates the 
contextual shift (and atomisation) for our implicit emotional behavioural patterns. While 
drugs have (in many cases) replaced alcohol as the ‘recreational choice’ and the traditional 
sporting interests of ‘rugby and racing’ have atomised into a myriad of sporting pastimes 
(which while previously existent, only garnered a minute amount of public interest), it is the 
massive growth in computer games, iPods and the information stream that best illustrates our 
dislocation: “What we need to retain…is the idea that… schizophrenia, emerges from the 
failure of the infant to accede fully into the realm of speech and language.”376  
 
Wittgenstein has shown that speech and language contain our reality, a view supported by 
Noam Chomsky: 
 
A child, in Chomsky’s view, “knows” the principles of language before he says his first 
words…. “Knowledge of language,” Chomsky is careful to point out, “results from the 
interplay of initially given structures of the mind, maturational processes and interaction with 
the environment.” Chomsky’s theories rest upon two observations about language. The first is 
that a grammar describes a basic knowledge shared by all speakers of the language. The 
second is that our use of language is fundamentally creative.377
 
Therefore, with our language lapsing into the ‘ever-present-present’, and hence not achieving 
its potential, historical evolution is impossible. No longer is there an inter-dependent 
community but instead a plethora of atomised individuals, desiring a ‘self-interested’ context, 
consequently disallowing any inter-connected community and ensuring a schizophrenic 
destiny. This is especially apparent “in the hyperreal United States, where “reality TV” has 
usurped reality itself, (and) the problematic status of “the real” is precisely the issue.”378 As 
Baudrillard continues: 
 
(T)oday it is the very space of habitation that is conceived as both receiver and 
distributor…regulating everything from a distance…. Simulators of leisure or of vacations in 
the home…become conceivable.379
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The same dynamic operates here as within the nexus. The inverted sublime, the space of 
habitation, regulated at a distance by a self-contained group, with ‘little if any qualifying 
characteristics’. Baudrillard progresses this theory one step further, by showing how our 
entire life is simulated, reinforcing Foster’s description of Jameson’s shift from parody to 
pastiche. The problem pertains to how the “transistorization [sic] of the environment, 
relegates to total uselessness…all that used to fill the scene of our lives…. The real itself 
appears as a large useless body.”380  
 
Where Zizek’s ‘fetish’ reinforced reality, allowing the lie to permit the unbearable truth, 
Jameson’s ‘pastiche’ removes the truth from our lives, causing a fragmented solipsistic 
schizophrenic reality. When viewed “(f)rom an anarchist perspective, however, fragmentation 
does not indicate the dissolution of society but its perfection, the realization of a utopian 
world divided into independent autonomous units.”381  
 
Baudrillard appears to agree with this ‘large useless body’ of ‘pastiche reality, reinforcing 
Jameson’s argument that the signifier has not only lost its signified meaning, it never 
possessed one (from today’s dislocated perspective). He argues that: 
 
(o)bscenity begins precisely when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when 
everything is exposed to the harsh inexorable light of information and communication….we 
live in the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene…. (It) outs an end to every 
representation.382
 
With ‘a simulated transistorization of pastiche schizophrenia’ replacing any ‘real’ linear 
narrative, mainstream society has turned to an obscene consumerism in an attempt to gain 
hypocritical societal acceptance, which is itself kitsch. This schizophrenia means that all 
historical trends (and none) are present now and continually now. Thus modernity, post 
modernity, soft modernity and all other societal progressions simultaneously effect our 
atomised society, suggesting that anarchy may indeed be our final destination. That is, with 
our externally referenced manipulation, our atomised society and our ever-present-present 
information stream, we appear headed on the path to non-community. That is, individualism 
within a context of ‘might is right’, or anarchy. 
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In this final chapter, Frederic Jameson continues to support the perspective outlined in chapter 
3, arguing that schizophrenia is evident in “the immense fragmentation and privatisation[sic] 
of modern literature…[that] foreshadows deeper and more general tendencies in social life as 
a whole.”383 The argument (as Zizek elucidated with the ‘free society’) is that we have lost 
our inter-connectedness as we become increasingly atomised and commodified, this 
increasing our consumerism and the fictional nature of our fractal lives.  
 
The traditional religious institutionalised hierarchy have transformed into consumer 
marketing; consequently we believe that certain products will bring us salvation, therefore we 
live in primary reference to them. Our attention spans relate to the electronic media (that is, 
very short) and the only meaning in our lives is signified by advertising slogans. While we 
may still ‘empirically validate’ words on a computer screen, something more than this is 
happening. We feel connected to these words, as if they speak directly to our consciousness 
(which in fact they may do) with the removal of all filters, increasing the intensity of our 
input. While we perceive these words as fixed, following our written tradition, they may be 
altered at a moments notice, causing a panic bred from dislocation.   
 
This new societal panic derives from “this state of terror proper to the schizophrenic… with 
no halo of private protection, not even his own body, to protect him anymore…. now only a 
pure screen, a switching center[sic] for all the networks of influence.”384 Our hypocritical 
desire for ‘societal acceptance’ has paradoxically fulfilled itself without our notice. While we 
have hidden our desires, protecting our ‘inner selves’ from the physical world with ‘external 
armour’; we have submitted our ‘inner selves’ to information overload in a way we would 
never accept in physical reality. In the 1950’s the New Zealander who was “afraid of that 
accursed self of his that might get off-side of his norm-ridden society”385 would never allow 
emotional depth to show to others. However, this fear has evolved so that today we are so 
busy with our isothymia that we have collectively become, as Baudrillard has stated, a 
‘switching centre’, and schizophrenic interface.  
 
Edward Said argues that culture (at least in the current ‘western’ sense) serves this role, and 
“works very effectively to make invisible and even “impossible” the actual affiliations that 
exist between the world of ideas and scholarship, on the one hand, and the world of brute 
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politics, corporate and state power, and military force on the other.”386 In this context, culture 
serves to remove from view, the ‘first-order’ consequences of ‘second-order’ intentions. We 
may be assured that these consequences exist; they are simply irrelevant in a world devoid of 
meaning. Perhaps the irrelevance of these consequences needs to be placed in the current 
context of cultural sensory desensitisation, due to our lack of a collective ‘halo of private 
protection’ to protect against the various ‘networks of influence’ along the ‘information 
stream’. 
 
For example, Fredy Perlman argues that even when “(c)apital wears the mask of a natural 
force…. [and] it is admitted that the power of Capital is created by men, this admission may 
merely be the occasion for the invention of an even more imposing mask, the mask of a man-
made force, a Frankenstein387 monster, whose power inspires more awe than that of any 
natural force.”388 This, while using the dynamic of a nexus, may take the form of a religion or 
nation state philosophy. 
 
Ignorance of conceptual consequences. 
 
Returning to Harraway’s argument that practical examples of these information driven 
schizophrenic nexuses abound, and can be reduced to a single function, or dynamic, for our 
creation of monsters such as Frankenstein’s, we see: 
 
Modern states, multinational corporations, military power… political processes, fabrication of 
our imaginations… commercial pornography…and religious evangelism depend intimately 
upon electronics. Microelectronics is the technical basis of simulacra, that is, of copies 
without originals.389
 
One suitably disgusting example of this is “(v)irtual child pornography [which] does not 
involve children. Instead, it uses computer simulations of children. "If there are no children 
involved, you're not exploiting any children," said [Rep. Jerry] Nadler. Thus, a previous law 
banning virtual child porn was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court” of the U.S.A.390  
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 Therefore the physical consequences of our information stream are in many cases deemed 
irrelevant. These simulacra, these functions of our information stream, our current nexus, are 
the building blocks that inspire a new and awe full future nexus, hence we always have an 
apocalypse to live into. This also reinforces Said’s argument of the invisibility of affiliations 
between ideas and brute force, whether externally explicit, or internally implicit. When the 
physical world becomes irrelevant (or desensitised), both the origins and consequences of 
‘ideas and scholarship’ also become irrelevant. “There is always an Other; and this Other 
willy-nilly turns interpretation into a social activity, albeit with unforeseen consequences, 
audiences, constituencies and so on.”391 We treat this ‘Other’ as an external part of our nexus, 
only referring to it in a socially acceptable manner, this acceptance conditioned by both 
transmitters and receivers within the nexus. 
 
While this dynamic is most apparent in religion and concepts of God, the same dynamics 
apply to ‘politics, corporate and state power’. It is this ignorance of the separation between 
‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ reality and the ignorance of the consequences of mixing the 
two that must be acknowledged. If our concepts are externally referenced (as they currently 
are) it is easy to ignore this fact, yet if concepts are (societally) internally referenced, personal 
responsibility must win out. While a shift in referencing may bear exactly the same results as 
those currently on offer, at least we would consciously choose these results, instead of having 
them transmitted to the ‘switching centre’ that currently is our subconscious. 
 
It appears that the simplicity of this concept, that all non-physical concepts have fictional 
origins, attaining provisional truth only through ‘the harsh inexorable light of information and 
communication’, has been hidden through over-complication. It appears accepted that 
knowledge is atomised within various disciplines, with very little inter-dependence. All 
universities “appear to exercise an almost totally unrestrained influence: the principle that 
knowledge ought to exist, be sought after and disseminated in a very divided form.”392  
 
I argue that this divided dissemination of information only proves that there is no underlying 
truth to be ascertained, for if there were, these varied paths should all allow some common 
frame of reference, which they do not. By that, I mean that while similar disciplines can 
converse, they still rely on their respective perceptual filters and it is the similarity in these 
filters that allows the conversation. 
 
                                                 
391 Said, Edward W. Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies. in Foster, Hal. Postmodern Culture. p 137. 
392 Ibid. p 140-141. 
 108
For example, if an evolutionary psychologist, a sociologist, an anthropologist, a theologian 
and an oral historian all travelled to the highlands of Papua New Guinea (and I use this 
example purely for its remote location), it seems a foregone conclusion, that they would draw 
rather different interpretations of the culture they investigated. No one of them could provide 
an understanding of it; they could only interpret it from within their own respective 
frameworks, and would require a common frame of reference in order to discuss their data. 
However an unconditioned common frame of reference is not forthcoming. 
 
Therefore I am arguing for the absence of any divine external referent, which effectively 
occurs as a divine absence. That is, without this absence, we would not have our ‘second-
order’ divine external referents. However, we still appear to act as thought these referent(s) 
exist (outside the context of our ‘second-order’ interdependent constructions) and have an 
almost phobic opposition to encountering the method at work, instead following specifically 
isolated paths as if they were truth, when none exists. Said reiterates this argument with the 
requirement “to pass through certain rules of accreditation… [to] learn the rules…speak the 
language… master the idioms and… accept the authorities of the field…to which you want to 
contribute.”393  
 
Said also inadvertently supports Pearson’s concept of last year’s hens394 pecking this year’s 
pullets, as this ‘pecking’ continually conditions the division of contextually disseminated 
‘truths’ that we require in order to converse within our disciplines. While we require certain 
language skills, we do not need to perpetually reinforce the same doctrinal ‘truths’. It is a 
prerequisite to both individual and societal evolution that we understand the dynamic of our 
chosen field, but this dynamic may be understood without necessarily accepting ‘the 
authorities of the field’. Every ‘truth’ should be critically re-evaluated in an ongoing manner. 
 
I am arguing that this ‘re-evaluation’ is antithetical to the dynamic of our current societal 
nexus; this is reflected in the practice of literary studies, which (amongst others) focuses on 
“masterpieces in need of periodic adulation and appreciation. Such correlations make possible 
the use of words like “objectivity,” “realism” and “moderation” [which] when used in 
sociology or in literary criticism…. represent non-interference in the affairs of the everyday 
world.”395 Our ‘everyday world’ within the obscenity of the ‘single dimension of information’ 
is just another influential image projected into our ‘schizophrenic switching centre’.  
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 Yet it cannot be stated too strongly that there is no conspiracy in operation here; for as 
previously stated ‘if we did not desire consumerised acceptance, those in power would have 
no need for the delivery of it.’ This reflects Pearson’s earlier statement that when the New 
Zealander of the 1950’s “complains half his bitterness is that he has been made to complain 
because he hates complaint and he can’t complain with dignity.”396 Whatever our historical or 
geographical context within the ‘western’ culture, we seem to desire our ‘truths’ to be 
externally given, to be concise and to be of no threat to our perceived everyday world. We are 
for the most part uninterested in the physical consequences of our intentions on the ‘Other’ 
whether this ‘Other’ is located within our own or another community. An argument may be 
made that this is a consequence of the Judeo Christian/ Greek legacy. Joseph Daleiden argues: 
 
Claiming special knowledge of God's will, the Judeo-Christian religions (as well as other 
religions) have sought for three millennia or more to usurp the political process to further their 
theological ends.397
 
What is required is fluidity of thought, a conscious interpretation of the ‘everyday world’, 
instead of an externally conditioned acceptance of it. Conceptual ‘knowledge’ must be 
critically and consciously investigated, or as Said argues; interference is necessary with a 
“crossing of borders and obstacles, a determined attempt to generalize exactly at those points 
where generalizations seem impossible to make.”398 While this may be an unreasonable 
expectation of ‘mainstream society’ (due to work, social and familial obligations causing time 
constraints), there is no excuse for ‘intellectuals’ who must “reopen the blocked social 
processes ceding objective representation (hence power) of the world to a small coterie of 
experts and their clients.”399  
 
While external referencing is still an obvious prerequisite to any form of social knowledge, 
this must be balanced against internal referencing based in critical interpretation. Charles 
Horton Cooley elucidates that “(t)here is no sharp line between the means of communication 
and the rest of the external world. In a sense all objects and actions are symbols of mind, and 
nearly anything may be used as a sign”.400 With an (apparently) inadvertent nod to both 
Wittgenstein and Rorty, Cooley seemingly denotes our reality as constrained by language, as 
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there is (currently) no other method for discussing ‘symbols of mind’, save our part within the 
collectively schizophrenic interface of the nexus.  
 
However as we have seen, within the nexus there are a multitude of signifiers and an almost 
infinite amount of signified consequences determined by the ‘small coterie of experts and 
their clients’. We should always remember “that communication…is truly the outside or 
visible structure of thought, as much as (the) effect of the inside or conscious life of men”.401 
When this dynamic is collectively applied to us as schizophrenic interface within our ‘ever-
present-present’ obscenity of information, communication becomes identical with our ‘inside 
or conscious life’, and we see our role as a singular ‘sublimely-inverted’ collective. It is 
necessary to recall Zizek’s concept of the sublime here:  
 
the logic of the negation of the negation’ – the discovery that negation can be experienced 
positively.402
 
There are two important elements in this statement pertinent to our current situation.  
First, in order for negation to be experienced positively, there must be dualism, for if there is 
not, we become negated and lose our ‘real-world’ reference point. It may be argued that this 
is the goal of all religions, to experience non-duality; yet this has always been impractical 
from an evolutionary perspective, hence there has always been a split between mainstream 
society and the clergy/sangha/shaman. While these individuals or institutions may assume a 
significant or even dominant position within the society, if the whole society assumed their 
position, it would break down very quickly, due to total contextual immanence. Second, there 
is a major difference between experiencing negation positively and replacing negation with a 
positive singularity. The reason negation is sublime is that it has no ‘real-world’ referent and 
(due to its singularity) is the absence of all signifiers.  
 
With our ‘nexus-driven’ inversion of this singularity, we become desiring clones, divorced 
from ‘real-world’ consequences and schizophrenically receiving and transmitting the many 
signifiers. Again, this is not a conspiracy theory, nor Gnostic rhetoric. I am not arguing that 
there is some spark of divine knowledge, or some mischievous demon playing with humanity 
in some freakish puppet show. I am also not arguing that all humanity acts in this way, but 
unfortunately for mainstream passive society, most of us (either deliberately or accidentally) 
do act in this way. What I am arguing for is some realisation of the dynamic of our belief 
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structures and their contextual consequences, for active as opposed to passive belief 
structures.  
 
To return to my earlier argument: ‘Whether a hierarchically organised cosmological schema 
or a nationalist based democratic bureaucracy, it is the inverted ‘self-disclosure’ or inverted 
kenosis, with the conceptual framework being emptied into the space, that allows the 
maintenance of the respective institutions.’  So since our desires are active they cause us to 
become passive, (‘our machines become active while we become frighteningly inert’,) that we 
may receive what we desire, and without a ‘halo of protection’ we assume our position as 
schizophrenic switching centres.   
 
This combined with our isothymia ensures that our collective maintains the nexus, as this 
gives us community and allows those who transmit the information to ‘empty out’ kenotically 
into our ‘empty space’. As previously stated, Jameson’s ‘failure of the infant to accede fully 
into the realm of speech and language’ ensures the ‘plethora of atomised individuals, desiring 
a ‘self-interested’ context, consequently disallowing any inter-connected community’. 
However all is not lost, for if we become aware of the method of communication, become 
aware of the lack of ‘first-order’ divinity and of the actions of ‘the coterie of experts’ (both 
religious and secular), we may gain the ability to live in a truly authentic way.  
 
This authenticity would be achieved with the many individual (atomised) 
interpretations/creations of society shared interdependently with others (within and between 
communities) through language. This is certainly not a (sublime) utopian concept, for we are 
closer to that in our ‘ever-present-present’, even if this has been inverted into a (kitsch) 
dystopic context. However this is as close as we are likely to come and this is illustrated when 
we create a space and then fill it with human constructs. 
 
Pluralist society. 
 
Terry Godlove unintentionally offers a solution to our current hierarchical societal problems 
by outlining the operational dynamic behind a functioning pluralist society. He argues: 
 
the fun and the frustration in coming to understand one another involves mixing and matching 
considerations of holism, natural history, rationality of value, together with all we know of 
our interlocutor’s capacities and education, together with our knowledge of the causal, non-
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rational forces we suspect are in play – group pressure, raging hormones, wishful thinking, 
and cognitive predispositions might all be candidates.403
 
In short, a pluralist society has many internal biologically individual and external societally 
contextual influences and interdependent historical traditions, with the society’s conceptual 
function (that is, our conceptual structures being a function of us), being (holistically) more 
than the sum of its constituents. Hence in a Feuerbachian sense we project ourselves into the 
‘absence’ (in the previously argued inverted kenosis) to externally self reference. “The 
creation of meaningful events out of raw happenings…. results from the performance itself, 
from “the movements of the body in space and time””404, and thus it is a function of the 
performance.  
 
The subconsciously conditioned mind currently (supportively or antagonistically) interprets 
events in reference to the current contextual external reference, the information stream. In a 
religious sense, this is how external ‘experiences’ occur and are held to be evidence of an 
external deity. They are purely subliminally conditioned/stimulated functions of us, 
referenced either against the mainstream or the periphery of society. 
 
In many cultures the ‘emotional stimulation’ that motivates a religious experience occurs in 
the form of a crisis, which is often manifested as a psychosis (usually experienced in early 
adolescence). It is pertinent here to ask the question, “(w)hat happens when we construct our 
lives in the discourse of crisis?”405 Or more pertinently, what happens when we construct our 
lives in the discourse of a religious experience, founded in the moment of crisis? Sheila 
McNamee provides the first step to answering this question by suggesting two options for the 
description of life’s ‘disruptive episodes’406. The first conception is that something ‘happens’ 
to a person while the second suggests “circumstances have brought the crisis to the 
person,”407 (Italics in quote) be that ourselves or some external factor(s).  
 
McNamee argues that people experiencing crisis can follow two paths, and while I am in full 
agreement, I must suggest that a third possibility also exists. She shows that the term ‘crisis’ 
is derived from the Greek term krinein, which means separation from “others in our 
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interactive communities.”408 Thus crises would seem to be socially constructed marginalising 
events that dislocate the recipient of the experience from the societal centre. 
 
The recipient then follows what McNamee argues are the only two possibilities for people in 
crisis, either: “(1) finding a route back to the center[sic], or (2) moving beyond the border into 
another domain (which includes both ‘healthier’ non-crisis identities and the possibility of the 
‘abnormal’ domain).”409 Therefore, they communally validate their experience and locate 
themselves within this new community. Since crises are social constructs, a third possibility is 
that instead of moving to another society or back into the centre of the current society, one 
may instead choose to live on the margins of society.  
 
Liminality. 
 
Liminality (as a function of crisis) may be an empowering experience; David Aberbach 
illustrates one consequence of liminality, in which “the charismatic leader rises from the 
ordinary, to be transformed and fulfil this destined role…. [Therefore] (c)risis creates 
charisma.”410 However, we must remember that both crisis and charisma are ‘socially 
constructed’, are therefore ‘second-order’, and are only societally important within a 
homogenised mainstream community. That is, as I have previously argued with reference to 
Terry Godlove’s interpretation of a pluralistic society; charisma is far less effective when 
there is no communal consensus and validation. 
 
Would liminal non-conformity and societal dislocation cause the individual to be 
distressed/motivated enough to act in a charismatic manner, if the mainstream was not 
homogenised? Would the charisma be socially acceptable? Would liminally charismatic 
behaviour be brought into the mainstream in a non-hierarchical society? These questions raise 
the dangerous problem of what occurs when physical consequences are ignored; or when 
‘second-order’ reality is accepted as ‘first-order’ truth: 
Throughout evolution it has always been the misfit that has been the vehicle of creative 
change…. by creating maladjustments (in religious language, willing ‘evil’), misfits 
continually cause the present to be transcended (in religious language, they create ‘good’).411
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When we consume the misfit’s concepts we forget the subjective nature of all ‘second-order’ 
belief systems. For instance “in Hitler’s ideology…. (r)edemption is brought about by 
knowing, by knowledge.”412 However, as we have seen there is nothing to know, except in 
this case, Hitler’s belief in redemption. Thus, when his charismatic message was transmitted 
through the interface to the mainstream community who were collectively undergoing the 
socially constructed crisis, it became the mainstream ontology.  
In this 20th Century context, the “transformation of extraordinariness into charisma… and 
magnetism of the potential charismatic leader”413 caused six million deaths. “A charismatic 
leader [such as Hitler]… cannot consider himself to be the agent of an ideology, which 
always represents some measure of constraint…. A chiliastic idea is infinitely….   malleable 
– it can be what the leader says it is.”414 Thus this ‘malleable idea’ becomes a propaganda 
tool, for projection into the nexus where the mainstream consumes the liminally constructed 
crisis.  
 
This reiterates my argument that it is only with the absence of any ‘first-order’ truth that we 
are left with the ‘second-order’ creations that are accepted by the mainstream, as it externally 
references for some type of meaning:  
 
The production of proof… falls under the control of another language game, in which the goal 
is no longer truth, but performativity – that is, the best possible input/output equation.415
 
So we rely not on what is said but how it is said. As Marshall McLuhan states, “The medium 
is the message" because it is the "medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of 
human association and action."416 In our present dislocated society, the (medium is the 
information stream and the) performativity of the meaning occurs through the fulfilment of 
our desires. In this case we desire meaning. 
 
When we remember that all (discussable) reality is contained within language, we see that 
“(t)his is how legitimation by power takes shape…. The performativity of an utterance, be it 
denotative or prescriptive, increases proportionally to the amount of information about its 
referent one has at one’s disposal.”417 Since all (non-physical) truths are effectively reducible 
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to faith statements, the amount of propaganda therefore ‘proportionally increases’ the 
legitimation of the hegemonic power’s consumption of the liminal crisis.  
 
By combining Macquarrie’s argument with a question of Aberbach’s, we arrive at an 
interesting paradox: “Religion or spirituality, uncriticized by reason, tends to become fantastic 
and undisciplined; truth divorced from justice (‘value-free’) may easily become inhuman”418 
as ‘second-order’ reality is, when divorced from ‘first-order’ consequences. Yet “(i)s it not 
also true that charisma provokes crisis? In this paradox the dynamic nature of charisma 
lies.”419
  
The problem is that “(c)harisma can be a force for evil, but it also represents that part of 
human nature which keeps alive primeval wildness and freedom. To frame its fearful 
symmetry is to strangle it.”420 However, antithetically, framing ‘its fearful symmetry’ also 
amplifies it. While Hitler’s ideals may still have influenced a pluralistic society, they would 
not have found the same ‘feeding ground’ as that of a hierarchical homogenised society in 
crisis, searching for liminal referents. Again, the Holocaust is easily the most pertinent case 
study to support this argument. Without rational bureaucratisation “the Holocaust would be 
unthinkable. It was the rational world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust 
thinkable.”421  
 
That is, the Holocaust would never have occurred without the legitimation of ‘bureaucratic 
propaganda’: 
 
The most poignant point, it seems, is the easiness with which most people slip into the role 
requiring cruelty or at least moral blindness – if only the role has been duly fortified and 
legitimized by superior authority.422
 
One solution to this ‘poignant point’ may be for the hierarchical mainstream to cease 
bureaucratising peripheral charismatic movements, and instead allow these minority 
movements in a pluralistic manner. Yet this danger is reduced within the conceptual 
variety of the pluralist society. I acknowledge that relative ‘evil’423 would still occur, 
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423 “Evil, in a large sense, may be described as the sum of the opposition, which experience shows to 
exist in the universe, to the desires and needs of individuals; whence arises, among humans beings at 
least, the sufferings in which life abounds.” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm. 
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but the scale of the damage would be markedly reduced. Again, if we return to 
Godlove’s interpretation of a pluralistic society, I am arguing that ‘relative ‘evil’’ would 
be far less likely to take hold within a hegemonic bureaucracy, since in a truly 
pluralistic society, there would be a great many competing conceptual realities. The 
consequence of this is that none of these ‘conceptual realities’ would enjoy 
preference, with every concept being forced to compromise in some manner. 
 
Therefore, I must oppose Cooley’s argument that “(a) well-developed individual can exist 
only in and through a well-developed whole, and vice versa.”424 While an individual must 
enjoy some social contact, the level of such contact and the condition of the whole are 
completely flexible. This is currently borne out within the ‘information stream’, as we are 
hardly a ‘well developed whole’ (either individually or collectively), when acting as a 
‘switching interface’. I am simply arguing that the marginalised individual may not conform 
directly to societal norms, (especially when the Holocaust’s historical context is used as an 
example) but it is out of this non-conformation that individual and therefore societal growth 
occurs. 
 
The Edge. 
 
The Saatchi and Saatchi advertising guru Kevin Roberts gives an example of this with the 
naming of his website www.nzedge.com. In 1996 Roberts and Kevin Kelly (founding editor 
of “Wired”) were in conversation, with Kelly relating “that New Zealand was really easy to 
understand, “because in biology – his genre – change and innovation occurs first on the edge 
of a species, where the population is most sparse.”425 It is worth noting that prior to founding 
“Wired”, Kelly was a nomadic photojournalist and spent most of the 1970’s in isolated parts 
of Asia; he also ran a mail order catalogue for global budget travel during the 1980’s.426 So it 
would seem that Kelly is well qualified to speak of fringes and edges. Kelly’s argument is 
detailed in a conversation with Joe Flower where he states that: 
 
Almost all innovation in a system happens at fringes…. The nature of an innovation is that it 
will arise at a fringe where it can afford to become prevalent enough to establish its usefulness 
without being overwhelmed by the inertia of the orthodox system.427
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This emphasises my argument that there are other options to moving back into the centre of a 
community, or to a new community. It is this need for ‘normality’, for rational acceptance, 
and for crisis solution that pulls marginalised (individuals and) concepts into the mainstream. 
In contrast to this (homogenised normality) “‘(p)rimitive’ culture helps them through this 
experience with the result that it is beneficial to the individual, whereas [as Dr. Silverman 
stated] in our ‘rational’ culture ““the individual [schizophrenic] typically undergoes an 
intensification of his suffering over and above his original anxieties.””428  
 
That is, the individual exerts more effort in regaining ‘normality’ than in experiencing the 
crisis. It is only the rational mind that assumes that crisis is a problem to be ‘solved’, instead 
of an occurrence to be experienced and moved through; illustrating the threat that ‘normal’ 
society sees in ‘liminal’ elements. Therefore, this perceived ‘threat’ is purely a collectively 
mainstream response. I am arguing for tolerance while people undergo their crisis, without 
rushing their transformation back into ‘normality’, in many cases with the aid of prescription 
drugs: 
 
The unpalatable aspect of this is the inevitable requirement for hardship as a precondition of 
human growth, of the evolution of consciousness. Most people, obedient to the psychic pull of 
entropy, want ‘salvation in six easy lessons’. This is not possible.429
 
Our addiction to entropy would appear to be due to our terror of any kind of change, which 
occurs as a ‘form of death’ within any type of system.430 Any sort of system; “mechanical, 
biological or psychic, which operates on the principle of negative feedback has… to change in 
such a way as to restore itself to its original state…. If a self-preserving feedback system 
absorbs rather than resists change, it loses its self-sense, its identity – it dies.”431 Thus, if an 
individually or societally projected construct is to change, then effectively it must die. 
However, this death is only a symbolic or kitsch death, since we still exist within the physical 
context of ‘first-order’ reality. 
 
The problem arises when we accept this ‘second-order’ death as a threat to our well being. 
However, this is the nature of life, a nature we have forgotten. “People in grief often express 
their feelings in two familiar phrases: ‘nothing matters any more because my life is over’ and 
‘I can’t go on’…. the old ‘I’ cannot ‘go on’ because it is in the process of restructuring itself; 
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the former (stable) homeostatic controls are too altered to simply return to their prior state.”432 
So, this problem seems to occur primarily when our ‘place’ in the ‘system’ shifts and we lose 
our reference points, or feel lost and liminal. As Godlove argued previously, this is all part of 
the ‘fun and frustration in coming to understand one another’. 
 
Fluid dynamic. 
 
Fritjof Capra follows a similar line to Godlove’s argument and suggests a new holistically 
interrelated systems view of life showing the “interdependence of all phenomena – physical, 
biological, psychological, social, and cultural.”433  In the absence of a “well-established 
framework”434 for this system, he argues for “a network of interlocking concepts and models 
and, at the same time, developing the corresponding social organizations[sic].”435
 
Effectively this is a non-hierarchical ‘grass-roots’ formulation, since all current schemas are 
isolated into their respective specific disciplines. As with religions, most academic disciplines 
argue for their respectively superior ability to understand the nature of human reality, whereas 
this ‘systems view’ argues for a complete interdependence of all disciplines. “Systems are 
integrated wholes whose properties cannot be reduced to those of smaller units” 436, an 
argument reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s linguistic reality. However, reductionism should not 
be ignored as it provides useful descriptions for investigating and classifying individual and 
collective organisms.  
 
“Reductionism and holism, analysis and synthesis, are complementary approaches that, used 
in proper balance, help us obtain a deeper knowledge of life.”437 There is no singular answer 
but rather an inter-dependent fluid dynamic operating in each context. In contrast to 
constructed machines where structure determines activity, ‘the best possible input/output 
equation’ determines organic performativity.  
 
If we adopt a fluid organic perspective for investigating societal contexts, then (emotional, 
psychological, spiritual) evolution operates in harmony with the societal dynamic instead of 
from a marginalized perspective. Effectively, the mainstream adopts a ‘perpetually liminal’ 
ontology and applies that to constructed society.  
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However, the mainstream does not reference, consume and homogenise the liminality (as 
occurred in the Holocaust), but instead consciously embraces the conceptual plurality. 
Unintentional consequences are still a possible problem, but it seems less likely they would 
achieve major proportions without the homogenising hierarchy to condition us through the 
‘information stream’. “Through biology one understands how networks operate, how systems 
evolve, how trends rise and fall.”438
 
While liminality or marginality is useful for spiritual develpoment, that is only because of the 
homogenised perspective of the mainstream. If the complete dynamic was inter-dependent (as 
in systems theory), then greater balance, harmony and consequently freedom presents. 
Systems still evolve, trends still ‘rise and fall’, but they are simply that and no more; 
functions of our biology, and functions that have less impact within the interdependence of 
the pluralistic society. 
 
Capra outlines the manner in which self-organising systems continually interact with their 
environment and establish a twofold dynamic: 
 
(S)elf renewal – the ability of living systems continuously to renew and recycle their 
components while maintaining the integrity of their overall structure – and self-transcendence 
– the ability to reach out creatively beyond physical and mental boundaries in the processes of 
learning, development, and evolution.439
 
The contrast (between hierarchically organising and self organising systems) is quite apparent 
in the maintenance of religious institutions and religious belief structures, where some 
interesting comparisons become evident. If the dynamic of religious belief is organic, then the 
institutionalised aspects of religion are very dogmatic and, in some cases destroy the organic 
fluidity within. If we return to Penner, we are reminded that there is nothing wrong with 
religious language and concepts, but there is also nothing right with them. They simply ‘are’ 
and any attempt to quantify whatever subjective truth they contain is irrelevant and sometimes 
dangerous. 
 
Capra contrasts the maintenance of a self-organising system to a clock mechanism which 
“will proceed according to the second law of thermodynamics, from order to disorder, until it 
has reached a state of equilibrium in which all processes – motion, heat exchange, and so on – 
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have come to a standstill.”440 As with all things its energy came from nothing and will return 
to nothing. We are no different, yet we enjoy self-referential consciousness during our 
disordered time between order(s) and do not wish to ‘come to rest’, at least in the immediate 
future. However, we effectively live ‘at rest’ in our position as a ‘switching interface’, 
contextually dislocated and (with the collapse of observable space) singularly kitsch. 
 
Living organisms (such as ourselves and our societies) “maintain a continuous exchange of 
energy with their environment to stay alive…. [which] allows the system to remain in a state 
of nonequilibrium, in which it is always ‘at work.’”441 This non-equilibrium allows the 
dynamic of self-organisation and the two concepts should not be confused. 
 
Capra illustrates the differences by contrasting the nature of machines with the nature of 
organisms. In ‘second-order’ nature, a machine carries out specific tasks as intended by its 
creator/constructor, whereas (in ‘first-order’ nature) “an organism is primarily engaged in 
renewing itself; cells are breaking down and building up structures, tissues and organs are 
replacing their cells in continual cycles.”442
 
My argument is, that our conception of god(s) derive (at least in the Judeo Christian 
traditions) from something that hierarchically create(s)(d) us. We place ourselves in the 
position of a ‘second-order’ god, as we create machines, tools and other technological 
implements, and then regress this concept back to a ‘first-order’ creative deity, an unmoved 
mover if you will, something to create us along the same lines. But we are not machines. If 
we realise our own ontological nature, as fluidly organic, we should be able to extrapolate a 
concept of deity as a non-existent subjective construct.  
 
Individually and socially, we are engaged in ‘renewing ourselves’ and only ‘carry out specific 
tasks’ as an aid to this. The majority of people work to earn money to buy food, clothing, 
shelter and to fulfil our other desires. We would not choose to carry out these specific tasks if 
our desires were not fulfilled as a reward. Those who find their bliss in their work use this as 
a form of renewal; that is, we gain far more from carrying out the task than by simply 
completing it to gain a reward.    
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Since complex organisms have a finite lifespan (individually and societally) they are renewed 
through “the phenomenon of reproduction, which is characteristic of all life.”443 Apart from 
the individual examples of reproduction (within families) societal concepts are also 
reproduced albeit in an evolutionary manner, until there is no further evolution possible 
within the context. We are organic systems, yet we treat our reality as some ordered 
mechanical context. 
 
This world must instead be interdependent on human thought, as all human thought 
is ‘second-order’ and our physical world is (as previously argued) the ‘first-order’ 
physical consequences of our ‘second-order’ intentions. That is, political claims have 
ontological consequences; or, ‘second-order’ reality has ‘first-order’ consequences. 
                                                 
443 Ibid. 
 122
 Conclusion. 
 
In this argument I have attempted to elucidate the underlying dynamic of our reality, 
together with our conceptual creations. I have hopefully shown that “(h)uman social 
and cultural constructs are the products of intentional actors with certain concerns, 
but once the products are “released” into the world they more or less lead their own 
lives and feed back upon what produced them.”444 This loop follows Haraway’s 
cyborg theory, and shows how unless we become aware of the dynamic, we will 
continually recycle in a closed loop, while referencing against invisible hierarchical 
external manipulation.  
 
Don Cupitt (in referring to the American philosopher Charles Peirce) argues that ‘all 
thought is transacted in signs’445 and that communication is both contextually and 
communally validated: 
 
Our ability to communicate effectively depends upon our prior communal 
development of a large number of agreed scales, each of a broadly evaluative 
kind.446
 
Yet the only ‘agreed scales’ we have within the ‘information stream’ are fed to our 
switching interface and are alterable in a moments notice. This may be supported in 
a religious context with regards to ‘sacred’ architecture, which “(a)ccording to 
Eliade…. provides access to that which is higher, eternal, and ultimately real.”447 
Consequently, I am arguing that even when an object, event or ‘content of a 
statement’ exist(s)(ed), these are purely interpretations that may be taken and 
incorporated into ‘communal developments’ over a period of time. Each of these is 
subjectively true while bearing no objective factual characteristics.  
 
For example if one contrasts a Chinese temple complex with a Christian church, one 
finds “the typical Chinese temple complex seems especially evocative of, and 
accommodating to, a spirituality that finds many sources of the sacred…. Clearly, a 
tradition’s dominant sacred space shapes its characteristic perceptions of the sacred 
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and the very identity of those who worship in a particular way.”448 Therefore, in the 
case of God, we cannot possibly know if it exists or not, since the only common 
frame of reference we have can only contain contextual representations/creations, 
making it impossible to engage in any useful discourse.  
 
Consequently, all revelatory claims with regards to qualities are purely (as previously 
outlined) the fulfilment of human desires. The only possible exception to this 
argument, is the Christian argument for the self revelation of God within the physical 
world in the incarnation, but again, (as we have seen) we have no means of 
determining what is God and what is not (since we have no referent for the singular), 
therefore we cannot speak of God, which reiterates this thesis as a-theistic. 
 
A further paradox exists within the various monotheistic (and especially Christian) 
framework(s), regarding: 
 
[the]struggle to make manifest throughout the human world the reality of the 
Creator’s self-disclosure and to transform the human order in correspondence to the 
Creator’s love and will…. Cosmos and history collapse into each other, establishing 
an unmediated community of Creator and creation, the unification of all reality.449
 
The paradox is that this eventuality would mean the end of contextual and provisional 
reactions to this perceived self-disclosure and an end to the institutions. That is, 
these institutions pretend to seek a goal that would by necessity destroy themselves 
as ‘macrocosmically referenced individuals’, effectively causing their death. For 
‘Cosmos and history’ to collapse into each other, the historical linear tradition would 
dissolve and hence the need for these respective institutions.  
 
We may certainly argue that these institutions are never an ‘end in themselves’, but 
rather are calling for/pointing to the end of the need for their existence. In this manner 
they are theoretically ‘subjectively validated’ yet on a practical level they are not. The 
problem occurs when religious practitioners believe in their institutions and not in 
what these institutions point to. This is a major concern, for as we have seen within 
the context of this thesis, both the religious institutions and the concepts they point to 
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are human creations (since they are contained within language and are therefore 
dualistic), and we have no way of speaking about the singular.  
 
Therefore I am arguing that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between religious 
orthodoxy, and what that orthodoxy points to. I have also argued that the orthopraxy 
is primarily a ‘second-order’ function of humanity’s attempt to fulfil our desire for 
singularity, and therefore within the context of this thesis, I subjectively argue that all 
forms of revelation are purely mythic, which does not in any manner diminish their 
power(s).  
 
However since the only method we have (within monotheistic traditions) for 
accessing the ‘divine self-disclosure’ (regardless of tradition) is to refer to the mythic 
texts, this/these institution(s) continually reinforce the reality of (contextual) 
revelation(s) (or mythic responses) and thus strengthen their contextual hierarchical 
framework(s).  
 
These interpretations are based on the ‘communal development of a large number of 
agreed scales’ and allow the participants to contextually create the ‘second-order’ 
sacred. This is only possible with the absence of any ‘first-order’ sacred. While this 
equates to a form of nihilism, it completely inverts and is radically different from what 
Cupitt suggests “threatens us today. (This) is not so much the bare doctrine that 
nothing exists as rather the fear that nothing has value, there is nothing to live for – 
and therefore the world lacks ‘reality’.”450  
 
It is exactly this ‘lack of value’ that allows us to create value, this ‘nothing to live for’ 
that forces us to create ‘something to live for’ and this ‘lack of meaning’ that forces us 
to create meaning. My argument concludes that there is not and never has been any 
‘first-order’ non-physical reality and it is only this ‘complete absence’ that allows us to 
create our own ‘second-order’ reality.  
 
The variables and conceptual frameworks are unimportant (aside from their physical 
consequences) and are purely a function of the method in operation. Existent and 
non-existent concepts may both enjoy reality in the same context, since existence 
occurs within a strictly physical context, regardless of whether this physical reality 
has been modified by conceptual ‘second-order’ reality.   
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Whether a hierarchically organised cosmological schema (e.g. a religious tradition or 
deep ecological movement) or a nationalist based bureaucracy (e.g. Nazi Germany, 
the current U.S.A. or North Korea), it is the inverted ‘self-disclosure’ or inverted 
kenosis within the conceptual framework being emptied into the space that allows the 
maintenance of the respective institutions, as well as a good dose of fear.                              
 
Russell McCutcheon outlines the operative method this same dynamic takes within 
religious traditions: 
 
(T)here is a thriving industry, manufacturing and marketing what is called “religion,” a 
construct created in workshops housed in an assortment of institutions throughout 
our particular society, not least of which is the academy. The socio-rhetorical critique 
of “religion” revolves around the assumption that – once again to rephrase 
Strenski’s451 earlier thoughts on “myth” – current concepts and theories of “religion” 
have been manufactured according to larger theoretical, professional, and cultural 
projects.452
 
I am arguing that this manipulation forms the context for our concepts of good and 
evil (although I am arguing that these are still relative). The relativity of our 
conceptual ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is underscored by the way we “close” our minds in a 
similar manner to those around us, yet in a quite different way from other groups of 
humans. This “underscores the need to avoid the common epistemological pitfall of 
reifying our own horizons and regarding them as inevitable.”453 They are purely 
subjective, with our collective reality being inter-subjective, not objective.  
 
This is illustrated with the myriad of belief systems that are present in the world. 
As Wittgenstein showed, objects of our ‘second-order’ world bear ‘no kind of 
composition’, and are easily manipulated. It is for this reason that I am arguing 
against any objective truth. When ‘second-order’ objects relate to the ‘first-order’ 
world, they act purely as contextual representations of this world, since we may have 
no knowledge of the true nature of this world or ourselves, but only glimpses of it.  
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In terms of interpreting religious concepts the experience is personal and 
subjective454, whether one receives ‘revelationary insight’ or contextually interprets 
an independent object, in the case of assigning religious characteristics to physical 
locations: 
 
If a belief about the world is true and has sufficient justification or warrant for that kind 
of belief to qualify for knowledge, then we would say that sufficient conditions have 
been met for an individual to gain access to a certain understanding of the world.455
 
Gianni Vattimo, in supporting the need for religious belief, suggests that if “to act in 
conformity with the moral law, is to make any sense, it must be possible to hope 
reasonably for goodness (namely, the unity of happiness and virtue) to be realized in 
another world since it is clearly not given in this one.”456 It is precisely for this reason 
that I oppose such concepts and argue for a nihilistic ‘first-order’ non-existence.  
 
If we choose to ignore (with the exception of subjective religious practice and creative 
visualisation) the reality of another world, then we are forced to create all the qualities 
of this ‘other’ world here on earth. Religion would no longer bear Marx’s ‘opiate of the 
masses’ critique, but could instead become a powerful tool for shifting our 
interpretative reality. Religion would effectively transform its traditionally empirical 
‘non-realist’ position into a realist position.  
 
That is, since all revelation is a human response pointing to something that may or 
may not be real, (since it is impossible to describe a singularity without it becoming a 
tautology), it is a huge risk to take especially when it negates our current physical 
‘first-order’ existence. This is the crux of the a-theistic aspect of my thesis, that we 
create meaning in every aspect of our lives, meaning which may or may not exist, but 
meaning that is never-the-less subjectively real. The only difference between this 
suggested practice and our current ontology within the information stream, is that we 
are consciously referencing concepts against our physical context, hence duality is 
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operating and we are connected to a history (of either a linear or circular nature); we 
are not trapped in the ever-present-present. 
 
I suggest that the intention behind our functional relationality is real, and that we 
create this intention or meaning. Others we meet assess this intention, and these 
others create their own meaning, colouring their own interactions in either a positive 
or negative manner. In this way we sub-consciously condition others and ourselves, 
usually with no knowledge of the implicit dynamics of our interactions, which leads 
me to the nexus. 
 
These beliefs and experiences are therefore faith statements, some of which are 
communally validated and some which are not. Therefore, in my (previously outlined) 
a-theistic argument for non-God, it is purely the ‘complete absence’ of (any ‘first-
order’ non-physical object or God) that allows the different contextual creations that 
are understood through language.  
 
Don Cupitt appears to support this argument and argues (as a non-realist) that 
“(o)bjectivity is given in and with language; it is not, as realists suppose, something 
external to language around which language wraps itself.”457 So objectivity (within the 
context of this argument) is not objective in the world. If we take Rorty’s world, no 
description matches the way ‘the world independently is’ and if we take 
Wittgenstein’s world, no concept bears ‘any kind of composition’ and it therefore 
remains unobservable.  
 
However, I would like to invert Norman Malcolm’s argument that: 
 
“(a) complex thing, to be fully understood, would have to be analysed into its 
constituent elements and the relationships between them. But if those elements were 
themselves complex, then the analysis…. could never display the final and complete 
sense of a proposition.458
 
If all elements/variables were absent, then a referent becomes rather like a fact. That 
is, a referent becomes an ‘actual possibility’ and no more, hence the provisional 
nature of all non-physical scientific truth. Non-physical objectivity is a function of 
language and as such, purely inter-subjective since it is a contextual creation. The 
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objectives that are ‘very possible’ are those that describe the physical laws of gravity 
and other physical consequences of ‘second-order’ intentions.  
 
Other objectivities relating to purely theoretical concepts are more difficult to validate. 
Where one may experience falling off a roof to gain a common frame of reference for 
gravity, one may have more difficulty knowing the concepts of love or anger or God, 
until they strike, and even then our sensitivity to life experience may alter our 
interpretation of our desires in diametrically opposing ways as A.J. Ayer elucidates: 
 
For to say that “God exists” is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be 
either true or false. And by the same criterion, no sentence which purports to 
describe the nature of a transcendent god can possess any literal significance.459  
 
Hence languages offer us a context to loosely conform to, with concepts such as 
love, anger or God being experienced in culturally specific ways.  While a cross-
cultural transmission/expression of these concepts is possible, the fact that it is 
cross-cultural proves its respective contexts. For if this were not the case, these 
concepts would be immediately understandable, without the need for a common 
frame of reference. 
 
Cupitt applies this concept to religious realism showing: 
(t)he crucial objection… is that insofar as it succeeds in being realistic it necessarily 
ceases to be religious…. as an apologist manages to establish a realist interpretation 
of some major doctrine he necessarily destroys it as religion.460
 
Objectivity is not only impossible to apply to religious doctrine (as one may not 
escape their context completely); any attempt to do this destroys the doctrine, as we 
have seen within the post Christian secular society. Through Cupitt’s argument, 
Wittgenstein’s world may be taken as non-real, yet this seems to be purely another 
contextual interpretation, and may itself fall into the category of a language game. 
Antithetically, Rorty’s world may appear to fulfil the ‘realist’ criteria. However, while 
“some formulations of realism and anti-realism overlook the possibility that, as 
conceived, both (conceptions of the world) may be false”,461 most appear to ignore 
the possibility that both may be ‘true’ or more correctly, contextually valid.  
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Consequently, ‘truth’ or ‘validity’ is purely contextual, and consequently, so, by 
necessity is morality. This validity is, in the same way as objectivity, purely inter-
subjective. This concept is most easily outlined with the media’s use of ‘spin-
doctoring’ objects and events to portray truth. Might (in the sense of the largest 
media outlet) is definitely right. Hence while validity concerning physical laws is 
relatively easy to agree on (due to physically observable cause and effect), ‘second-
order’ non-physical validity is somewhat more difficult to agree on, and requires 
communal validation (reinforced through the media).  
 
Sarah Kay, in critiquing Slavoj Zizek appears in favour of this argument, showing: 
 
that the whole point of the dialectical movement is not to cancel out (‘sublate’) its 
negative phase, but to shift perspective with respect to it. ‘The “synthesis” is exactly 
the same as the anti-thesis; the only difference lies in a certain change of 
perspective’ (Sublime Object, 176, emphasis original). This is what is understood by 
‘the logic of the negation of the negation’ – the discovery that negation can be 
experienced positively.462
 
That is, if the physical ‘first-order’ existent world is the thesis, and our conceptually 
created non-physical ‘second-order’ real world is the antithesis, expressed as a 
negation, then we too are a negation, since the synthesis is exactly the same as the 
antithesis. All that is required is to discover “that negation can be experienced 
positively”, and cease filling it up with commodified fetishism(s).  
 
It is tempting at this point to reincorporate part of the thesis, and read it through the 
antithesis. That is, to continue reading our physical context through our conceptual 
filters. However, I am arguing that this is especially problematic within religious 
conceptual frameworks. If we invert our position in a circular manner, (starting at the 
synthesis and branching out into the thesis and antithesis) then the thesis is exactly 
that which we use to fill out the absence of the antithesis. Instead of this practice, I 
am arguing that we should embrace the negation and realise that this allows us our 
‘second-order’ reality, thereby negating this negation.  
 
To apply the practical dynamic of this argument to religious belief, I will now apply 
this ‘negation of the negation’ to two concepts of God, one in the realist (thesis) 
position and one in the non-realist (antithesis) position. In each example an absolute 
                                                 
462 Kay, Sarah. Zizek: A Critical Introduction. p 24. 
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space, or nihilistic non-God will occupy the other position. I will not entertain 
contingent or contextual concepts of God, since these are contained within language, 
and as previously argued, we are unable to speak of God in this way.  
 
Remembering that by the logic of ‘the negation of the negation’, ‘negation can be 
experienced positively’, the synthesis arrives the same location, at least from our 
perspective. That is, if God is placed in the (traditionally) realist position, then the 
“synthesis” takes the antithetical position or the non-real position and therefore 
negates God’s reality. While realist God is still valid it is independent of us and hence 
we may have no knowledge of it, since to transfer Rorty’s ‘conception of the world’ to 
a ‘conception of God’, ‘we have lots of interpretations but none that match the way 
God independently is’. It is important to remember that whether or not God is real is 
irrelevant when we consider our perspective at the position of the synthesis, since if 
God is real we lack a dualistic referent for it.  
 
 
 
 
In the Hegelian dialectic the synthesis becomes the new thesis, so regardless of the 
outcome (from a ‘first-order’ perspective) ‘God’ is either non-real, or ‘non-God’ is real. 
That is, ‘God’ that we may speak of must be a tautology, since for us to be able to 
speak of it; it is contained within language and is reducible to a ‘simple object with no 
kind of composition’. Diametrically opposing this; ‘non-God’ (or the previously 
outlined ‘complete Absence of any ‘first-order’ divinity) is the space that allows for the 
projection of our conceptual creations.  
 
It is for this reason that the ‘negation can be experienced positively’, not in recreating 
realist God (since we can not match an interpretation to the way God possibly 
independently is), but rather by positively experiencing the negation of God. This 
absence allows one to either create and project a contextual God, or accept the 
space that is the nihilistic absence of God, as God from the synthesis perspective.463  
 
However it must be remembered that this positive experience of the negation does 
not allow for the realist God at the synthesis position. This is because we are at the 
synthesis position, and while our entire conceptual reality (as well as this thesis) is a 
                                                 
463 See diagram 4.1. 
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faith statement, contained within language, it is all we have to work with. Because 
this argument refers to religious reality, the only possibility we have to speak of the 
way God might ‘independently be’ is to speak of the non-God, that is, to speak of 
negative theology. We cannot speak of anything else. 
 
So when God is placed in the non-realist antithesis position, and non-God is placed 
in the realist thesis position, the synthesis again takes the position of the antithesis, 
hence God is non-real. However while non-real God occupies the synthesis position, 
real non-God is still in the thesis position. When this negation is again experienced 
positively, it negates God, since non-God464 was real and hence God was non-real. 
Again, realist non-God is irrelevant when we consider our perspective at the position 
of synthesis. “Emphasizing that there is a double negation at the heart of the 
dialectical process, Zizek insists that far from sustaining identity in imaginary 
wholeness, it radically undoes it.”465
 
Malcolm Norman would also appear to agree with this ‘undone identity’ stating:  
 
philosophers have frequently supposed that their mission was to reveal the general 
features of reality…. But as early as 1931 Wittgenstein had arrived at the realization 
that there is nothing to be discovered!466
 
Although Wittgenstein’s world is different from Rorty’s, the same dynamics apply.  
In Wittgenstein’s world, no concept bears ‘any kind of composition’, and in Rorty’s 
world, no interpretation or description matches the way ‘the world independently is’; 
therefore ‘there is nothing to be discovered’ and God/the world is therefore 
unobservable. Hence “Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief attached no value 
to intellectual proofs of God’s existence, and very little value to theological 
formulations in general.”467
 
Zizek furthers my previous argument regarding the tautology that it is to speak of 
God, with concepts of the universal and the singular, showing that they are 
misaligned since “one of the signifiers has no corresponding signified…. This signifier 
is represented as S1 because, having no signified, it is singular, whereas all the other 
                                                 
464 The best definition for non-God, is the absence of God that allows our conceptual ‘second-order’ 
creation of God. It is primarily a term of convenience to provide a context for this argument. 
465 Kay, Sarah. Zizek: A Critical Introduction. p 25. 
466 Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein. A religious point of view? p 79. 
467 Ibid. p 90. 
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signifiers are double, hence S2.” 468 So, with no signified aspect S1 is singularly 
unique and can “also be referred to as the ‘unary feature’.”469  
 
This ‘unary feature’ differs from normal signs or names as these qualities or powers 
occur “in the medium of language, not in the medium of reality. In a sense the name 
is a ‘duplicate’ of the object….in a different medium.”470 With no signified or S2, 
nothing can ‘have all of the powers’ of S1 even within the reality of language. What is 
perhaps more pertinent is that nothing can be the ‘duplicate’ of the ‘unary feature’; 
therefore it is effectively an absence or what Zizek terms an ‘empty space’. 
 
One example of this is “the claim that we are a ‘free society’… (for instance, one way 
we regularly show we are a ‘free society’ is by locking up people who threaten our 
‘freedom’). But in everyday thinking, the term ‘free society’ becomes ‘filled out’ with 
all the aspects of our society which we treasure (family life, nice cars, TV, etc.)”471  
The important point here is that the term ‘free society’ is a (‘second-order’) political 
claim and not an ontological (‘first-order’) one, yet it is taken as an ontological claim 
and thus becomes our ontology. That is, in this case there is no distinction between 
‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ reality. 
 
Not only is our ‘free society’ negated, but the space cleared by its absence is filled 
with things which ensure those within it are unable to be free. Our ability to be ‘free’ 
becomes commodified in comparison to the economic and commodified limits of 
‘unfree societies’. Thus we are not ‘free’. This inversion or negation of this freedom is 
then held to be the original concept, even though it is antithetical.  
 
Zizek concludes my argument in one of his earlier works, with reference to a 
favourite scene from a high-class restaurant in Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil.472 When 
the ordered food arrives, it: 
 
is a dazzling colour photograph of the meal on a stand above the plate, and on the 
plate itself a loathsome, excremental, paste-like lump:473 this split between the image 
of the food and the Real of its formless excremental remnant exemplifies perfectly the 
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disintegration of reality into the ghostlike, substanceless appearance on an interface 
and the raw stuff of the remainder of the Real…474
 
I have intentionally omitted the conclusion of the above quotation, for Zizek argues 
that only a return to “the paternal Prohibition/Law… guarantees our access to 
reality.”475 This is a ‘second-order’ claim within the context of this thesis, and as such 
is no better or worse than many other claims. I am arguing that only by 
acknowledging the shift ‘of reality into the ghostlike’ will we regain our access to the 
real, and the context of this regaining is irrelevant so long as it does not contribute to 
the same ‘first-order’ consequences.  
 
Recognising that our ‘first-order’ ontology is conceptually manipulated by ‘second-
order’ political claims, is an argument that is also supported by Laing’s nexus, and 
supported by Zizek, who concludes that: 
 
Via a process of double reflection, then, S1 appears first as negating the rest of the 
set, S2 – that is, as unique relative to it fullness – and next, via a negation of this 
negation, when the rest of the set is reflected into it, as typifying the universal in the 
form of the particular.476
 
However, instead of embracing the negation of the negation and accepting it ‘as 
unique relative to its fullness’, we continually ‘fill it out’ and then hold this concept to 
be the original ‘unary feature’ which, of course it is not. If my conclusion is reducible, 
it is reducible to this. Humanity should spend less time concerned with the variables 
of our belief systems, and spend more time concerned with the method and dynamic 
behind it. This tool is available to all, not just a ‘small coterie of experts.’ We should 
reducceo ur egos. 
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